Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gvh9x Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-23T02:32:43.602Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On the Principle of the Flexibility of Scientific Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

F. Zwicky
F. Zwicky*
Affiliation:
Norman Bridge Laboratory of Physics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Other
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , July 1934 , pp. 353 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1934

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. F. Zwicky, Physical Review, 43, 1031, (1933) and E. T. Bell, Physical Review, 43, 1033, (1933).

2. A. Einstein, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1934).

3. Perhaps one might argue that the beliefs in simplicity and absoluteness are related to a fundamental desire of certain men for beauty. This desire has not always found its realization in the ordinary ways of life, and man by wishful thinking endows at least science with simplicity and beauty. Although I take the stand that orthodox and absolute formulations of truth are ultimately inadequate for a comprehension of all being (German “sein”), I am of course fully aware of the fact that the belief in absoluteness was and still will be extremely fruitful and perhaps necessary in man's approach toward a comprehension of all being.

4. H. Margenau, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1934).