The Baltic Sea is one of the major maritime highway. During the middle ages, many of its southern ports belonged to the Hanseatic League. Since then, maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea has grown, having its trading activities internationalised through the diffusion of new shipping technologies. In 2007, the volume of cargo handled in Baltic ports was approximately 850 million tons. Moreover, the Baltic has an excellent network for passenger transportation: approximately 30 million people travel every year by ferry.

Nowadays, its winter traffic represents about one quarter of the annual traffic. Nevertheless winter navigation is relatively recent in the extremities of the gulfs of Bothnia and Finland. Indeed, at the beginning of maritime transportation, the activity was seasonal and occurred only in open water, threatening to stop completely in winter due to sea ice formation. But for over a century, the evolution of materials and shipping techniques has allowed continuous maritime navigation. Despite the fact that sea ice conditions require the assistance of icebreakers, adapted port infrastructures, the introduction of ice classes and winter restrictions to the navigation, harsh winter conditions inevitably induce an increase in maritime incidents. There is the question of the future of winter navigation in the context of global warming and a possible significant reduction of sea ice.

Antarctic tourism has experienced a boom period over the last thirty years. Beginning in the 1980s, the number of tourists who visited the continent annually began to rise sharply, and within the space of twenty years the numbers had increased by more than six hundred percent. Despite a global recession and downturn in visitor numbers over the last two austral seasons, the expectation is that Antarctic tourist numbers will trend upward again as the world tourism market recovers and the demand for Antarctic visits increases. In a continent renowned both as the last great global wilderness and as a place dedicated to scientific research in the interests of humankind, tourism on this scale presents a formidable range of issues for the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) to contend with. This article suggests that the rapid growth in Antarctic tourism, and the impacts of that tourism coupled with the lack of a comprehensive regulatory and management framework for tourism now pose a considerable challenge to both the Consultative Parties and to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) itself. The obligations and duties of the ATCPs under the Antarctic Treaty and other ATS instruments require a robust, strategic response by them to the issues and concerns generated by the growth of tourism. What is needed, it is argued, is for the parties to initiate a more interventionist pro-active policy approach to create a holistic, binding tourism framework so that they may fulfill more effectively their stewardship and governance roles in Antarctica, prevent degradation of Antarctica's environment, and reduce risks to tourists themselves.

The EU ban on the import and commercialising of seals and seal products in the EU market, has attracted intense attention in recent years. As seal products mostly originate from outside the EU, it is argued that the EU action has been discriminatory and hence contrary to the WTO regulations. Canada and Norway have been critical of the EU regulation and have initiated dispute settlement procedures within the WTO since most of the products that enter into the internal market are mainly from these countries. The ban also provoked anger within the Inuit and other indigenous communities, mainly from Canada and Greenland. Although the EU regulation provides an exception for Inuit and indigenous hunts and the subsequent commercialisation of resulting products into the internal market, the exception suffers from clarity and lacks proper implementation procedures. The regulation is predicted to lead to the ultimate disappearance of the seal market in the EU, which directly affects the Inuit and other indigenous peoples engaged in sealing activities. They may lose their means of subsistence. While analysing the critical issues concerning the EU and the WTO regulations and its exceptions, the article focuses on the human rights perspective of the Arctic indigenous peoples affected by the EU ban.

This note considers the 10–11th March 2013 Falkland Islands referendum. As accredited observers, the authors were granted access not only to the work of the international observation mission but also the actual organisation of the referendum itself. The background to the referendum is explained and thereafter the result and longer-term significance is considered. Notwithstanding Argentine opposition to the referendum, the latter was widely considered within the Falkland Islands and beyond to be the most significant event since the 1982 South Atlantic conflict.

This study examines the change in visitor pattern since 1968 at the Ukrainian Vernadsky station (formerly the British Faraday station), one of the most popular Antarctic research stations that support non-governmental visits. The station became one of the major tourist destinations as a result of the revision of tourism policy following the transfer of the station from the UK to Ukraine in 1996. Since then a considerable increase in the number of both cruise ships and yacht visits have been observed. The longest time series of data on non-governmental activity at a research station in Antarctica has been collected from 1968 to 2010. This study examines site-specific guidelines at the station and indicates policies for better visitor management within the Antarctic Treaty System.

Since the early part of the 20th century, the federal government has engaged in a long and slow process of devolution in the Canadian Arctic. Although the range of powers devolved to the territorial governments has been substantial over the years, the federal government still maintains control over the single most important jurisdiction in the region, territorial lands and resources, which it controls in two of the three territories, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. This fact is significant for territorial governments because gaining jurisdiction over their lands and resources is seen as necessary for dramatically improving the lives of residents and governments in the Canadian north. Relying on archival materials, secondary sources, and 33 elite interviews, this paper uses a rational choice framework to explain why the Yukon territorial government was able to complete a final devolution agreement relating to lands and resources in 2001 and why the governments of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have not. It finds that the nature and distance of federal-territorial preferences, combined with government perceptions of aboriginal consent and federal perceptions of territorial capacity and maturity, explain the divergent outcomes experienced by the three territorial governments in the Canadian arctic.

The following acronyms are employed: AIP: Agreement-in-Principle; DTA: Devolution Transfer Agreement; GEB: gross expenditure base; GN: Government of Nunavut; GNWT: Government of Northwest Territories; NCLA: Nunavut Land Claims Agreement; NTI: Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated; NWT; Northwest Territories; ON: Ontario; TFF: Territorial Formula Financing; UFA: Umbrella Final Agreement; YDTA: Yukon Devolution Transfer Agreement; YTG: Yukon Territorial Government; YK: Yukon;

Energy companies and builders of energy transportation infrastructure find it difficult to evaluate Arctic natural gas development. Their business critical decisions require the assessment of not just technical risks but intangible issues regarding the future and past interactions of an energy system. These concerns call attention to the problem of time. In this article, I examine three types of time from which efforts to commercialise Alaska natural gas are drawn into the temporality of global energy markets: (1) volatility time, in which price spikes determine outcome; (2) government time, in which law and regulation assist in commercial enterprise, and; (3) entrepreneurial time, in which individuals of industry take initiative. These types of expectation in Alaska natural gas development correspond consequently to three methods for fixing time and space. In short, they are three development time-spaces or chronotopes. By offering these forms of time, taking place between 2000–2005, this article draws attention to concrete visualisations of constructing a pipeline to deliver natural gas from Alaska to continental United States. I argue that these efforts represent precise and well-marked steps and reflect a specific course of development, passing from self-confident ignorance, to self-reflective consultation and finally to genuine understanding.

In 1819, the Russian government launched two expeditions: the first squadron of two ships departed to explore the southern polar areas, and the second set out for the northern polar areas. The expedition to the southern polar areas took place under the command of Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen. Up to the present day, very little information is available, from the Russian literature, about the initiator and main goals of the expedition. At the same time, the travels and main results of the expedition have been widely popularised, but not necessarily accurately, in Russian as well as in English. On the basis of recently discovered documents, this article attempts to establish who the initiator of these Russian expeditions was, how the expeditions were prepared, and whether the main tasks of the expeditions were realised. The conclusion is that Jean-Baptiste Prevost de Sansac, Marquis de Traversay was the initiator of the Russian Antarctic expedition, not the Russian navigators Adam Johan von Krusenstern, Otto von Kotzebue, Gavrila A. Sarychev or Vasilii M. Golovnin as stated in Soviet publications. The real aim of the expedition was to discover the Antarctic continent which would have added glory to de Traversay as well as to Emperor Alexander I and, in a wider sense, also to the Russian empire. All dates are given according to the old style calendar. The difference with the new style calendar is 12 days.

Radiocarbon age determinations on shells of the common mussel (Mytilus edulis) show that this species was present in central East Greenland from approximately 9500 to 5400 cal. years BP. It probably arrived first at the outer coast, at a time when the inner parts of the fjords were still occupied by glaciers. After perhaps a millennium it spread to the central fjord region where it lived for at least three millennia. The former occurrence of Mytilus edulis indicates higher sea surface temperatures than at present and more extensive fjord water, which may have been a consequence of higher summer insolation, perhaps amplified by changes in atmospheric circulation, bringing more warm air masses to the north. The timing of the Holocene thermal maximum in the lowlands of East Greenland was later than recorded in the Renland ice core. This delay was probably related to the continuing recession of the margin of the Greenland ice sheet in the early Holocene. The lingering decaying ice meant that large lowland areas were still ice covered, and other areas were cooled by the ice.

When the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition 1955–1958 advance party sailed from the Millwall Docks in November 1955, bound for the Weddell Sea, their departure was the product of five years of intensive effort on the part of Vivian Fuchs to achieve the first overland crossing of the Antarctic continent. This paper investigates the many obstacles that had to be overcome leading up to Theron sailing and explains the manner in which they were overcome by the Fuchs-Wordie-Clifford triumvirate. The British Foreign Office was particularly opposed to the expedition with the office's focus on sovereignty rather than science while an alternative proposal from Duncan Carse raised a unique set of difficulties. The withdrawal from involvement by the Scott Polar Research Institute Director, Colin Bertram, indicated further disaffection. Most important, if political and financial goals were to be met, was the need for participation by several Commonwealth countries of which New Zealand was the essential partner. Fortunately, the vigorous efforts of a few Antarctic enthusiasts in New Zealand were successful in moving their government to assert its long dormant position in the Ross Dependency. New Zealand's commitment turned the tide of commonwealth apathy towards the TAE. Although the TAE preceded the IGY, events, including the dominating IGY presence of the United States, caused the two projects to become tightly interwoven. For these reasons the years leading up to the departure of Theron were as intriguing as the crossing journey itself.

This paper considers the role of the Arctic Council (AC) and its relationship to the future or even futures. Factors such as sea ice thinning and melting permafrost, alongside globalisation, have been cited as consequential in transforming the Arctic region. While we might be cautious about the novelty of change per se, there is a need for further debate about how the ‘future’ is imagined and put into practice. Exploring different logics, including precaution, pre-emption and preparedness, consideration is offered on how the AC attempts to anticipate the future. The contentious role of observers is investigated by way of an example, and it is concluded that there is more work to be done in terms of how different futures are assembled, mobilised and put into practice.

Douglas Mawson's Australasian Antarctic Expedition (1911–1914) has been portrayed in various narratives, usually with a focus on the Far-Eastern Sledging Journey from which Mawson made the epic trek back to the main base at Cape Denison alone, after the deaths of his companions, Xavier Mertz and Belgrave Ninnis. His is the sole eyewitness account of that sledging journey in 1912–1913, except for two handwritten pages of Mertz's diary, reproduced in Mawson's The home of the blizzard; two typed, imperfect copies of the diary, transcribed before it disappeared; and another transcript of the two pages published in the German edition of Mawson's book. This article traces the early journey of that missing diary and, drawing also on the available transcripts, re-interprets the content of those two pages. The content is compared with corresponding passages in associated documents and the subjectivity and limitations of these documents, when consulted for research purposes, are discussed.

The availability of modern computer models of plausible atmospheric pressure versus altitude for a grid of points over the earth's surface permits a reexamination of Richard Byrd's dead reckoning navigation on his flight in May 1926 from Spitsbergen northwards and his return. Although details of how Byrd converted atmospheric pressure to altitude are ambiguous, the recent atmospheric models probably indicate a small systematic bias that would cause Byrd to overestimate his dead reckoning distance traveled. The same models provide a range of computed winds versus time, altitude, and location, leading to the conclusion that, if Byrd's reported winds during his flight are correct, it was the result of a very unusual and fortuitous circumstance.

Captain Scott has been criticised for indecisiveness and for not making use of the dog teams for his own relief in his Terra Nova Expedition (1910–1913). This essay will demonstrate how a mistake made in Roland Huntford's double biography of Scott and Amundsen in 1979, repeated in polar writing by various authors until the present day, has maligned Scott's reputation. In fact, Scott left appropriate written orders in October 1911 for the polar party's relief by the dog teams, orders that were not subsequently implemented by the men at base. A re-examination of the actions and roles of two expedition members in particular, Lieutenant E.R.G.R. Evans and Surgeon Edward Atkinson, suggests strongly that misjudgements back at Cape Evans led to the failure of the mission to rescue Scott and his polar party. In this account all distances are in geographical miles.

In 1946, the Ainu Association of Hokkaido was established by the Ainu to reclaim their lands. The 1970s and 80s saw that the association successfully put pressure on the Hokkaido Prefectural Government to take social welfare measures for the improvement of their life and make a new law counter to the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act. In 1997 the Japanese Government enacted the so-called New Ainu Law. However, it is totally different from the original draft made by the Ainu. The law does not designate the Ainu as indigenous people. Further, it is outstripped by the decision of Nibutani Dam Case that, for the first time in Japanese history, recognised Ainu right to culture and indigenousness in Japanese territory. In 2008 the Japanese Government finally recognised the Ainu as indigenous people in the wake of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, the Ainu do not yet have any indigenous rights. This note chronologically outlines Japan's post-war Ainu policy, and moreover explores who and what has influenced Ainu policy and the law.

Sightings of killer whales (Orcinus orca) are increasing in the eastern Canadian Arctic, but trends in the western Arctic have not been thoroughly examined. We summarise killer whale observations from the Canadian Beaufort Sea, primarily from traditional ecological knowledge interviews and group workshops conducted in 1993 and 2006–2007. After correcting for duplicative reports, we documented 31 observations occurring from the 1940s to 2000s (18 of the 31 observations could be attributed to a particular decade whereas others could not). Killer whales are rare in the Canadian Beaufort Sea, with only 1–5 reported sightings per decade since the 1940s (median = 3). In 1993 only 15% of Inuvialuit hunters in three communities had observed them, including some sightings in Alaska. Recent mapping workshops (2006–2007) collected only eight sightings from 128 participants in all six regional communities. Local observations indicate no apparent increase in killer whale presence in the western Canadian Arctic. Sightings were widely distributed across the region, although concentrated in the Mackenzie Delta area with few to the east. Killer whales are annually observed as far north as Barrow, Alaska, but do not appear to make regular eastward movements and are rare in Canadian waters.