^1. A paper presented before the Section of Psychology, of the Michigan Academy of Science, held at Ann Arbor, March 16, 1934. For some of the ideas and phraseology used in the paper, the author is indebted to Korzybski's work, Science and Sanity, Science Press Printing Company, Lancaster, Pa., 1933.

^2. When someone is actually able to distinguish in immediate experience, temporally or otherwise, between the fact of being stimulated and a fact of sensation correlated with the stimulation, then it will be time to think of sensations, or “sensa,” as occurring within the brain. “Sensation” and “stimulation” are two ways of denoting precisely the same fact, where the stimulation is “adequate,” Effective stimulation of the foot of a “spinal” man would just as truly be a case of sensation as if the man were normal and could verbally report the fact of stimulation in addition to twitching his foot. As a matter of fact, the word “sensation,” as being a traditional mythological holdover from pre-scientific psychology, and thus an inapposite denotation of its designate, should be entirely eliminated from our psychological vocabulary. Similarly with the expressions “primary,” “secondary,” and “tertiary qualities.” These all imply a notion that our receptor cues to action somehow present us with a direct apprehension of some immanent constituent of our stimulus “events.” Of such inapposite notions and vocabulary is metaphysics constituted—which scientists tend to mistake for philosophy.

^3. J. R. Kantor, A Survey of the Science of Psychology, The Principia Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1933, pp. 21–27.

^4. Recognition of the importance of thus specifying the frame of reference within which thought and rational action move, I owe to suggestions of my friend, Arthur F. Bentley, of Paoli, Indiana.

A simpler and perhaps more effective way of describing our frame of reference would be to say that it consists of four axes or co-ordinates intersecting in a common point within ourselves. The three spatial co-ordinates thus intersect at right angles with each other. With reference to these we spatially locate objects and events as being before or behind us, to the right or the left of us, and up or down from us—or north or south, east or west, above or below our own spatial location. With reference to these, also, we reckon spatial distances from us. Upon our time co-ordinate we temporally locate events as being before or after our temporal present, and reckon the temporal intervals by which they are thus removed It is hardly correct to speak of a temporal dimension of anything other than our time co-ordinate, or processal segments of reality as demarcated by their termini with reference to this co-ordinate. If we look at the matter in this way, then we may say that one space-time frame of reference—or set of space-time co-ordinates—will serve us for all purposes: for thinking about things cosmic and terrestrial, and human and personal, and even such limiting cases of behavior segments as reflex acts.

^5. This reference to “control” does not apply to the endeavor of the scientist to control the variables in his situation, but to the fact that his hypotheses and their references serve as means for bringing about desired consequences. Here the question is whether they are appropriate as means for such purposes. The question is answered by putting them to work and observing whether in fact the anticipated consequences do follow—provided no significant variables in the situation have been overlooked. Solution of the problem of error involves the use of both of these criteria. There are errors of both appositeness and appropriateness; but so far as knowledge as such is concerned, the final question is whether or not it is apposite, in its medium, or its generative situation, so that it can be used as a semantic substitute for that situation.