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Dutch Books and Logical Form

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Joel Pust
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Abstract

Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) have been invoked to support various alleged requirements of rationality. Some alleged requirements, such as probabilistic coherence and conditionalization, are plausible. Others, such as credal transparency and reflection, may be less so. Anna Mahtani has argued for a new understanding of DBAs that, she claims, allows us to keep the DBAs for the plausible requirements while rejecting those for the implausible ones. I argue that Mahtani’s new account fails, as (a) it does not support highly plausible requirements of rational coherence and (b) it does not succeed in undermining the DBAs for credal transparency or reflection.

Type
Decision Theory and Formal Epistemology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 961 - 970
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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