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A New Response to the Problem of Natural Evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2024

Caleb Cumberland Open the ORCID record for Caleb Cumberland [Opens in a new window]
Caleb Cumberland*
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar, Celebration, FL, USA
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Email: calebedwardcumberland@gmail.com
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Abstract

This paper will offer a new defense in response to the problem of natural evil, called the Perfect Will defense. The defense argues that in sustaining the universe, God conforms the system of physical laws to his intellect and will. Yet, God could not fully conform the system of laws (for our universe) to his intellect and will without simultaneously forcing people into a loving relation with God. Yet, since God would not force people to love him, God must thereby initially create people in a universe that has a system of laws that is only partially conformed to God’s intellect and will. However, while a universe with a system of laws that is only partially conformed to God’s intellect and will allows for people to exercise their freedom over their relation with God, it also results in the occurrence of natural evils. The paper will argue that once this defense is fully developed, it is able to account for why God allows for natural evils to occur within the universe. The paper will outline the defense, as well as respond to the defense’s major objections.

Keywords

defensefree willnatural evilproblem of eviltheodicy
Type
Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 105 , Issue 3 , May 2024 , pp. 281 - 293
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers.

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References

1 c.f. Nick Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defense of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 276.

2 c.f. Nick Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defense of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), pp. 295–96.

3 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), p. 160.

4 For examples, see: Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman’s Press, 1977); Eric Reitan, ‘Does the Argument From Evil Assume a Consequentialist Morality?’, Faith and Philosophy, 17 (2000), 306–19; Greg Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2001); Bruce Little, A Creation-Order Theodicy (Lanham MD: University Press, Inc., 2005); Bruce Little, God, Why This Evil? (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2010); Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Stewart Goetz, ‘The Argument from Evil’, in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), pp. 449–97; Josh Rasmussen ‘On the Value of Freedom to Do Evil’, Faith and Philosophy, 30 (2013), 418–28.

5 Though this could be challenged for example, see: James P. Sterba, Is a Good God Logically Possible? (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

6 For examples, see: Dom Bruno Webb, Why Does God Permit Evil? (Manchester New Hampshire: Sophia Institute Press, 2004), pp. 34–42, 48–58; Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman’s Press, 1977), pp. 57–62; Terrence Penelhum, Religion and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 246–47; Greg Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2001); David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman’s Publishing, 2005); Michael J. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth & Claw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 96–106; Finding Ourselves After Darwin: Conversations on the Image of God, Original Sin, and the Problem of Evil, ed. by Michael Lloyd, in Stanley P. Rosenberg (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic 2018), pp. 262–79 (kindle version).

7 For some examples, see: John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper Rowe Publications, 1966); Trent Dougherty, The Problem of Animal Pain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013).

8 c.f. Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), p. 476.

9 c.f. Greg Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2001), pp. 259–62; Bryan Frances, Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 125–27.

10 For some examples, see: Thomas Jay Oord, The Uncontrolling Love of God (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2015). Thomas Jay Oord, ‘An Essential Kenosis View’, in God and the Problem of Evil: Five Views, ed. by Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr. (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2017), pp. 77–97; Thomas Jay Oord, God Can’t (Grasmere, ID: SacraSage Press, 2019). William Hasker, The Triumph of God Over Evil (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2008); William Hasker, ‘An Open Theist View’, in God and the Problem of Evil: Five Views, ed. by Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr. (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2017), pp. 57–76; Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 113–34; Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008); Michael J. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth & Claw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 130–99.

11 For some examples, see: John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper Rowe Publications, 1966), pp. 281–82, 315, 373; Kirk Macgregor, ‘The Existence and Irrelevance of Gratuitous Evil’, Presented at 2008 International Society of Christian Apologetics Annual Meeting, p. 6. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319128248_The_Existence_and_Irrelevance_of_Gratuitous_Evil>.

12 Nick Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defense of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 279.

13 This type of point is commonly argued in the literature; for example see: Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), p. 415.

14 For a similar argument see: Greg Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2001), pp. 380–86; also c.f. Stewart Goetz, ‘The Argument from Evil’, in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), p. 483.

15 I want to thank two anonymous referees for feedback on an earlier draft of this paper, along with feedback from friends including, but not limited to: Julie LeDuc, Bruce and Barbara Cumberland, Mark and Marie LeDuc, Fr. Todd Belardi, John Buck, Craig Reed, John Lopilato, Ben Watkins, Skylar Fiction, Joshua Bowen, A. Ryan, and Dustin C. I also appreciate many others who I have interacted with on the topic of this paper.