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Conscientious State Legislators and the Cultures of Compliance and Llberauzation Relating to International Trade Agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

Matthew Schaefer
Matthew Schaefer*
Affiliation:
University of Nebraska College of Law
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Abstract

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Type
International Law and the Work of Federal and State Legislators
Information
Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting , Volume 95 , 2001 , pp. 52 - 57
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2001

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References

1 See generally Schaefer, Matthew, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship Between Free Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA and Eyäng the FTAA, 23 Can.-U.S. L.J. 441 (1997)Google Scholar.

2 Id. at 449-54.

3 I borrow the term conscientious legislator and adapted arguments in this section from Brest, Paul, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (discussing with respect to federal legislators).

4 See Schaefer, Matthew, The ‘Grey Areas’ and ‘Yellow Zones’ of Split Sovereignty Exposed by Globalization: Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation, and Intrusion to Escape an Era of Misguided ‘New Federalism,’ 24 Can.-U.S. L. J. 35, 55-62 (1998)Google Scholar.

5 See Matthew\Schaefer, , Are Private Remedies in domestic Courts Essential for International Trade Agreements to perform Constitutional Fundions with Résped to Sub-Federal Governments? 17 Nw.J. Int’l L. & Bus. 609, 637-42 (1996)Google Scholar.

6 Tiefer, Charles, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 Mlnn. J. Global Trade 45 (1998)Google Scholar.

7 I borrow this term from Henkin, Louis, International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions, 216 Receuildes Cours 21 (1989)Google Scholar (discussing in the context of nation states).

8 See Schaefer, Matthew, Twenty-First Century Trade Negotiations, the U.S. Constitution, and the Elimination of U.S. State-Level Protectionism, 2 J. Int’l Econ. L. 71, 96-99, 101 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 141, 181-82 (1992).

10 See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).

11 See Schaefer, Matthew, Continuing Misconceptions of the Impact of International Trade Agreements on U.S. Federalism: The Beer II Case, Its legacy, and Recent Developments, J. L. & Pol. in Int’l Bus. (forthcoming 2001)Google Scholar.

12 See Schaefer, supra note 8, at 111.