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Surprise in World Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 May 2020

Glenn P. Hastedt
Glenn P. Hastedt*
Affiliation:
James Madison University
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Extract

As everyone who has taught a course on international politics can readily attest, there are few events which evoke as strong a reaction from students as does a major surprise. Surprise leaves a deep imprint upon the student, generating two simultaneous reactions which push the student in opposite directions. On the one hand, the student is impressed by the range of what can be accomplished by a skillfully undertaken course of action. At least for the moment, world politics no longer appears to him or her as an arena beset by problems totally without solutions. The strongly held desire of most students to believe that insight and vision can solve problems is reaffirmed.

Surprise also produced a second reaction. Depending upon whether the event is perceived favorably or not, student reaction ranges from moral outrage, to puzzlement, to disbelief or exhilaration.

Type
Research Article
Information
News for Teachers of Political Science , Volume 39 , Fall 1983 , pp. 1 - 6
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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References

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