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Dray on Rational Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

James Leach
James Leach*
Affiliation:
College of William and Mary
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 1966 , pp. 61 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © 1966 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

1 The form of each is as follows:

(H)

  1. 1.

    1. Agent A was in a situation of kind C.

  2. 2.

    2. A was a rational agent at the time.

  3. 3.

    3. Any rational agent, when in a situation of kind C, will probably do x.

  4. 4.

    4. Therefore, A did x.

    (R)

    1. 1.

      1. Agent A was in a situation of kind C.

    2. 2.

      2. When in a situation of kind C, the thing to do is x.

    3. 3.

      3. Therefore, A did x.

      See C. Hempel, “Reasons and Covering Laws in Historical Explanation,” in S. Hook (Ed.), Philosophy and History (New York: New York University Press, 1963), pp. 154-155.

2 L. Krieger, “Comments on Historical Explanation,” ibid., p. 137.

3 B. Mazlish, “On Rational Explanation in History,” ibid., p. 28.

4 William Dray, “The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered,” ibid., p. 107.

5 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 129.

6 Ibid., p. 130.

7 Ibid., pp. 130-131.

8 P. Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 95.

9 A. Donagan, “Explanation in History,” in Gardiner (Ed.), Theories of History (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 432.

10 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, p. 132.

11 Ibid., p. 132.

12 Ibid., pp. 132-133.

13 Ibid., p. 133.

14 K. Nielsen, “Rational Explanations in History,” in S. Hook, op. cit., p. 308.

15 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, p. 124.

16 Hempel, op. cit., p. 146.

17 Dray, “The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered,” in Hook, op. cit., p. 115.

18 Cited by Nielsen, “Rational Explanations in History,” ibid., p. 318.

19 Dray, “the Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered,” ibid., pp. 132-133.

20 Ibid., p. 133.

21 R. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (New York: Harpers, 1953), Chapter VI; C. W. Churchman, Theory of Experimental Inference (New York: Macmillan, 1948), Chapter XV; R. Rudner, “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. XX (1953).