1 Freund, “Social Justice and the Law,” in Social Justice 93, 116 (Brandt ed., 1962).

2 Pound, ‘ ‘ Philosophical Theory and International Law,'’ 1 Bibliotheoa Visseriana 71, at 89 (1923). Cf. Yuen-li Liang, “Eoscoe Pound and the Science of International Law,” 22 Tulane Law Eev. 369, 382 (1948).

3 Brierly, ‘ ‘ Régles Générales de Droit de la Paix,'’ 58 Hague Academy Eeeueil des Cours 5 (1936); De Visscher, Theory and Eeality in Public International Law 153, 207-10, 215, 341, 353, 360 (Corbett trans., 1957). Cf. Lauterpacht, “Brierly's Contribution to International Law,” in Brierly, The Basis of International Law, p. xxv (1958).

4 “Conflict” is, of course, a broad and elusive term which has been made a central focus for numerous types of studies in the physical and social sciences and the humanities. It has been suggested that every controversy between two people is in fact a controversy involving six components. This is believed to be overly modest since at least ten can be identified, i.e., A and B; A's conception of himself and B 's conception of himself; A's conception of B and B's conception of A; A's conception of B's conception of B; B's conception of A's conception of A; A's conception of B's conception of A and finally B's conception of A's conception of B. The literature is enormous especially if extended to embrace problems of war, revolution and causation. In light of present types of game theory and other forms of system analysis (both deterministic and stochastic) it is instructive to observe the extent to which conscious human choice is considered among the operative determinants of conflict. The familiar logical distinction between “necessary” and “sufficient” causes finds loose application in distinctions made by historians between causes which are variously labeled as “incidental” vs. “fundamental“ “accidental” vs. “purposive“ “temporary” vs. “ persistent “ ;“proximate” vs. “ remote “ “ initial “ vs. “ ultimate “ “ personal “ vs. “ social “ and “ostensible” vs. “ real . “ Types of interpretation include genetic, probabilistic, economic, psychological, political and social or cultural. Emphasis on “ forces “ which, however caused, are beyond immediate human control seemed to dominate the so-called revisionist historians of World War I. Thus Professor Sidney Fay appeared to emphasize: (1) the system of secret alliances; (2) militarism; (3) nationalism; (4) economic imperialism and (5) the newspaper press. See Pay, The Origins of the World War 32-34 (2d ed., 2 vols, in 1, 1947). Cf. Sehmitt, The Coming of the War 1914, pp. 3-7 (2 vols., 1930), who stresses “industrialism,” and of. the prophetic volume of Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (1915, reprint, 1942). These types of interpretation should be contrasted with the controversial analysis of Beard and Tansill. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War (1948); Tansill, Back Door to War (1952). For a more balanced appraisal, see Perkins, “Was Eoosevelt Wrong,” 30 Virginia Quarterly Review 354 (1954). For more general treatment, see Wright, A Study of War (1942); “The Nature of Conflict,” 4 Western Pol. Quarterly 193 (1951); Bernard, War and Its Causes (1944); Stratton, Social Psychology of International Conflict (1929); Lasswell, “Social Conflict,” in 2 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 194, 195 (1937). One way to analyze conflict is to reduce the aims and aspirations of actors into objectively asserted claims (interests) and to categorize such interests in light of those which are incompatible. This is exemplified in the wry remark of Charles V that he wanted exactly what his brother wanted, viz., the City of Milan. For a penetrating analysis of the deeper problems of logical explanation involved in treating history (including conflict situations) see Nagel, “Problems in the Logic of Historical Inquiry,” in his The Structure of Science, Ch. 15 (1961), which should be read in conjunction with the two preceding chapters dealing with methodological problems in the social sciences and explanation and understanding in the social sciences. See also, Social Science Research Council, Committee on Historiography, Bulletin No. 64 (1954). Of course many technical aspects of conflict analysis are now being published through the medium of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. For an early popular account of game theory which draws on the abstruse work of von Neumann and Morgenstern, see McDonald, Strategy in Poker, Business and War (1950).

5 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740.

6 The case is hypothetical. It is suggested in Patterson, Goble and Jones, Cases and Materials on Contracts 1089 (1957).

7 Housing Authority of Bristol v. East Tennessee, etc. Power Co., 183 Va. 64, 31 S.E. 2d 273 (1944). The jury decided that the Housing Authority had assumed the risk of the unanticipated event. Perhaps one factor leading to the jury's conclusion was the fact that, prior to entering into the contract, the Housing Authority had called in its own experts to make findings as to the natural gas resources.

8 Santayana, Persons and Places 136 (1944).

9 347 U. S. 483 (1954). The case is reported in full in Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht (1956).

10 The problem of determining the ‘ ‘ meaning'’ ascribed to terms and the manner in which single terms are defined is too technical to be treated in an address of thirty minutes. The reference to “ six “ ways of defining terms refers to: “stipulative,” “ostensive,” “contextually oriented,” “operationally oriented,” “customary usage” and the method of “intellectual apprehension.” If we move from single terms to phrases and sentences, the problem becomes even more complex. The science of communication (to which lawyers have, perhaps, paid too little attention) reaches beyond the mere analysis of types of “signs” to the problem of the relationship between “signs,” “objects” and the “expectations” aroused by their use both in the minds of the user and the hearer or reader. For an over-all indication of the subject matter embraced in the discipline (of which “semantics” form only a part), see C. W. Morris, “Foundations of the Theory of Signs,” in International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences Vol. 1, No. 2 (1938). Quite obviously any science of communication is rested on epistemological assumptions concerning the operation of the human mind, which may not be fully exposed. When these assumptions remain hidden, disputes over the “meanings” attached to terms and their sway over decision-makers create a barrier between disputants. This is revealed in the current controversy over the “policy oriented” approach. Critics fail to meet it at its own level of discourse when they assume that terms have a single meaning which furnish “norms” of decision instead of guides to analysis. Again, the problem is too complex to justify elaboration in the context of an address.

11 Brierly, “Law, Justice and War,” in The Basis of International Obligation 275 (Lauterpacht ed., 1958). Cf. Lauterpacht, loc. cit. note 3, at p. xxix.

12 Bloomfield, Evolution or Revolution 119-123 (1957).

13 See Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, esp. pp. ix, x, 33-37; 45-49 and 119- 225 (Holcombe ed., 1959).

14 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 213 (1961).

15 For an elaboration of the points, see Calvocoressi, World Order and New States, esp. Chs. 1 and 5 (1962). Cf. Miller, “The Adequacy of International Law in Meeting the Challenges of the Present Era,” 8 Howard Law J. 86-94 (1962).

16 I have drawn upon Eapoport, Fights, Games and Debates, esp. pp. 299-305 (1960), and C. L. Stevenson, “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement,” in Feigl and Sellars, Headings in Philosophical Analysis 587-593 (1949).

17 Warburg, Germany—Bridge or Battleground 119-123 (1946).

18 Rapoport, note 16 above, at p. 300. Cf. ibid, at p. 273 et seq.

19 Particular reference is here made to Northrop, ‘ ‘ Contemporary Jurisprudence and International Law,” 61 Yale Law J. 623 (1952), reprinted as “The Method and Neurophysiological Basis of Physical Anthropology” in Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience 102 (1959).

20 1960 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 254-260.

21 The simile is to be found in Franks, Central Planning and Control in War and Peace 40 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1947). The discussion in the text follows remarks which I have heretofore stressed in other contexts, e.g., 1960 Proceedings, Assoc, of Am. Law Schools 53-57, and “Some Aspects of Law and Diplomacy,” in 91 Hague Academy Eecueil des Cours 518-525, 532 (1957).

22 U. S. 1 (1824).

23 The examples in the text have been suggested by the Stanford Kesearch Institute study on “Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States,'’ which forms one of the thirteen studies prepared under the Direction of the Committee on Foreign Eelations, United States Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., and S. Ees. 31 and S. Res. 250, 86th Cong. The study is printed in Vol. I, pp. 93-198 (1960).