¹ Burrell, David B. C.S.C., ‘Some Requisites for Interfaith Dialogue,’ New Blackfriars 89 (2008): 300–10,CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 300.

² See, e.g., Burrell, David B. C.S.C., Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1993)Google Scholar; idem, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn‐Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 92–108.

³ Burrell, ‘Some Requisites for Interfaith Dialogue,’ 301.

⁴ With contemporary theological and philosophical goals in mind, Burrell has inquired into the relationship of human freedom and divine sovereignty in al‐Ghazali: see Burrell, ‘Al‐Ghazali on Created Freedom,’ in his Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 156–75.Google Scholar In this essay Burrell aims ‘to mine al‐Ghazali's preoccupations to display an alternative view of freedom to that which tends to occupy center‐stage in current discussions, and thereby to show up the inadequacies of (1) current standing polarities of libertarian versus compatibilist accounts of human freedom, especially in the face of the creator/creature relation, as well as challenge (2) a style of philosophical inquiry which pretends to set out from ‘our intuitions’ about such matters—as though these were not already structured by philosophical positions internalized in our culture’ (ibid., 156). In ‘Aquinas and Scotus: Contrary Patterns for Philosophical Theology,’ also included in Faith and Freedom, Burrell warns against misunderstanding Aquinas's use of the word ‘predestination’, since the ‘pre’ might seem to indicate a temporal beforehand or to constrict the freedom of rational creatures. See Burrell, ‘Aquinas and Scotus,’ 110, especially fn 64; cf. Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 123–24.Google Scholar

⁵ Ratzinger, Joseph Cardinal, God and the World: Believing and Living in Our Time: A Conversation with Peter Seewald, trans. Taylor, Henry (German 2000; San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 57, 58.Google Scholar Ratzinger approved the text of the interview, but did not remove its conversational tone. Thomas Aquinas writes on the Book of Life: ‘[A]ll the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the book of life,’ insofar as God knows those whom he has chosen from eternity (Summa theologiae I, q. 24, a. 1).

⁶ Ratzinger, God and the World, 58.

⁷ Ibid., 59.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ ‘al‐Ashqar, Umar S., Divine Will and Predestination: In the Light of the Qur’an and Sunnah, trans. al‐Khattab, Nasiruddin (Arabic 1990; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: International Islamic Publishing House, 2003), 143.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid., 143–44.

¹¹ Ibid., 144.

¹² Ibid., 48–49. See also 38, where al‐Ashqar affirms that Allah knows ‘whether they are doomed or blessed. He knows who among them are the people of Paradise and who are the people of Hell, from before the time when He created them, and created the heavens and the earth.’ See 34 for a definition of ‘predestination’ or qadar. Al‐Ashqar affirms that sins happen by the will of Allah (25). Compare al‐Ashqar's position with John Calvin's argument regarding predestination: ‘That men do nothing save at the secret instigation of God, and do not discuss and deliberate on anything but what he has previously decreed with himself, and brings to pass by his secret direction, is proved by numberless clear passages of Scripture’ (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Beveridge, Henry [reprint, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989],Google Scholar Book I, ch. xviii, 199). Calvin makes clear that by God's ‘righteous impulse man does what he ought not to do’ (ibid., 205). He emphasizes that ‘when we cannot comprehend how God can will that to be done which he forbids us to do, let us call to mind our imbecility, and remember that the light in which he dwells is not without cause termed inaccessible (1 Tim. vi. 16), because shrouded in darkness’ (ibid., 203).

¹³ Al‐Ashqar, Divine Will and Predestination, 41. This view resonates not with Calvin but with William of Ockham or Luis de Molina. See William of Ockham, Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. Adams, Marilyn McCord and Kretzmann, Norman (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983)Google Scholar; Luis de Molina, S.J., On Divine Foreknowledge, trans. Freddoso, Alfred J. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

¹⁴ For background in early Islam, see Watt, W. M., Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (London: Luzac, 1948).Google Scholar

¹⁵ For discussion of kalam, which means ‘speech’ or ‘conversation’, see Leaman, Oliver, An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy, 2^nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10–13.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ibid., 13.

¹⁷ Al‐Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans. Marmura, Michael E. (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2000).Google Scholar See Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 2, 182.Google Scholar In his introduction to his translation, Michael E. Marmura points out al‐Ghazali's clear explanations of philosophical positions in The Incoherence of the Philosophers paradoxically ‘helped spread philosophical ideas, as it also set a new tradition in kalam. After al‐Ghazali, no Islamic theologian worth his salt avoided detailed discussion of the philosophical theories al‐Ghazali had criticized’ (Marmura, ‘Translator's Introduction,’ xv–xvi). See also the dialogic refutation of The Incoherence of the Philosophers written by Ibn Rushd (Averroës, 1126–1198), in English translation as Averroës’ Tahafut Al‐Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans. Simon Van Den Bergh (Cambridge: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 1987 [1954]).

¹⁸ Hodgson, Marshall G. S., The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 2: The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 178.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Knowledge of al‐Ghazali's life comes largely from his account of his intellectual path, Deliverance from Error (al‐Munqidh min al‐dalal), translated by McCarthy, R. J. as Freedom and Fulfillment (Boston: 1980).Google Scholar See also Watt, W. M., Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al‐Ghazali (Edinburgh: 1963);Google Scholar Marmura, ‘Al‐Ghazali,’ 138–40; Mitha, Farouk, Al‐Ghazali and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority in Medieval Islam (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Mitha's book focuses on al‐Ghazali's Kitab al‐Mustazhiri, written against the doctrines of the (Shi‘ite) Ismailis prior to his departure from Baghdad. Even at this early stage in his career al‐Ghazali is concerned with the place of reason in Sunni law and theology (in contrast to ‘the Shi‘i Imam's claim to infallible authority’[Mitha, Al‐Ghazali and the Ismailis, 21]). Mitha describes al‐Ghazali's effort as one ‘of integration, avoiding the excesses, hitherto expressed in Islamic history, of a literalist rejection of, or a philosophical subservience to, reason’ (ibid., 90).

²⁰ In his introduction to his translation of Book XXXV of The Revival of the Religious Sciences, a translation which appears as Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2001),Google Scholar David B. Burrell, C.S.C. comments that al‐Ghazali's intention in The Incoherence of the Philosophers was to make the philosophers’ writings usable by ‘purify[ing] them of their pretensions to offer an access to truth independent of and superior to that of divine revelation’ (xi).

²¹ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 15. For discussion of the meaning of ‘agent’ in al‐Ghazali, see Burrell, ‘Al‐Ghazali on Created Freedom,’ 159.

²² Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, 80. Burrell draws here upon Frank, Richard, ‘Moral Obligation in Classical Muslim Theology,’ Journal of Religious Ethics 11 (1983): 210, 228Google Scholar fn 19, and Gimaret, Daniel, La doctrine d’al‐Ash‘ari (Paris: Cerf, 1990), 371.Google Scholar For discussion of al‐Ghazali's relationship to Ash‘arite doctrine, see also Marmura, Michael E., ‘Al‐Ghazali,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Adamson, Peter and Taylor, Richard C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 137–54,Google Scholar at 141–53; Frank, Richard M., in Al‐Ghazali and the Asharite School (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994)Google Scholar. Frank holds that al‐Ghazali strongly repudiates his early Ash‘arite positions; Marmura argues to the contrary.

²³ On Averroes's treatment of this problem, see Mohamed, Ismail, ‘Concept of Predestination in Islam and Christianity: Special Reference to Averroes and Aquinas,’ The Islamic Quarterly 44 (2000): 393–413.Google Scholar After affirming that ‘all Muslims are completely in agreement that there is no agent (fa‘il) except Allāh,’ Mohamed states, ‘To clarify the statement that ‘there is no agent except Allāh’, Averroes gives two answers. First, this statement can be taken to mean that there is no agent but Allāh, and that causes other than Him cannot be called agents except only metaphorically. This is because the existence of those causes depends on Him. The second answer is that Averroes distinguishes between two terms—creator and agent … . Averroes states that an agent in the empirical world (al‐shahid) does not create anything, but its action is only to change one quality into another; it does not change non‐existence into existence’ (398). Mohamed concludes that ‘Averroes’ answer does not contradict that which is held by all Muslims, namely there is no agent except Allāh’ (ibid.).

²⁴ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 16. See Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, 52, 54, 80–81, 121. Burrell comments that in reaction to the emanationist philosophy of Ibn Sina and others, al‐Ghazali and the Ash‘arites take care that ‘God alone will properly be called agent, and what we take to be causal activity will be explained as customary connections established by the divine will’ (ibid., 52). The key is ‘to restore to the One the freedom to create or to refrain from creating a universe’ (ibid., 54).

²⁵ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 16.

²⁶ Ibid., 18.

²⁷ Ibid. As Khalidi points out, in The Incoherence of the Incoherence Ibn Rushd (Averroës) offers an ‘implicit criticism of Ghazali's conception of God. He hints that the view of causation put forward by Ghazali would lead ultimately to an unsatisfactory conception of God, who would be seen to rule over the universe like a despotic tyrant (as opposed, perhaps, to a law‐abiding authoritarian)’ (Khalidi, ‘Introduction,’ xxxix). For his part, Ibn Rushd argues for the necessity of the universal causal chain, thus imperiling the theology of miracles. Richard M. Frank associates al‐Ghazali with the same necessitarian view: see Frank, Al‐Ghazali and the Ash‘arite School, 4, summarizing the fruits of Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System: al‐Ghazali and Avicenna (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992).Google Scholar By contrast, Oliver Leaman sharply differentiates al‐Ghazali from Avicenna and Averroës: Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy, 23–24, 55–77. In Leaman's view, ‘Al‐Ghazali is trying to re‐establish the role of a personal, powerful and omniscient God’ (77). See also Marmura, ‘Al‐Ghazali,’ 141–53, for support of Leaman's position.

²⁸ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 19.

²⁹ Ibid., 24.

³⁰ Ibid. See Bahier, Salman, Ibn al‐‘Arabi's Barzakh: Concept of the Limit and the Relationship between God and the World (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004).Google Scholar

³¹ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 27, 28.

³² Ibid., 28. As Leaman observes, ‘The very notion of God being compelled to behave in a certain way is repugnant to al‐Ghazali. Some theologians argued that, given the sorts of creatures God created, he is morally obliged to provide a revelation that sets out specific instructions and rewards designed to apply to the natures of the creatures on which they are imposed. The imposition of this obligation is not really something that God can do anything about, he is morally obliged to impose it given his nature, the nature of the creatures in the world, and the world itself. Al‐Ghazali objected to the idea of God being confronted with notions of human good and evil which had the status of an extrinsic and independent law’ (Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy, 156). The Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arites parted ways over this issue of divine freedom, among other issues (see ibid., 25).

³³ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 29. For al‐Ghazali's discussion of the divine name ‘the Dominator’ (al‐Qahhar), see al‐Ghazali, The Ninety‐Nine Beautiful Names of God (al‐Maqsad al‐asna fi sharh asma Allah al‐husna), trans. Burrell, David B. C.S.C. and Daher, Nazih (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992), 74.Google Scholar Marmura comments with regard to al‐Ghazali's Ash‘arite theology of the divine attributes: ‘The cornerstone of Ash‘arite theology is its doctrine of the divine attributes. Al‐Ghazali endorses and expands on this doctrine. For the Ash‘arites, the divine attributes of life, knowledge, will, power, speech, hearing, and seeing are co‐eternal with the divine essence and intimately related to it, but are not identical with it. They are attributes ‘additional’ (za’ida) to the divine essence’ (Marmura, ‘Al‐Ghazali,’ 141). For medieval Christian discussion of God's power, see the texts collected in La puissance et son ombre. De Pierre Lombard à Luther, ed. Boulnois, Olivier (Paris: Aubier, 1994),Google Scholar focusing on Peter Lombard's Sentences and its commentatorial tradition.

³⁴ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 33.

³⁵ Ibid., 34. For historical and speculative reflections on divine agency and human freedom from Christian perspectives, see also, e.g., Adams, Marilyn McCord, William Ockham, vol. II (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987),Google Scholar chapters 24–31, pp. 1033–1347, treating an array of issues in the work of Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham (as well as Peter Lombard, Henry of Ghent, and others); Jacob Schmutz, ‘The Medieval Doctrine of Causality and the Theology of Pure Nature (13^th to 17^th Centuries),’ in Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth‐Century Thomistic Thought, ed. Serge‐Thomas Bonino, O.P., trans. Williams, Robert (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2009), 203–50;Google Scholar Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Crowe, Frederick E. and Doran, Robert M. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000);Google Scholar Goris, Harm J. M. J., Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will (Leuven: Peeters, 1996);Google Scholar Long, Steven A., ‘Providence, Freedom, and Natural Law,” Nova et Vetera 4 (2006): 557–605.Google Scholar

³⁶ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 37.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Al‐Ghazali here describes how the Ash‘arite school called God's action ‘ “freedom of choice,” on condition that freedom of choice is not understood as willing after confusion and indecision, for that would be absurd in His case’ (ibid., 38–39). He then points out that because of God's transcendence, all names of God only apply to God in a metaphorical fashion. Burrell explains that al‐Ghazali holds that between the Creator and creatures there is ‘affinity or similarity, yet no palpable resemblance. Ghazali may not have had the semantic tools available to him which Aquinas used so adroitly, in distinguishing manner of signifying from the reality signified in certain privileged expressions whose use proves to be inherently analogous, yet he arrives at a similar conclusion regarding human language pressed into service in divinis’ (Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, 136, cf. 45 and 125 on freedom of choice).

³⁹ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 39. Marmura comments that for al‐Ghazali, ‘Whatever we believe to have been “acquired” by our own power is in reality acquired on our behalf by divine power. Al‐Ghazali insists that the created power in us exists only with the acquisition the divine power creates for us. Created power does not temporally precede the human act. It and the act are created simultaneously’ (Marmura, ‘Al‐Ghazali,’ 143). See however Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, 80.

⁴⁰ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 40.

⁴¹ Ibid., 42.

⁴² Ibid., 43.

⁴³ Ibid., 43.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 46. Recall that an ‘agent’ is ‘one who originates’ (mukhtari’).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 47.

⁴⁷ Ibid. For further discussion see Burrell, ‘Al‐Ghazali on Created Freedom,’ 164–65; Marmura, ‘Al‐Ghazali,’ 143, 150–53.

⁴⁸ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 48.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 49.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 49–50.

⁵³ Burrell argues here for the priority of practical reason in al‐Ghazali's approach: ‘by trying our best to act according to the conviction that the divine decree expresses the truth in events as they unfold, we are shown how things truly lie. So faith [tawhîd] and practice [tawakkul] are reciprocal; neither is foundational’ (Burrell, ‘Al‐Ghazali on Created Freedom,’ 165). Burrell's description evokes cultural‐linguistic approaches to Christian faith, and he goes on to show (through a superb comparison of Aquinas and Scotus) the necessity of appreciating ‘the unique founding relation, creation, which seems best elucidated by a metaphysics which can understand act analogously, and so indicate how the originating activity of the creator continues to make the creature to be an agent in its own right’ (ibid., 171).

⁵⁴ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 29.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 15.

⁵⁶ Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, 135.

⁵⁷ Al‐Ghazali, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence, 5, 29.

⁵⁸ Describing Ockham's position, Marilyn McCord Adams observes, ‘To sin is to act contrary to one's obligations. But according to Ockham's ethics, God does not have any obligations to anyone and so cannot act contrary to His obligations no matter what He does … . As Ockham sees it, the fact that God cannot will anything maliciously or command anything unjustly—like the fact that He cannot sin—is merely a reflection of the fact that God has no moral obligations to anyone and so cannot act contrary to his obligations, no matter what He does. Yet this is no restriction on God's power to will or command, but rather on the descriptions that His volitions and commands could fit’ (Adams, William Ockham, 1160, 1162).

⁵⁹ Burrell, ‘Al‐Ghazali on Created Freedom,’ 166.