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In Epistemic Networks, Is Less Really More?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sarita Rosenstock ,
Justin Bruner  and
Cailin O’Connor
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Abstract

We show that previous results from epistemic network models by Kevin J. S. Zollman and Erich Kummerfeld showing the benefits of decreased connectivity in epistemic networks are not robust across changes in parameter values. Our findings motivate discussion about whether and how such models can inform real world epistemic communities.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 2 , April 2017 , pp. 234 - 252
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We would like to thank Liam Kofi Bright, Remco Heesen, Bennett Holman, Aydin Mohseni, Hannah Rubin, Kim Sterelny, Jim Weatherall, and Kevin Zollman for helpful comments and feedback, as well as Jeff Barrett, Simon Huttegger, Louis Narens, Don Saari, Brian Skyrms, and the other participants in the UC Irvine Social Dynamics research group. We are also grateful for questions and comments from the audiences at the following 2016 conferences: Medical Knowledge in a Social World at UC Irvine, Models and Simulations at the University of Barcelona, the Formal Epistemology Workshop at the University of Gröningen, and the Lund Conference on Games, Interaction Reasoning, Learning, and Semantics. This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant STS-1535139.

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