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The Plausibility of Research Programs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Arthur B. Millman*
Affiliation:
University of Southern California

Extract

Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Lakatos have held that no objective reasons can be given for entertaining or working on a particular new theory, paradigm, or research program. I shall examine one of the-main cases they appeal to and argue that, although Copernicus's theory was not superior to the Ptolemaic theory according to any of the usual criteria for comparing theories, it did have features which provided the early Copernicans with good reasons for entertaining it and trying to develop it further.

Let us begin with Feyerabend. He has been a vigorous advocate of a “principle of proliferation” according to which scientists should always be considering alternatives to the theories currently accepted. Indeed, Feyerabend holds that scientists should strive to “invent and elaborate theories which are inconsistent with the accepted point of view, even if the latter should happen to be highly confirmed and generally accepted” ([4] , p.26).

Type
Part IV. History and Philosophy of Science
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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