Leaving out of account the eighteenth century natural-law thinking which still persists in some quarters, we may say that until recently Anglo-American jurists stood for a political interpretation of jurisprudence. English jurists maintain that position today. But the present fashion in America seems to be an economic interpretation. Not only is such an interpretation insisted on by many juristic writers, but nearly all recent discussions of judicial organization and of judicial power with respect to legislation proceed upon that basis. We have, then, two prevailing types of thinking in this country on the part of those who purport to treat the law scientifically. The one type is represented by the historical school, and is idealistic and political. The other type is represented by a phase of the sociological school—an early phase if we look at the development of that school the world over—and is mechanical and economic. The former looks on law as something which is found. It holds law to be something discovered rather than made. The latter looks on law as a product of the human will. The latter is an imperative theory, the former is not. Thus the distinction between these two types of thinking connects itself at once with a controversy that has gone on since the beginnings of juristic science.