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Remarks of Christopher Greenwood

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

Christopher Greenwood
Christopher Greenwood*
Affiliation:
International Law, London School of Economics; Queen‘s Counsel, Essex Court Chambers, London; for the United Kingdom in, Bankovic
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Abstract

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Type
“Bombing for Peace: Collateral Damage and Human Rights”
Information
Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting , Volume 96 , 2002 , pp. 100 - 104
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2002

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References

1 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Others Contracting States, Eur. Cl H.R. 52207/99, 41 ILM 517 (2002).

2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 1, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].

3 Bankovic, supra note 1 at para. 80. The Court contrasted Article 1 of the European Convention with the position under common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135, which requires each state “to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”

4 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226. Article 15 of the Convention does, however, permit states to derogate from certain provisions of the Convention in time of war or national emergency.

5 Id.

6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedforsignature May 23, 1969, S. Exec. Doc. L., 92-1 (1971), 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].

7 See Golder v. United Kingdom, 56 ILR 200, para. 29 (1975); Johnston v. Ireland, 9 EHRR 203, para. 51 (1987); Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 EHRR 99, para. 73 (1995) (Preliminary Objections).

8 Bankovic, supra note 1 at para. 56 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 6, at art. 31(1)).

9 Id. at para. 57 (citing Viennac Convention, supra note 6, at art. 31 (3) (c)).

10 Id. at paras. 59-61.

11 Vienna Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.

12 Supra note 8, at paras. 62-65.

13 The Court has recently relied on this principle in its three decisions on sovereign immunity and the Convention: Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 34 EHRR 273 (2002); Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 34 EHRR 302 (2002); McElhinney v. Ireland 34 EHRR 322 (1995).

14 Sir RobertJennings, The Proliferation of Adjudicators Bodies, Asilbull., Nov. 1995 (EDUC. Resources on Int’l L., at 6).

15 Bankovic, supra note 8, at para. 71.

16 Loizidou, 20 EHRR 99; Cyprus v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25781/94 (2001).

17 Bankovic, supra note 8, at para. 80.

18 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 EHRR 439 (1989).

19 Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, Eur. Ct. H.R. 39473/98, available at <http://www.echr.coe.int>.

20 Issa v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 31821/69 (2000), available at <http://www.echr.coe.int>.

21 ICTY: Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the Nato Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 ILM 1257, paras. 71-79 (2000).