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Causation: Interactions between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

James Woodward
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Abstract

This article explores some ways in which philosophical theories of causation and empirical investigations into causal learning and judgment can mutually inform one another.

Type
Psychology and Neuroscience
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 5 , December 2012 , pp. 961 - 972
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Alison Gopnik and the other members of the McDonnell Collaboration on Causal Learning for many stimulating discussions.

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