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(C) Instances, the Relevance Criterion, and the Paradoxes of Confirmation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Phillip J. Rody
Phillip J. Rody*
Affiliation:
Ottawa
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Abstract

The Relevance Criterion of confirmation gained prominence as the underlying principle of the class-size approach (CSA) to Hempel's paradoxes of confirmation. The CSA, however, yields counter-intuitive results for (c) instances, and this failing cast serious doubt on the acceptability of the Relevance Criterion. In this paper an attempt is made to rescue the Relevance Criterion from this embarrassment. This is done by incorporating that criterion into a new resolution of the paradoxes, a resolution based on a theory of selective confirmation and a distinction between mere confirmation in principle and evaluative confirmation (E-confirmation).

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , June 1978 , pp. 289 - 302
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

†

This paper is adapted from chapter IV of my Ph.D. dissertation “Confirmation And Paradox,” University of Toronto, 1976. An earlier version of the paper was read at the 1976 Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Quebec City. The paper was read in my absence by Diane Huberman. I wish to thank the Canada Council for generous financial support, and Keith Arnold, Diane Huberman, Andrew Lugg, and John Thorp for helpful discussions on the topic.

References

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