Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-m8qmq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T05:13:56.924Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

How Diffusion of Power in Parliaments Affects Voter Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Orit Kedar
Orit Kedar*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, ISR, 426 Thompson Street, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI, 48106. e-mail: oritk@umich.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I analyze how the diffusion of power in parliaments affects voter choice. Using a two-step research design, I first estimate an individual-level model of voter choice in 14 parliamentary democracies, allowing voters to hold preferences both for the party most similar to them ideologically and for the party that pulls policy in their direction. While in systems in which power is concentrated the two motivations converge, in consensual systems they diverge: since votes will likely be watered down by bargaining in the parliament, outcome-oriented choice in consensual systems often leads voters to endorse parties whose positions differ from their own views. In the second step, I utilize institutional measures of power diffusion in the parliament to account for the degree to which voters in different polities pursue one motivation versus the other. I demonstrate that the more power diffusion and compromise built into the political system via institutional mechanisms, the more voters compensate for the watering down of their vote by endorsing parties whose positions differ from their own views.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 13 , Issue 4: Special Issue on Multilevel Modeling for Large Clusters , Autumn 2005 , pp. 410 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aardal, Brent, and Valen, Henry. Norwegian Election Study 1989 [computer file]. Norwegian Gallup Institute [producer]. Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) [distributor].Google Scholar
Achen, Christopher H. 2005. “Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation: Beyond Regression Analysis.” Political Analysis. doi:10.1093/pan/mpi033.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alvarez, R. Michael, and Nagler, Jonathan. 2000. “A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections.” British Journal of Political Science 30(1): 57–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blais, André, Nadeau, Richard, Gidengil, Elisabeth, and Nevitte, Neil. et al. 2001. “The Formation of Party Preferences: Testing the Proximity and Directional Models.” European Journal of Political Research 40 (August): 81–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES MODULE 1, 1996–2001. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor]. (Available from www.cses.org.)Google Scholar
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES MODULE 2, 2001–2005. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor]. (Available from www.cses.org.)Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Döring, Herbert. 1995. “Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda.” In Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, ed. Döring, Herbert. New York: St. Martin's, pp. 223–246.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Grofman, Bernard. 1985. “The Neglected Role of the Status Quo in Models of Issue Voting.” Journal of Politics 47(1): 230–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heath, A. et al. British General Election Study, 1987 [computer file]. 2nd ed. Colchester, UK: UK Data Archive [distributor], SN: 3887.Google Scholar
Herron, Michael. 2000. “Post-Estimation Uncertainty in Limited Dependent Variable Models.” Political Analysis 8(1): 83–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hinich, Melvin J., Henning, Christian H. C. A., and Shikano, Susumu. 2004. “Proximity versus Directional Models of Voting: Different Concepts but One Theory.” In Interdisziplinaere Sozialforschung. Theorie und empirische Anwendungen, eds. Henning, Christian H. C. A. and Melbeck, Christian. Campus: Frankfurt: pp. 37–56.Google Scholar
Iversen, Torben. 1994. “Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies: A Test of Three Models of Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (February): 45–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kedar, Orit. 2005. “When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections.” American Political Science Review 99 (May): 185–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, and Wittenberg, Jason. 2000. “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.” American Journal of Political Science 44 (April): 347–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lacy, Dean, and Paolino, Philip. 1998. “Downsian Voting and the Separation of Power.” American Journal of Political Science 42(4): 1180–1199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lacy, Dean, and Paolino, Philip. 2002. “Policy Expectations Voting in the States: The 2001 Gubernatorial Elections in New Jersey and Virginia.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL.Google Scholar
Laver, Michael, and Hunt, Ben W. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and King, Gary. 2000. “No Evidence on Directional vs. Proximity Voting.” Political Analysis 8(1): 21–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Meguid, Bonnie M. 2002. “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Rising Party Success.” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.Google Scholar
Powell, G. Bingham, and Whitten, Guy. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science 73(2): 391–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubin, Donald B. 1987. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York: John Wiley and Sons.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strøm, Kaare. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Strøm, Kaare, and Leipart, Jorn Y. 1993. “Policy, Institutions, and Coalition Avoidance: Norwegian Governments, 1945–1990.” American Political Science Review 87 (December): 870–887.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Westholm, Anders. 1997. “Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity Theory of Electoral Choice.” American Political Science Review 91 (December): 865–885.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Kedar supplementary material

Supplementary Material

Download Kedar supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 49.3 KB