No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
“Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extract
Some recent discussions of A. N. Whitehead's treatment of the problem of value have stressed the point that his work in this field is open to serious objection. For example, Professor John Goheen claims that Whitehead's attempt to indicate distinguishing characteristics of experience of “the Good”, is too general to be adequate. He also suggests that this generality of approach makes it impossible for Whitehead to differentiate between different species of value. Further, according to Goheen, Whitehead involves himself in confusion when he claims that satisfaction (value) is achieved when experience is characterized by order (unity); and yet he also suggests that in some cases, the presence of disorder makes possible a higher type of satisfaction. Professor P. A. Schilpp agrees with Goheen in feeling that Whitehead's explanation of the good life in terms of “pattern” is too vague. In Schilpp's opinion, Whitehead does not answer the basic question: “What kind of pattern?” There is a further objection to Whitehead's “theory of the close connection between morality and beauty,” because at times it looks like an actual identification. Schilpp also objects to what appears to be Whitehead's identification of “good” with “interest”. Finally, it is claimed by Schilpp that Whitehead subordinates goodness to beauty. This interpretation is apparently supported by Prof. George Morgan who states: “Truth and moral values are instrumental except in so far as they enhance beauty.” Professor B. Morris objects to Whitehead's attempt to apply the mathematical method to aesthetic experience. He suggests that the method of symbolic logic is too abstract to deal adequately with concrete aesthetic data. Professor J. W. Blyth, as the result of his examination of Whitehead's theory of truth, reaches the conclusion that “the various elements involved in Whitehead's theory of truth cannot be brought together in one coherent and consistent system.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1944
References
1 John Goheen, Whitehead's Theory of Value, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp Ed.), pp. 444, 458. Hereafter this article will be referred to as G.
2 G p. 456.
3 P. A. Schilpp, Whitehead's Moral Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp Ed.), p. 615. Hereafter this article will be referred to as S.
4 S p. 604.
5 S p. 611.
6 S p. 607.
7 George Morgan, Whitehead's Theory of Value, The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XLVII, 1937, p. 309.
8 Morris is referring to Whitehead's suggestion that perhaps in the distant future, symbolic logic “will become the foundation of aesthetics”. See B. Morris, The Art-Process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 485. Hereafter this article will be referred to as Morris.
9 J. W. Blyth, Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 92–3.
10 A. N. Whitehead, Religion In The Making, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1926, p. 100. Hereafter this book will be referred to as R.
11 A. N. Whitehead, Science And The Modern World, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1929, p. 136. Hereafter this book will be referred to as S.M.W.
12 The relative uniqueness of Whitehead's position in this regard is aptly stressed in Morgan's article, mentioned above.
13 A. N. Whitehead, The Aims Of Education, Williams & Norgate, London, 1929, p. 63. Hereafter this book will be referred to as A.E. Also, A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1938, p. 16. Hereafter this book will be referred to as M.
14 S.M.W. p. 152.
15 S.M.W. p. 278.
16 A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 1933, p. 11. Hereafter this book will be referred to as A.
17 A. N. Whitehead, Process And Reality, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1929, p. 27. Hereafter this book will be referred to as P.R.
18 P.R. pp. 35 and 37.
19 P.R. p. 135.
20 P.R. p. 71.
21 P.R. pp. 184–286.
22,23 S.M.W. p. 136—emphasis mine.
24 P.R. p. 97.
25 M p. 28—emphasis mine.
26 A. N. Whitehead, Immortality, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 692—emphasis mine. Hereafter this article will be referred to as I.
27 M p. 161.
28 M p. 11—emphasis and brackets mine.
29 M p. 44—emphasis mine.
30 Percy Hughes, Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate?, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 296. Hereafter this article will he referred to as Hughes.
31 G p. 444.
32 I pp. 695–6.
33 I pp. 695–6.
34 I p. 686. See the reference to Plato's “ideas” in this connection. P.R. p. 526, p. 693.
35 Personal identity is maintained when a number of actual entities form a linear succession, “a historical route in which some defining characteristic is inherited by each occasion from its predecessors.” P.R. p. 301.
36 I p. 689.
37 P.R. pp. 39–40.
38 P.R. p. 46.
39 P.R. p. 367—brackets mine.
40 See P.R. p. 368.
41 P.R. p. 380.
42 G p. 454.
43 G p. 453.
44 G p. 459—emphasis mine.
45 It is interesting to note that in considering Whitehead's use of the term ‘valuation’, Goheen restricts himself to the third usage and apparently pays no attention to the other two.
46 Professor P. A. Schilpp agrees with Goheen that Whitehead is a devotee of the interest theory of value. “Professor Whitehead's moral philosophy could well be classed among the so-called ‘moral interest theories’.” Schilpp, however, notes that “It must, nevertheless, be said that the ‘interest-side’ is by no means the only constitutive aspect of Mr. Whitehead's notion of ‘importance’ ” (S p. 572). Yet apparently Schilpp does not take this qualification very seriously because his final point of view is, “Importance, as we have seen, is largely, though not exclusively, reducible to personal reactions in terms of interest” (S p. 573).
47 R p. 100.
48 R p. 158.
49 P.R. p. 526—brackets mine.
50 P.R. p. 525—brackets mine.
51 A p. 309. Note also the following:
“A truth-relation will be said to connect the objective contents of two prehensions when one and the same identical pattern can be abstracted from both of them. They each exhibit the same partial pattern, though their omitted elements involve the differences which belong to their diverse individualities.” (A p. 310.)
52 A p. 269.
53 A p. 270.
54 A proposition, according to Whitehead, has as its logical subject an actual entity or a group (society) of actual entities. (e.g., a stone is a society of actual entities.) Its predicate is an eternal object or a group of eternal objects. (The term “pattern” is also used in place of the term eternal object.) A proposition is defined as “the possibility of that (a certain specified) predicate applying in that assigned way to those (specifically indicated) local subjects.” (P.R. p. 394. Brackets mine.) (See also pp. 282–283, and A p. 312.)
55 See A p. 313. In terms of the definition of truth noted above, it will be realized that the type of truth relation under consideration does not involve an identical pattern (eternal object) in both the thing and the proposition about the thing. For example, the proposition: This stone is grey, involves the eternal object “grey” as a possibility. If the stone actually exemplifies the eternal object grey (i.e. is grey), then there is a truth relation between the proposition and the stone, as perceived. Thus in terms of Whitehead's technical lanaguage, it is a case of the conformation of appearance (the proposition) to reality (the stone). (For a more detailed discussion of this topic see A. H. Johnson, The Psychology of Alfred North Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, forthcoming issue.)
56 A p. 314.
57 A p. 315.
58 A p. 314.
59 A p. 317.
60 A p. 318.
61 A p. 318.
62 P.R. p. 291.
63 A. N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason, Princeton University Press, 1929, p. 31.
64 A p. 309.
65 A p. 311.
66 A p. 285.
67 S.M.W. pp. 262–3.
68 S.M.W. p. 266.
69 S.M.W. pp. 266–7.
70 A p. 313.
71 P.R. p. 281.
72 A p. 313.
73 A p. 321.
74 A. N. Whitehead, Symbolism, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1927, p. 39.
75 M p. 14.
76 A p. 324.
77 “A distinction must now be made between two meanings of the term Beauty. There is the primary meaning (involved in the definition just quoted)—But in the analysis of an occasion, some parts of its objective content may be termed Beautiful by reason of their conformal contribution to the perfection of the subjective form of the complete occasion.” (A 328—brackets mine.) Whitehead, however, concentrates his attention on the primary meaning.
78 See P.R. p. 526.
79 A p. 324.
80 A p. 324.
81 A p. 324—emphasis mine.
82 A p. 339.
83 A p. 339.
84 A pp. 330–1. Whitehead illustrates this point by very apt references to various cultures, Greek, Hellenistic, Byzantium and Chinese. See A pp. 331–2.
85 A p. 132.
86 A. N. Whitehead, Remarks, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI, 1937, p. 186.
87 A. N. Whitehead, Mathematics and The Good, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp Ed.) p. 678. Hereafter this book will be referred to'as M.G.
88 Morris p. 485.
89 Professor Wilbur Urban also accuses Whitehead of placing too much stress on the importance of symbolic logic in connection with aesthetic matters. For a refutation see: A. H. Johnson, The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10, 1943, p. 50.
90 I p. 692.
91 M p. 164.
92 M.G. pp. 672–3.
93 In the course of this discussion the terms “good” and “goodness” will be used as synonyms.
94 M.G. p. 678—emphasis mine.
95 M p. 19.
96 G p. 445. Schilpp offers the same objections. See S p. 615.
97 See reference, later in this article, to Whitehead's discussion of the difficulty involved in formulating minutely specific rules of conduct.
98 S p. 595.
99 P.R. p. 19.
100 S p. 596—emphasis mine.
101 S p. 572.
102 M.G. p. 679.
103 M.G. p. 680—emphasis mine.
104 M p. 108.
105 P.R. p. 171.
106 M p. 109.
107 R p. 98.
108 See G pp. 456–8.
109 M.G. p. 679. Whitehead also distinguishes triviality from evil. There is a triviality which “lies in the anaesthesia by which evil is avoided.” From this point of view, evil is the half-way house between perfection and triviality.“ (A p. 355.)
110 M.G. p. 679.
111 I pp. 686–7.
112 S.M.W. p. 276.
113 P.R. p. 517.
114 R p. 95.
115 R p. 97.
116 M pp. 69–70.
117 M pp. 69–70.
118 R p. 155.
119 R p. 155—emphasis mine.
120 P.R. p. 531—brackets and emphasis mine.
121 Whitehead's discussion of “peace” in Adventures of Ideas is relevant here. Peace is defined as “the intuition of permanance—it sees the tragedy (pain, frustration, loss) as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal—What might have been and was not: What can be. The tragedy was not in vain.” (A p. 369.)
122 S. L. Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God, University of Wisconsin Press, 1942, p. 39. Hereafter this book will be referred to as Ely.
123 See Professor Charles Hartshorne's criticism of Ely on this point. Is Whitehead's God the God of Religion? Ethics, Vol. LIII. 1943, p. 223; also, Whitehead's Idea of God, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.) pp. 522–7.
124 M p. 18.
125 A pp. 374–5.
126 M p. 165.
127 M p. 20.
128 P.R. p. 526.
129 See A pp. 376–7.
130 M p. 17.
131 M pp. 17–8.
132 A.E. p. 23.
133,134 A.E. p. 49.
135 Ely p. 52. See also previous references to Schilpp and Morgan in connection with this point.
136 Ely p. 52.
137 A. N. Whitehead, Autobiographical notes, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 8.
138,139 A p. 13—emphasis mine.
140 A pp. 341–2—emphasis mine.
141,142,143 A p. 342.
144 A p. 344.
145 A p. 345.
146 A p. 190.
147 M.G. p. 674—emphasis mine.
148 M.G. p. 678.
149 A p. 345—emphasis mine.
150 A. N. Whitehead, An Appeal to Sanity, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 163, 1939, p. 315.
151 A. N. Whitehead, The Study of The Past—Its Uses And Its Dangers, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 11, 1932–3, p. 440. Hereafter this article will be referred to as Study.
152 Study p. 441.
153 Study p. 443.
154 See S.M.W. pp. 280–1.
155 M p. 26.