One recent problem in philosophy of science is, “Ought a methodology be construed, not merely as an instrument of appraisal, but also as a source of advice to the practising scientist(s)?” Imre Lakatos ([7], p. 174 and 178) and John Worrall ([11], p. 163), among others, have answered the question in the negative. Alan Musgrave disagrees. In a section entitled, “Appraisals and Advice,” in [9], Musgrave attempts to give us a deductive argument in support of his claim that methodologies should be construed as giving advice. After briefly explaining the plausibility of the claim, I shall present Musgrave's argument in full, and then examine each of his premises. I will try to show that his attempt to answer the above question in the affirmative raises some interesting questions, and which must be answered if his venture is to succeed. I should add, that if my objections are successful against Musgrave's attempt, it would be a Pyrrhic victory: I am neither an inductivist nor do I think that the answer to the question should be in the negative.