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The Changing Relationship between Theory and Experiment in Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Robert Sugden
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Abstract

Until recently, economics was generally understood to be a nonexperimental science with a hypothetico-deductive methodology. This article considers how the methodology of economics has changed with the spread of experimental methods. Initially, most experimental economists saw their work as testing pre-existing theories. However, a method of systematic inductive enquiry in which theory plays a less central role is now evolving. This method is structured around the discovery and progressive refinement of regularities. “Exhibits”—experimental designs that generate significant regularities—are taking over some of the functions formerly performed by theoretical models.

Type
Philosophical Issues in Experimental Economics
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2008 , pp. 621 - 632
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

My work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom (award no. RES 051 27 0146).

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