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Laws and Possibilities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
The initial part of this paper explores and rejects three standard views of how scientific laws might be systematically connected with physical necessity or possibility. The first concerns laws and their consequences, the second concerns the so-called counterfactual connection, and the third concerns a possible worlds construction of physical necessity. The remaining part introduces a neglected notion of possibility, and, with the aid of some examples, illustrates the special way in which laws reduce or narrow down possibilities.
- Type
- Laws, Possibility, and the New Instrumentalism
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 719 - 729
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association
References
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