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Direct Inference in the Material Theory of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

William Peden
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Abstract

John D. Norton’s “Material Theory of Induction” has been one of the most intriguing recent additions to the philosophy of induction. Norton’s account appears to be a notably natural account of actual inductive practices, although his theory (especially his answer to the Problem of Induction) has attracted considerable criticism. I detail several novel issues for his theory but argue that supplementing the Material Theory with a theory of direct inference could address these problems. I argue that if this combination is possible, a stronger theory of inductive reasoning emerges, which has a more propitious answer to the Problem of Induction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 4 , October 2019 , pp. 672 - 695
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I thank Julian Reiss, Wendy Parker, Nancy Cartwright, Peter Vickers, Robin Hendry, Donal Khosrowi, Tamlyn Munslow, Chien-Yang Huang, Richard Williams, and the rest of the CHESS team for their assistance in the development of this article. I also thank Rune Nyrup, John Norton, and an anonymous referee for their help.

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