Political scientists are tasked with a deeply meaningful and consequential responsibility: explaining the political world. This encompasses a wide array of phenomena, from the behavior of presidents, voters, rebels, and bureaucrats to the origins, transformation, and demise of institutions, regimes, and wars across history and the world. Moreover, our discipline delves into profound normative questions surrounding domination, freedom, equality, representation, and sovereignty, among others.

Each year we have the honor to publish an article version of the APSA Presidential Address. In the six years we have done this John Ishiyama is the first comparativist whose work we have featured in this capacity. He presently holds an appointment as University Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. John has long been a fixture in the subfield of comparative politics for his contributions on democratization, political parties, and ethnic politics in both the post-Soviet region and Africa. He has also written extensively on teaching, publishing, and assessment in political science. He has published over 150 articles. And while the outlets and subject matter are too diverse to summarize succinctly, we do want to mention that “The Politics of Intercountry Adoption: Explaining Variation in the Legal Requirements of Sub-Saharan African Countries,” coauthored with Marijke Breuning, won the 2010 APSA Heinz Eulau Award for Best Journal Article published in Perspectives on Politics during the previous year (2009).

This issue marks the last of our six years as the editorial team of Perspectives on Politics. It has been both a richly rewarding and exhausting journey, as well as a labor of love. As with all journeys, some of what we encountered along the way was foreseeable, but much of it was not. For example, we knew that Donald Trump’s presidency would be consequential and in many ways unprecedented when we assumed the helm in June 2017, but not that he would become the first president to be impeached twice, or the first to attempt to overturn presidential election results and violently prevent the peaceful transfer of power, thereby threatening the republic’s very foundations. We had no idea what COVID-19 was, or that it would go on to kill more than one million people in the United States alone. Nor could we foresee that the murder of George Floyd would spark the greatest wave of protest in the United States since the 1960s. Nor yet again did we know that more than seventy-five years after the end of World War II, there would be a major European land war between two former Soviet Republics. Yet we felt compelled to respond to each of these world historical moments as they unfolded in real time, while also attempting to modernize and innovate with respect to the journal’s publication procedures and to stay true to its substantive mission.

Despite the common assumption that ethnography is most successful where researchers achieve recognition as insiders within the communities they study, conducting research in nondemocracies inverts incentives to conduct ethnographic research as an insider and poses unexpected ethical risks to both researchers and respondents. Rather than increasing trust and facilitating access, cultivating insider roles in nondemocracies may have the unintended effects of encouraging conformity with regime discourses, limiting further fieldwork access, and exacerbating respondents’ tendency toward epistemic deference. Drawing on the authors’ research experiences and the growing literature on fieldwork in nondemocracies, this article argues that outsider roles may be preferable to insider roles for identifying the unspoken rules, assumptions, and taken-for-granted aspects of everyday politics in nondemocracies. Moreover, outsider roles clarify the relationship between researcher and respondent in ways that provide clear ethical advantages in terms of consent, value, and risk.

In this essay I outline what I see as the challenges, trends and opportunities facing political science after the pandemic. In particular, the essay focuses on the importance of political science education in addressing the challenges to democracy we now face, and the need to rethink political science education at all levels, k-12, undergraduate and graduate education. It ends with a description of the presidential task force on “Rethinking Political Science Education” and the establishment of an APSA standing committee on civic education.

Democracy is weakened when citizens and elites do not criticize actions or actors that undermine its principles. Yet this study documents a widespread pattern of partisan rationalization in how elites and the public evaluate democratic performance in Latin America. Survey data show that those whose party controls the presidency consistently express positive evaluations of the current state of democratic competition and institutions even when democracy in their country is weak. This pattern emerges in both mass survey data and among elected elites. These data have a worrying implication: if only the political opposition is willing to publicly acknowledge and sound the alarm when democracy is under attack, public pressure to protect democracy is likely to be dramatically reduced.

Most global population growth over the next two decades is projected to occur in small- and medium-sized cities in low- and middle-income countries. Expectations derived from the literature on fiscal federalism suggest that this is a cause for concern, as larger cities are thought to deliver public goods more effectively than smaller ones owing to economics of scale. Drawing on detailed cross-sectional data from Brazil and Indonesia, we show that smaller municipalities tend to possess more basic public health clinics and schools per capita, scattered throughout their territory, than larger cities. We theorize that the greater prevalence of such facilities in small cities reflects a relative lack of non-state alternatives, fewer concerns regarding “urban” problems faced in larger cities, and politicians’ greater ability to secure and claim credit for such facilities. We illustrate the logic of this argument in case studies of otherwise-similar cities of different sizes in Brazil, and with shadow cases from Indonesia. Our analysis underscores how jurisdiction size and non-state service provision can affect government services.

How does the social nature of focus groups shape what researchers learn about preferences? This article delineates three preference types—private, publicly expressed, and group preferences—and introduces a new method for measuring each in a focus group setting. Original data on people’s preferences for punishing rape, wife beating, and theft across 80 focus groups in 20 villages in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo reveal clear differences across preference types, featuring more extreme punishment preferences in the public sphere. A within-subject experiment also shows that focus group discussions affect people’s private preferences by making them more extreme, which has ethical implications for researchers who use focus groups worldwide. The social nature of preferences observed in Democratic Republic of Congo underscores that scholars must adopt clear and transparent approaches to data comparison to learn about sensitive issues in the face of contested norms.

Why do some immigrant diasporas in the United States (U.S.) establish foreign policy interest groups while others do not? While scholars have demonstrated that diasporic interest groups often successfully influence U.S. foreign policy, we take a step back to ask why only certain diasporas attempt to do so in the first place. We argue that two factors increase the likelihood of diaspora mobilization: a community’s experience with democratic governance and conflict in its country of origin. We posit that these conditions make it more likely that political entrepreneurs emerge to serve as catalysts for top-down mobilization. To test our hypotheses, we collect and analyze novel data on diasporic interest groups as well as the characteristics of their respective countries of origin. In turn, we conduct the first in-depth case studies of the historical and contemporary Indian-American lobbies, using original archival and interview evidence.

The article proposes the notion of emotional attrition to capture the process through which activists working in high-risk environments may develop a lasting state of emotional exhaustion caused by protracted exposure to adversarial conditions. Combining insights from clinical psychology and the sociology of emotions, it outlines a novel framework to understand the relationship between activism, emotions, and disengagement. We argue that activists can develop an emotional state characterized by dispiriting emotions and disengaging attitudes that affect their well-being and ability to sustain their activism. This argument is grounded on an in-depth analysis of more than 130 interviews with local human rights activists in Colombia, Kenya, and Indonesia. By examining their experiences and pressures in relation to the arena of repression, their immediate social circle, and the broader sociopolitical and cultural context, we shed light on the complex intersections between activists’ emotional challenges and the range of contextual and strategic factors shaping their work and lives.

Addressing climate change requires coordinated policy responses that incorporate the needs of the most impacted populations. Yet even communities that are greatly concerned about climate change may remain on the sidelines. We examine what stymies some citizens’ mobilization in Kenya, a country with a long history of environmental activism and high vulnerability to climate change. We foreground efficacy—a belief that one’s actions can create change—as a critical link transforming concern into action. However, that link is often missing for marginalized ethnic, socioeconomic, and religious groups. Analyzing interviews, focus groups, and survey data, we find that Muslims express much lower efficacy to address climate change than other religious groups; the gap cannot be explained by differences in science beliefs, issue concern, ethnicity, or demographics. Instead, we attribute it to understandings of marginalization vis-à-vis the Kenyan state—understandings socialized within the local institutions of Muslim communities affected by state repression.

Ideas play an important role in policy change. Theories of policy change, including rational and bounded learning, bracket what needs to be explained: the creation of new ideas. We develop a theory of creative learning in international organizations (IOs). It posits that IO officials respond to new problems and state practices by creating novel concepts and policy ideas. New ideas help officials to manage multiple pressures in their organization’s strategic situation. They enable officials to mediate principal demands while seeking to mobilize client states. We theorize three modes of creative learning that generate new ideas: conceptual combination, translation, and repurposing. Empirically, we explain a major change in global environmental policy: the rise of green growth ideas among major IOs, including the OECD, the UN, and the World Bank. Green growth ideas include new arguments drawn from Keynesian and Schumpeterian economics, which claim that environmental policies can drive economic growth. We show how these ideas were a creative response to the problem of climate change and emerging state interventions in support of clean energy. Our theory of creative learning applies beyond IOs to domestic politics and takes on added significance in times of transformative change that challenge the scripts of policymaking.

Political scientists working on clientelism have become interested in the relationships between brokers and the politicians and parties for whom they work. In most of this research, brokers are seen as inherently disloyal and normally act against the interests of their patrons, unless monitoring efforts are enacted. In contrast, we argue that territorial brokers have strong incentives to construct long-term, dependent relationships with their patrons, which diminishes the likelihood of cheating, while their patrons also wish to maintain durable ties with brokers to hold an assured voter base. We argue that politicians prefer brokers who have a good reputation for providing their voters with goods and assuring their votes. Still, sometimes brokers go rogue and cheat on their bosses. This study, which is based on more than fifty in-depth interviews with both local politicians and brokers in Mexico City, examines the conditions under which brokers remain loyal and those that promote cheating. We identify two factors that explain this variation—electoral competitiveness and the level of resource autonomy between brokers and politicians. Non-autonomous brokers working under conditions of low competition tend to have high probabilities of remaining loyal, while independent brokers working under high competitiveness will often resort to cheating.

The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the unpredictability and instability of fieldwork as a method for data collection. As the pandemic prompted unprecedented political dynamism and social and economic disruptions at both domestic and global levels, in-person fieldwork became challenging, if even possible, in the two years following March 2020. While scholars are again using traditional fieldwork methods, we have seen an increased use of digital tools to conduct research remotely since the pandemic due to international travel bans and social distancing measures. Although not yet widely discussed, these new approaches pose new ethical questions as understandings of both our “fields” and “homes” evolve. In this paper, we stress the need for scholars to reconsider how we conceive of our ethical obligations in situations wherein we have conducted research without ever physically accessing our field sites or interacting in person with our participants. We particularly urge researchers to re-evaluate their ethical responsibilities around transparency and replicability in the dissemination and publication of findings when engaging in fieldwork “from home.” These considerations were necessary prior to 2020 but are especially relevant within the context of the pandemic as scholars enter new field sites remotely or return to those previously visited in person. As a result, this paper starts a critical conversation about ethical practices in remote and digital fieldwork, which will continue to prove significant as digital and remote methods are used for data collection in a post-pandemic world.

Concerns about public opinion-based threats to American democracy are often tied to evidence of partisan bias in factual perceptions. However, influential work on expressive survey responding suggests that many apparent instances of such bias result from respondents insincerely reporting politically congenial views in order to gain expressive psychological benefits. Importantly, these findings have been interpreted as “good news for democracy” because partisans who knowingly report incorrect beliefs in surveys can act on their correct beliefs in the real world. We synthesize evidence and commentary on this matter, drawing two conclusions: (1) evidence for insincere expressive responding on divisive political matters is limited and ambiguous and (2) when experimental manipulations in surveys reduce reports of politically congenial factual beliefs, this is often because such reported beliefs serve as flexible and interchangeable ways of justifying the largely stable allegiances that guide political behavior. The expressive value of acting on political commitments should be viewed as a central feature of the American political context rather than a methodological artifact of surveys.

Scholars have long understood the American states as “laboratories of democracy,” exploring how mechanisms of learning and competition lead to the diffusion of successful state policy experiments across the federal system. Drawing from policy feedback literature, I develop a new framework for studying policy interdependence in American federalism. I argue that state policies can, in addition to promoting learning and competition, also feed into the interest group politics in other states. Broadly speaking, the organized interests that benefit from, and are strengthened by, particular policy reforms might apply newfound strength to propagate them. Empirically, I study rooftop solar policy, an area in which state-level decisions have been fundamental to industry growth and the emergence of installers as political actors. Bringing together a variety of administrative, lobbying, and policy data, I demonstrate that solar installers used resources accumulated in early adopter of favorable rooftop solar policies to influence policy decisions elsewhere. For reformers, I suggest that subnational policy can be a crucial ingredient in building coalitions for (geographically) broader policy reform.

Institutional reforms often diverge from substantive problems and societal demands that originally prompted reform, raising questions about democratic responsiveness. Such reform gaps are prevalent in policing, wherein some police forces improve capacity and performance, while extrajudicial violence persists. I argue that police evade pressure for reform through strategic policy substitution, pressuring politicians to replace reforms that threaten bureaucratic autonomy with favorable reforms that preserve it. I describe how police act as veto players, thwarting high-threat structural and oversight reforms demanded by advocates to address violence and corruption by enacting low-threat operational and marginal reforms. Drawing on evidence from Colombia and Brazil, I demonstrate that operational reforms, (e.g., body-worn cameras and community policing) preferred by police can produce constrained institutional change. Such reforms may improve performance, but by preserving bureaucratic autonomy, they increase the police’s structural power and ability to resist future structural reforms, complicating efforts to address police violence.

The American Political Science Association recently cautioned against the use of misinformation (giving research participants false information about the state of the world) in research with human subjects. This recommendation signals a growing recognition, as experimental research itself grows in prevalence in political science, that deceptive practices pose ethical problems. But what is wrong with misinformation in particular? I argue that while this question certainly has an ethical dimension, misinformation is bad for inference too. Misinformation moves us away from answering questions about the political world effectively. I propose a straightforward, intuitive solution to this twofold problem: tell the truth.

The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This “losers’ consent” allows the winners to govern, and when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede but also actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This article studies the evolution of public opinion about Donald Trump’s “big lie” using a rolling cross-sectional daily tracking survey, yielding 40 days of polls and more than 20,000 responses from US voters from October 27, 2020, through January 29, 2021. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky: the number of Republicans and independents saying that they believe the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. Belief in the lie may have buoyed some of Trump supporters’ self-esteem. In reaction to the lie and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for violent political activism among Democrats, which only waned after efforts to overturn the election clearly failed. Even if these findings merely reflect partisan cheerleading, we nonetheless find significant and potentially long-term consequences of the lie. A conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to continue to do so in the next electoral cycle. These findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.