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Goodman's Paradox and Rules of Acceptance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extract
The purpose of this note is to examine the claim made by Howard Smokler that “Goodman's paradox should be considered as an independent argument against a conception of inductive logic which makes use of rules of acceptance” ([4], p. 76).
Smokler's claim arises from his treatment of Goodman's paradox in the form given it by Israel Scheffler ([2]). Schefflerhas discussed this paradox primarily in the context of a methodology of induction which views inductive rules as rules of acceptance permitting one to assert detached conclusions. The inductive rule considered by Scheffler is described as follows:
What leads us to make one particular prediction rather than its opposite is not its deducibility froIII evidence but rather its congruence with a generalization thoroughly in accord with all such evidence, and the correlative disconfirmation of the contrary generalization by the same evidence. (I shall refer to this hereafter as the “generalization formula”) ([2], p. 177).
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- Copyright © 1969 by The Philosophy of Science Association
References
[2] Scheffler, I., “Inductive Inference: A New Approach,” Science, vol. 127, 1958, pp. 177–181.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
[4] Smokler, H., “Goodman's Paradox and the Problem of Rules of Acceptance,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 3, 1966, pp. 71–76.Google Scholar