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Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Valerie Gray Hardcastle*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
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Abstract

In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can “illuminate” issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this “illumination” would work between psychology and neuroscience.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , September 1992 , pp. 408 - 428
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Patricia Churchland, Todd Jones, Sandra Mitchell, and Adina Roskies for their conversations. I also owe a debt of gratitude to two anonymous referees who gave very detailed and helpful comments. Finally, I would especially like to thank Patricia and Philip Kitcher for their patient readings of several drafts of this paper and their insightful criticisms of my thoughts on reductionism, explanatory extension, and all that.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061–0126, USA.

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