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Public Choice in Political Science: We Don't Teach It, But We Publish It

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Jay Dow
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Austin
Michael Munger
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Abstract

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Type
News
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1990

Footnotes

*

Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Public Choice Society, Tucson, Arizona, March 1990. We wish to thank John Carter, James Enelow, William Keech, and William Mitchell, as well as conference participants Dennis Mueller and Gordon Tullock at Public Choice, for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors of interpretation or presentation are of course ours alone.

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