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Enumerative Induction and Lawlikeness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Wolfgang Spohn
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Abstract

The paper is based on ranking theory, a theory of degrees of disbelief (and hence belief). On this basis, it explains enumerative induction, the confirmation of a law by its positive instances, which may, indeed, take various schemes. It gives a ranking theoretic explication of a possible law or a nomological hypothesis. It proves, then, that such schemes of enumerative induction uniquely correspond to mixtures of such nomological hypotheses. Thus, it shows both that de Finetti's probabilistic representation theorems may be transformed into an account of confirmation of possible laws and that enumerative induction is equivalent to such an account. The paper concludes with some remarks about the apriority of lawfulness, or the uniformity of nature.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 164 - 187
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am indebted to two anonymous referees whose rich remarks led to numerous improvements and clarifications of this paper.

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