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Probability Kinematics and Representation of Belief Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Zoltan Domotor
Zoltan Domotor*
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Abstract

Bayesian, Jeffrey and Field conditionals are compared and it is shown why the last two cannot be reduced to the first. Maximum relative entropy is used in two kinds of justification of the Field conditional and the dispensability of entropy principles in general is discussed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , September 1980 , pp. 384 - 403
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This paper grew out of numerous discussions with Mario Zanotti since December 1978 and a talk I gave at the University of Western Ontario in the fall of 1979. I wish to thank Bill Harper, Roger Rosenkrantz and some anonymous referees for their extensive comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.

References

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