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Science and Idealism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Robert F. Almeder*
Affiliation:
Georgia State University

Abstract

In this essay it is argued that (1) if the process of scientific inquiry were to continue forever, then science would ultimately terminate in the acceptance of a single theoretical framework better than all conceivable others, and (2) there is some evidence in favor of the view that science will continue unto eternity but no evidence in favor of the contrary view.

In arguing for claim (1) it is claimed that if we are to understand the sense in which science is progressive we must mean either that science progresses by approximating a final goal which, given an infinite process, will be attained, or that science progresses simply in the sense of expanding a body of funded knowledge such that, given an infinite process, the body of funded knowledge expands ad infinitum. That the second member of this disjunct is false and that the first cannot be shown to be false follows largely from a discussion and rejection of all available arguments (five) against the hypothesis proposed in (1). Further, an argument provided by Peirce (and suitably supplemented) provides additional positive evidence for the truth of the first member. No such argument exists for the truth of the second member.

In arguing for claim (2) it is held that evidence in favor of a belief can be purchased by the positive moral value likely to occur as a result of accepting the beliefs, and that there is at least one moral value which accrues to the belief that inquiry will continue forever but which does not accrue to the belief that inquiry will not continue forever. In short, while there is no systematic evidence for or against the view that inquiry will continue forever, we have the right (and duty) to believe that inquiry will continue forever but we do not have the right (and duty) to believe the contrary.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I wish to credit W. Kneale, W. Westcott, and an anonymous referee from Philosophy of Science for helpful criticisms of an earlier draft. Also, the Research Foundation of the State University of New York provided the tangible support for research which led to the writing of this paper.

References

REFERENCES

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