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Discussion: Eliminativism and Methodological Individualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Harold Kincaid
Harold Kincaid*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Alabama at Birmingham
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Abstract

Tuomela (this issue, pp. 96–103) raises several objections to the analysis and critique of methodological individualism in my (1986). In what follows I reply to those criticisms, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the alleged reductions provided by Tuomela and others fail, because they either presuppose rather than eliminate social predicates or do not avoid the problem of multiple realizations; (2) supervenience does not guarantee that the social sciences are reducible, because merely describing supervenieence bases leaves numerous questions unanswered, and (3) the eliminativism that Tuomela favors verges on being self-refuting and is highly implausible short of a detailed empirical critique of the social sciences, something Tuomela does not provide and something there is little reason to think can be provided.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 141 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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