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Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Branden Fitelson
Branden Fitelson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison
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Abstract

In a recent article, Wayne (1995) offers a critique of Horwich's (1982) Bayesian explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity. Presently, I argue that Wayne's reconstruction of Horwich's account is not faithful to Horwich's original presentation. Because Wayne's reconstruction is uncharitable, his criticisms turn out to be off the mark. I try to provide a more faithful and charitable rendition of Horwich's account. Unfortunately, even this more charitable reconstruction of Horwich's position seems—at best—to provide an incomplete explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 652 - 660
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Ellery Eells, Malcolm Forster, Geoffrey Hellman, Mike Kruse, Patrick Maher, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706, USA.

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