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Liberalism and Juridical Democracy, or What's Interesting About Interest Group Liberalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Extract
Why is The End of Liberalism important? This work is not without its flaws or critics, but it is indisputably important—not because it is right, although I believe it largely is—but because it is provocative, stimulating, and pertinent to both scholai and practitioner.
The Culprit
One of the more revealing and less pedantic kiss-and-tell books to come out of a presidential administration was David Stockman's (1987) The Triumph of Politics. In it, Stockman detailed his dismay over the failure of the Reagan Revolution—an effort to establish “minimalist government” (p. 9) incorporating “sweeping, wrenching change” that “would have hurt millions of people” (p. 11) by such actions as “elimination of subsidies to farmers and businesses … an immediate end to welfare for the able-bodied poor … [and] no right to draw more from the Social Security fund than retirees had actually contributed” (p. 12).
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- Copyright
- Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1990
References
Notes
1. It is important to note that Lowi's work stood on the shoulders of others, especially Schattschneider (1960) and McConnell (1966).
2. The concept of juridical democracy was introduced in the final chapter of The End of Liberalism, but it served as the basis for his succeeding book, The Politics of Disorder (1971).
3. The first articulation of the arenas notion appeared in Lowi (1964). For a compilation of works using the scheme, see Spitzer (1987). Interestingly, The End of Liberalism began as “The Arenas of Power.”
4. The “Second Republic” appeared in the second edition of The End of Liberalism (1979, ch. 10), and is a springboard for much of the analysis in The Personal President.
5. Hamilton's blueprint for the presidency was profoundly institutional, in that it called for such constitutional features for the president as life tenure, an absolute veto, sole power to appoint cabinet secretaries, and substantial warmaking powers. See Farrand (1966, 1, 282–93).