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Much Ado About Very Little: Reply to Herron

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Lawrence S. Rothenberg  and
Mitchell S. Sanders
Lawrence S. Rothenberg
Affiliation:
Department of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208. e-mail: lawrence-rothenberg@kellogg.northwestern.edu
Mitchell S. Sanders
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556. e-mail: msander1@nd.edu
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Abstract

While Herron (2004, Political Analysis 12:182–190) is correct that sensitivity to changes in underlying scale and how they affect estimates and inferences is generally important, our assumption in Rothenberg and Sanders (2000, American Journal of Political Science 44:310–319) that W-NOMINATE scales can be directly compared from one Congress to another to study legislative shirking is quite defensible because scale variability is not a substantial problem. Not only are the assumptions in our original analysis regarding variability very reasonable, because any variability is quite small, but effects on consistency are marginal and, to the degree that they are relevant, indicate that our test of the shirking hypothesis is conservative. Furthermore, even generous estimates of variability in W-NOMINATE between one immediate Congress and another have little impact on results. In addition, Herron's analysis includes an unaddressed censoring problem that again, while unlikely to have much substantive relevance, indicates that Rothenberg and Sanders have worked against themselves in trying to find shirking. In conclusion, the issues that Herron highlights are of marginal consequence for the original analysis and, to the extent they matter, only buttress the findings generated and the inferences drawn.

Type
Replications and Extensions
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , Spring 2004 , pp. 191 - 195
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Political Methodology 2004 

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References

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