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Analyticity Without an Observational-Theoretical Distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Mark Tamthai
Mark Tamthai*
Affiliation:
Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand
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Extract

The problem we are concerned with in this paper is that of separating out, among the consequences of an empirical theory, those that play a purely linguistic role (the “analytic” consequences) from the rest. This problem we shall refer to as the problem of theoretical analyticity. In a sense, the problem was solved by Carnap's proposal (p. 270) to consider the analytic consequences to be exactly the consequences of a special sentence associated with each theory, along with results of Winnie, which gave further justification to this proposal. Besides Carnap's proposal there have been other attempts to solve the problem of theoretical analyticity (e.g.,). However, all such attempts (including Carnap's) have relied upon a distinction between observation and theoretical terms in the language of empirical theories. Since there has been much debate concerning this distinction, and since there do not seem to be any good reasons why “analyticity” should be tied so closely to it, we shall attempt to attack the problem of theoretical analyticity without assuming an observation-theory distinction among the vocabulary of empirical theories.

Type
Part III. Observation and Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 109 - 115
Copyright
Copyright © 1978 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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