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Discussion: Professor Nagel on the Cognitive Status of Scientific Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Henry C. Byerly
Henry C. Byerly*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
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Extract

1. Introduction. Professor Nagel's account of the “cognitive status” of scientific theories has been attacked by P. K. Feyerabend [5] and M. B. Hesse [8] in terms of his alledgedly misguided distinction between experimental laws and theories. The difficulty lies, these critics agree, in Nagel's attempt to find a stable basis for scientific theories in an observational basis of experimental laws. Both Feyerabend and Hesse note the vacillation in Nagel's account of the stability of the meaning of experimental terms and in his discussion of the status of observational as opposed to theoretical terms. They find Nagel too “positivistic” and see as a first step toward a more adequate account of scientific theories the abandonment of the theoretical-observational dichotomy as having more than a pragmatic significance. Nagel's discussion of the theoretical-observational dichotomy is, I agree, inadequate in certain respects. I shall, however, suggest a quite different remedy from those of Feyerabend and Hesse, one that depends neither on a phenomenalistic reduction of theoretical entities nor on a blurring of the theoretical-observational dichotomy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , December 1968 , pp. 412 - 423
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1968

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References

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