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Exit Options and the Effectiveness of Regional Economic Organizations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2013

Julia Gray  and
Jonathan B. Slapin
Julia Gray
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
Jonathan B. Slapin
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Abstract

Regional economic organizations (REOs) proliferate in the developed and developing world. However, there is wide variation in both their institutional structure and the degree to which they achieve their goals. This article presents a theoretical framework and empirical evidence to explain the variance in the institutional design and effectiveness of these agreements. It argues that the conditions that produce effective and broad agreements are not a function of design, but rather of exogenous factors. If countries within the REO have fewer options for world trade beyond the REO, they will develop strong institutions and make substantial use of them. This study presents a new cross-regional dataset, compiled from expert surveys, to test these arguments. It shows that expert evaluations of how well a REO functions - including its ability to meet its own goals and the ambition of those goals—hinge less on that agreement's legalization and more on the trade opportunities that REO members faced when the institution was formed.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , December 2013 , pp. 281 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Julia Gray is Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania 208 S. 37th Street, Room 217, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6215, United States (jcgray@sas.upenn.edu). Jonathan B. Slapin is Associate Professor, University of Houston, 447 Philip Guthrie Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204-3011 (jslapin@central.uh.edu).

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