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A Note on A Definition of ‘Observation Term‘
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extract
In a recent series of articles, and in his latest book, James Cornman has proposed and defended a definition of ‘observation term’. The original definition appeared in [3]; in [4] Cornman defended this definition against some criticisms offered by P. K. Machamer ([5]), and also revised it somewhat; the revised definition is restated in [2] and used there in Cornman's discussion of the identity theory of the mind. Finally, in [1], Cornman again invokes his definition in defending scientific instrumentalism, and defends it against various generalized attacks on the very possibility of drawing a distinction between observational and theoretical terms which will do the sort of work Cornman wants it to do.
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- Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
†
I wish to thank Philosophy of Science's anonymous referee for helpful comments.
References
REFERENCES
Cornman, J. “Craig's Theorem, Ramsey Sentences, and Scientific Instrumentalism.” Synthese 25 (1972): 82–12810.1007/BF00484999CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornman, J. Materialism and Sensations. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1971.Google Scholar
Cornman, J. “Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism.” Philosophy of Science 35 (1968): 45–63.10.1086/288186CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornman, J. “Observing and What it Entails.” Philosophy of Science 38 (1971): 415–417.10.1086/288382CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Machamer, P. K. “A Recent Drawing of the Theory/Observation Distinction.” Philosophy of Science 38 (1971): 413–441.10.1086/288381CrossRefGoogle Scholar