1. For detail on problems of the landlocked states see generally Glassner, M.I., Access to the Sea for Developing Land-locked States, (The Hague 1970)Google Scholar; Franck, T., El Bradei, M., Aron, G., “The New Poor: Land-locked, Shelf-locked and other Geographically Disadvantaged States”, International Law and Politics, Vol. 7:33, 1974, 33–57Google Scholar [Hereinafter cited as Franck et al.]; Alexander, L.M. and Hodgson, R.D., “The Role of the Geographically Disadvantaged States in the Law of the Sea”, 13 San Diego L. Rev. 558 (1976)Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Geographically Disadvantaged]; Miles, E., “An Interpretation of the Geneva Proceedings, Part II”, 3 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 317 (1975–1976)Google Scholar; Childs, , “The Interests of the Land-locked States in the Law of the Sea”, 9 San Diego L. Rev. 701 (1972)Google Scholar; United Nations Secretariat, “Study of the Question of Free Access to the Sea of Land-locked Countries and the Special Problems of the Land-locked Countries Relating to the Exploration and Exploitation of the Resources of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction”, UN Doc.A/AC. 138/37, 11 06 1975Google Scholar; Stevenson, J. and Oxman, B., “The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session”, 69 Am J Int'l L., 1975, 770, 784CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Njenga, F., “Africa”, in “Perspectives on Ocean Policy”, Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations, 21–24 10 (Airlie, VA, 1974) 987–94Google Scholar. “Final Report – The Land-locked States Commission of the American Branch of the International Law Association on the Landlocked States at the Sixth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, NY, 23 May-15 July 1977, by Glassner, Martin Ira, 07 1977Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Final Report]; Glassner, M., “Land-locked Nations and Development”, 2 Int'l Dev. Review, 19 (1977)Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Land-locked Nations]; Comment- “UNCLOS III: Last Chance for Landlocked States?”, 14 San Diego L Rev. 637 (1976–1977)Google Scholar; Govindaraj, V.C., “Land-locked States and their Right of Access to the Sea”, 14 IJIL, 190 (1974)Google Scholar; Ibler, V., “The Interests of Landlocked States in the Law of the Sea”, 9 San Diego L Rev. 701 (1973).Google Scholar

2. Id.

3. Glassner refers to the landlocked states' “urge to the sea” as “the feeling of national claustrophobia”. See Glassner, , supra note 1, at 14.Google Scholar

4. For example, Iran and Afghanistan have a friendly relation; nevertheless, providing a desirable transportation system by the former for its landlocked neighbour is very costly and at the same time useless, since the fastest transportation means to the sea (railroad or truck roads) has to go through uninhabitable desert areas.

5. Internal problems or boundary disputes need not be explained here but for “other events” the Entebbe incident can be mentioned as an example. The incident resulted in a closed border between Uganda and Kenya for some time. This in turn caused shortage of oil products not only in Uganda but also in Rwanda, for which the former is a transit state. See landlocked nations supra n. 1, 20–21. Zambian transit trade was also harmed when Zambia had to abandon its southern transit routes in order to comply with the UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia. See Statement by the Zambian delegate to the UNCLOS, in Summary Records, Vol. II infra n. 80, at 258.Google Scholar

6. The list of the landlocked states that are members of the UN or its specialized agencies includes Austria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Vatican City, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, San Marino and Switzerland, in Europe; Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, Nepal and Mongolia, in Asia; and Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Upper Volta and Zambia, in Africa. See Office of the Geographer, De't of State, “Theoretical Areal Allocations of Seabed to Coastal States, Limits in the Seas”, International Boundary Study, Series A, No. 46, 12 08 1972Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Boundary Study].

7. See the UN Secretariat Study (UN Doc.A/AC. 138/37) supra n. 1.

8. See UNCTAD, Annex 5 to E/Conf.46/SR 18, 7 April 1964, 11–12; “The Economy of East Africa; A Study of Trends”, The Economist Intelligence Unit. (London 10 1955), at 53Google Scholar; East African Railways and Harbours, Annual Report 1966, (Nairobi 04 1967), at 12.Google Scholar

9. For the incident which involved the seizure of shipments of arms to Uganda by Kenya and the subsequent dispute between the two countries, see Glassner, supra n. 1, 170–71.Google Scholar

10. For information on Dar es Salaam and its congestion problems, see de Blij, H.J., Dar es Salaam; a Study in Urban Geography, (Evanston 1963), 11–27Google Scholar; East African Railways and Harbours, Annual Report 1966, (Nairobi 04 1967), at 27Google Scholar. For detail concerning transit routes available to Uganda through Kenya and other countries, see, generally, International Bank for Reconstructions and Development, The Economic Development of Uganda, (Baltimore 1962)Google Scholar; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya, (Baltimore 1963).Google Scholar

11. Through its transit agreements in 1961 and 1962 with Afghanistan, Iran has provided free transit rights (based on reciprocity); warehouses; additional facilities in the city of Meshed; and the ports of Khorramshahr (Persian Gulf), the Bandar Shahpur, and the Bandar Abbas (between the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman). Goods, however, have to be transported through either Meshed or Tehran to these ports. Iran has also started developing the port of Chahbahar (close to the Pakistani border) for the foreign trade of Afghanistan. This port's facilities, however, without a railroad or any road in the eastern part of Iran, would be useless to Afghanistan. On the other hand, construction of such transportation means in Eastern Iran would only benefit Afghanistan. See explanation supra n. 4. As one observer has actually described, with the exception of emergency cases (cold war between Afghanistan and Pakistan, closed borders, etc.), because of the foregoing problems, “all in all, Iran provides a most unattractive and impractical outlet to the sea for Afghanistan”. See Glassner, supra n. 1, at 68Google Scholar. For Afghanistan's transportation arrangements with India, the Soviet Union and Pakistan, see id. Glassner, , 65–71Google Scholar. Also see Article 9 of the “Transit Agreement between Iran and Afghanistan”, 1 02 1961Google Scholar, and annexes 1 and 2 (in Persian). In its recent agreement (Oct. 17, 1975) with Afghanistan, Iran has agreed to provide loan and technical assistance to Afghanistan, as well as expanding the Afghani railway in order to link Afghanistan with the Persian Gulf. Iran is also trying to include Afghanistan in its plan for an electric railway system which will link Iran with Pakistan and India. Through the Afghan-Iranian Commission for Economic and Trade Co-operation, Iran is “pouring money” into Afghanistan, because it is landlocked, but economic development of Afghanistan cannot occur immediately. For detail, see Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 24 10 1975, at 9Google Scholar; MEED 9 07 1976, at 18Google Scholar; MEED, 31 12 1976, at 12Google Scholar; MEED, 13 08 1976, at 10Google Scholar. For trade agreements between Afghanistan and India, and Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, see MEED, 28 02 1975, at 9Google Scholar; MEED, 21 03 1975, at 12Google Scholar; MEED, 9 07 1976, at 18.Google Scholar

12. Id. Glassner, , 66Google Scholar, Table 1, at 7. The closest distance to the sea for some other landlocked states is even longer than that for Afghanistan. The distances to the available seaports are 775 miles for Mongolia, 900 miles for Chad, 1000 miles for Zambia, etc. Id. Table 1.

13. On Nepal's problems, see generally UNCTAD, Committee on Preparation of a Draft Convention Relating to Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries, “Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries of the ECAFE Region”, E/Conf.46/AC.2/5, 22 October 1964, Glassner, supra n. 1, 7, 9, 12, 13, 32, 184, 193, 212, 214Google Scholar; Landlocked Nations supra n. 1, at 23.Google Scholar

14. Id. Glassner, , at 184.Google Scholar

15. Id., 13.

16. Szekely, A., Latin America and the Development of the Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, (NY 1976) at 43Google Scholar. For a case study on Bolivia, see Glassner, supra n. 1, 84–136Google Scholar. On Paraguay see id., Glassner, , pp. 84, 135, 185, 192, 198, 212, 228, 229, 238–239.Google Scholar

17. Bolivia exports oil and is among the top producers of tin. Szekely, id.

18. Id. See also the Statement by Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, , in Bulletin Information of Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 13 10 1977, 2–12Google Scholar; “La Obra Con Chile”, Bulletin Information, id., 20 October 1977, 3–6; Statement by Mr. Tredinnick, Bolivian delegate to the UNCLOS, in Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records, Vol. II (Caracas 1974), (NY 1975), 198–199.Google Scholar

19. See generally Glassner, supra n. 1, 120–127.Google Scholar

20. See generally Glassner, id., 127–36; Szekely, supra n. 16, at 44Google Scholar. During the Panama Canal Treaty negotiation in September of 1977 in Washington, President Suarez of Bolivia started negotiating with the Presidents of Peru and Chile in order to establish “an access route for Bolivia to the Pacific”. The three leaders then signed a declaration agreeing to resolve the Bolivian problem through a workable solution. See Binder, D., “Bolivia Gains an Access to the Sea”, The NY Times, 11 09 1975.Google Scholar

21. The reasons behind selection of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Nepal, Paraguay and Uganda as model landlocked countries are twofold: they are among the developing category of the landlocked states group; they have been among the most active and outspoken developing landlocked states in international conferences which have dealt with the problems of landlocked states. They will be referred to occasionally throughout this chapter.

22. See section 1 supra.

23. See Glassner, supra n. 1, at 18.Google Scholar

24. Id. 18–19, Govindaraj, supra n. 1, 191–193.Google Scholar

25. Id.

26. Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, conveniently found in Basic Documents of the United Nations, ed., Sohn, L., (2nd Rev. ed.), The Foundation Press, Inc., NY, at 303.Google Scholar

27. Prior to the Barcelona Convention, Switzerland was the first country that established a bilateral approach to the transit trade problems through its agreements with Sardinia on 16 March 1916. Significant bilateral and multilateral conventions on transit trade or access to international waterways in the 1920's include the Geneva Convention of 1923 on Maritime Ports; the Paris Convention of 21 April 1921 (Germany, Poland and the Free City of Danzig); Convention of Helsingfors of 28 October 1922 (Finland and the Soviet Union); Belgrade Convention of 23 May 1923 (Greece and the Kingdom of the Serbs); Hungarian-Czechoslovakian Convention of 8 March 1923, and the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923. See generally De Martens, , Nouveaux Supplements au Recueil de Traites, Vol. 2, 1761–1829, at 473Google Scholar; UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1958, Official Records, Vol. 1, at 312Google Scholar; League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS), Vol. XII, 1922, 161–175Google Scholar; LNTS, Vol. 1, 1923, 207–223Google Scholar; LNTS Vol. XXV, 1924, 441–71Google Scholar; LNTS, Vol. 28, 1924, 91–92Google Scholar; Vali, F.A., Servitudes in International Law – A Study of Rights in Foreign Territory, 2nd ed., (London 1958) 114, 115.Google Scholar

28. See, e.g., Article 107 of the Treaty of Lausanne, id.

29. 7 LNTS, 11, also conveniently found in Glassner, supra n. 1, 247–253.Google Scholar

30. Id.

31. Art. 1, Statute, id.

32. Id., Art. 3.

33. Franck, et al. supra n. 1, at 52Google Scholar; Glassner, supra n. 1, at 21.Google Scholar

34. Id. Franck et al.; Glassner, , 21, 26.Google Scholar

35. Id., Franck et al.

36. Art. V (Freedom of Transit), 55 UNTS 187, also reproduced in UNCTAD, “Texts of International Instruments and Certain Recommendations Relating to Transit Trade”, E/Conf. 46/AC.2/2, 25 09 1964, 67–68.Google Scholar

37. Id.

38. Paras. 1, 2, 5, id., Art. V.

39. Para. 6, id., Art. V.

40. Franck, et al. supra n. 1, at 53.Google Scholar

41. The Havana Conference, which was convened shortly after the adoption of GATT, intended to create an International Trade Organization but the Conference failed since its Charter was only ratified by one state (Australia, with reservation). See UNCTAD, “Texts of International Instruments and Certain Recommendations Relating to Transit Trade”, E. Conf. 46/AC.2/2, 25 09 1964, at 70.Google Scholar

42. See United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Problems of Trade of Landlocked Countries in Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Tokyo, 29 08 1956.Google Scholar

43. Art. 38 tried to exclude the landlocked states from application of the most-favourednation clause of Art. V of GATT: UNCTAD supra n. 41, at 70Google Scholar. Also see ECAFE supra n. 42, at 7.Google Scholar

44. See n. 42. See also United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Transit Problems of Eastern African Landlocked States, (Addis Ababa 6 11 1963) at 11.Google Scholar

45. For detail, see generally, Dean, A., “The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was Accomplished”, 52 Am J Int'l Law 607 (1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: Fitzmaurice, G., “Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea”. 8 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 73 (1959).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46. Sorensen, M., “Law of the Sea”, International Conciliation, No. 520, 11 1958, 199–200Google Scholar; United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. VII (Fifth Committee: Question of Free Access to the Sea of Landlocked Countries), UN Doc. A/Conf. 13/43, 04 1958, 78–79.Google Scholar

47. UN Doc.A/Conf. 13/L.53, 1958.

48. Id.

49. McDougal, M.S. and Burke, W.P., The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea, (New Haven 1962) at 113Google Scholar. Also see Pearcy, G.E., “Geographical Aspects of the Law of the Sea”, Ann. of the Assn. of Am. Geographers, XLIX, 03 1959, at 23.Google Scholar

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51. Obviously a transit coastal state has a stronger negotiating position and therefore may impose any restriction upon the landlocked state. For the latter any agreement is better than no-agreement.

52. Franck, et al. supra n. 1, at 55.Google Scholar

53. See n. 42 supra.

54. See UN ECAFE, “Regional Economic Co-operation in Asia and the Far East”, Report of the Ministerial Conference on Asian Economic Co-operation, Manila, 3–6 12 1963, UN 1964, at 2.Google Scholar

55. United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 20th Sess., Tehran, 2–17 March 1964, UN, March 1964, at 2.

56. Glassner, supra n. 1, at 33.Google Scholar

57. Id.

58. UNCTAD, E/Conf.46/AC.2/SR.2, 3, December 1964.

59. See UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries, TD/TRANSIT/R.3, UN, June 1965.

60. See n. 30–51 and the accompanying text supra. Also see Arts. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 of the Transit Convention, n. 61 infra.

61. UNCTAD, Convention on Transit of Landlocked States, 1965, 597 UNTS, also conveniently found in Glassner, supra n. 1, pp. 254–263Google Scholar. See the Preamble and Arts. 2–10, id. [hereinafter cited as the Transit Convention]. Also see Fried, J., “The 1965 Convention on Transit of Landlocked States”, 6 IJIL, 28 (1966).Google Scholar

62. Id. Transit Convention, Art. 1(d).

63. Id., Art. 10.

64. Art. 16 provides an arbitration procedure if dispute settlement is not reached between the parties after 9 months of negotiations, id.

65. The Convention provides that traffic in transit should be “in accordance with the laws, rules and regulations of the transit state”, Art. 2, paras. 2, 3, id. It further allows the transit state to impose certain restrictions on transit of the landlocked state because of public health, security, or political purposes. See Arts. 11, 12, 13, id.

66. Franck, et al. supra n. 1, 55Google Scholar. Also see UN Secretariat, “Status of Multilateral Conventions”, UN Legislative series, SP/LEG/SER.3, July 1967, pp. X–15; Govindaraj, supra n. 1, at 210.Google Scholar

67. “The Classics of International Law”, James Brown Scott, ed., Vol. 1, 1950, 219–220.Google Scholar

68. Scelle, George, Manual de droit international public, 1941, Part I, at 389.Google Scholar

69. Lauterpacht, E., “Freedom of Transit in International Law”, the Grotius Society – Transactions, (1958–1959), Vol. 44, at 349.Google Scholar

70. Id.

71. Hyde, , International Law, Vol. 1, SecRev ed., 1945, at 618.Google Scholar

72. Pounds, N., “A Free and Secure Access to the Sea”, Ann. of the Assn. of Am. Geographers, XLIX (1959), 257Google Scholar. For other arguments on the right of access to the sea, see generally Pounds, id., at 267; Thierry, H., “Les Etats Privés de Littoral Maritime”, Rev. Gen. de Droit Int'l Pub., Vol. LXII, 10–12 1958, at 615Google Scholar; Vali, F.A., Servitudes of International Law – A Study of Rights in Foreign Territory, 2nd ed. (London 1958), 42–55Google Scholar; McNair, A.D., “So-called State Servitudes”, 6 BYIL 1925, at 126.Google Scholar

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74. Fulton, T.W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, (1911), 3–6Google Scholar; Linden, V. “Alexander VI and the Demarkation of the Maritime and Colonial Domains of Spain and Portugal 1493–1494”, 22 Am Hist Rev 1 (1916)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Camden, , The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, Late Queen of England, (1968), 255.Google Scholar

75. Id. Linden; id. Camden.

76. The Dutch-Portuguese conflicts in the Far Eastern waters can be mentioned as an example. The controversy led to Grotius' famous defense of the Dutch company which had seized several Portuguese vessels and cargoes in the Far Eastern waters. In his Mare Liberum, Grotius wrote that neither the Indian Ocean nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of occupation. Grotius then defined the legal phraseology of the law of nations. “The sea is called indifferently the property of no one (res nullius) or a common possession (res communis) or public property (res publica).” See Grotius, Hugo, Mare Liberum, (tr. Magoffin) 1916, 27, 28, 34, 50, 58Google Scholar. On Grotius' doctrine, see generally Oppenheim, L., International Law – A Treaties, 593–94 (8th ed., H. Lauterpacht, ed.), 1955.Google Scholar

77. Id., Grotius.

78. See n. 66 and the accompanying text supra.

79. For detail on the Seabed Committee see sources in Mirvahabi, F., “Conservation and Management of Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone 9:2 J. Marit. L. & Comm., 01 1978, n. 15, at 228.Google Scholar

80. For example, see statements of many landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states in Caracas in Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records, Vol. 1, Plenary Meetings, Caracas, 1974, 134–35Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Summary Records, Vol. I]; Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Sec. Committee, Summary Records Vol. II, Caracas, 1974Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Summary Records, Vol. II], 198, 199, 238–258.

81. Njenga, F., “Africa”, in Perspectives on Ocean Policy, Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations, 21–24 October (Airlie, VA. 1974), at 91.Google Scholar

82. Id., 91–92. Also see Table 3.

83. The figure 52 was given in the statement of the Bolivian delegate to the UNCLOS. See United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, 4th Sess., Provisional Summary Record of the 70th Plenary Meeting, NY, 7 05 1976, at 3Google Scholar. The negotiators in the UNCLOS have not been able to reach an agreement on definition of the term geographically disadvantaged; therefore, the list of LL/GDS can include states with limited coastlines, shelf-locked or zonelocked states, or even those coastal states that are isolated islands in the oceans because of being remote from shipping lines or the rest of the world. See Alexander, and Hodgson, supra n. 1, Table 1 to 6, pp. 562–66Google Scholar. Also see Art. 159(l)(e), 2. of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), which refers to geographically disadvantaged states without defining the term, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/WP.10, 15 July 1977. In this context also see the Bolivian Draft article on equivalence of landlocked states and states whose maritime geography is disadvantaged, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.93/Corr.2, 10 September 1976; Jamaica: Draft Articles on Rights of Developing Geographically Disadvantaged States within a Territorial Sea beyond 12 Miles, UN Doc.A/Conference.62/C.2/L.36, 5 August 1974.

84. Summary Records, Vol. I, at 135Google Scholar; Summary Records, Vol. II, at 242.Google Scholar

85. See generally Summary Records, Vol. II supra n. 80, 238–58.Google Scholar

86. See Conclusion in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc./A/AC. 138/79, 21 July 1972, also found in UN Doc.A/Conf.62/L.33, 1974.

87. Id., para. 9.

88. See the Conference of the Developing Landlocked and Other Geographically Disadvantaged States, 20–22 March, Kampala, Uganda, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/23, 2 May 1974.

89. Draft Articles on the Proposed Economic Zone by Uganda and Zambia, 28 UN GAOR. Supp. 21, Vol. III, at 89, UN Doc.A/9021, 1973, Art. 4, para. 1.

90. Draft Articles on Resource Jurisdiction of Coastal States Beyond the Territorial Sea, 28 UN GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. III, at 85, UN Doc.A/9021, 1973, Art. 3, para. 1. On International Seabed Authority see Part XI of ICNT supra n. 83.

91. Id., Art., para. 1.

92. See n. 89 supra.

93. See n. 86–92 and the accompanying text supra.

94. See Section 2 supra; Summary Records, Vol. II supra n. 80.Google Scholar

95. Id.

96. See the seven-power Draft Articles relating to Landlocked States, sponsored by Afghanistan, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mali, Nepal and Zambia, Official Records of the General Assembly, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 21 (A/9021), Vol. II. Also see the explanatory paper on these Draft Articles, in UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.29, 30 July 1974, pp. 10–11.

97. See statements by delegations of Kenya and Thailand in Summary Records, Vol. II supra n. 80, 253, 254–255.Google Scholar

98. Id., Summary Records, 238–58.

99. Id.

100. Draft Articles on Participation of Landlocked and other Geographical Disadvantaged States in the Exploration and Exploitation of the Living and Non-living Resources in the Area Beyond the Territorial Sea”, sponsored by Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Finland, Iraq, Laos, Lesotho, Luxemburg, Nepal, Netherlands, Paraguay, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, Upper Volta and Zambia, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C2/L.39, 5 August 1974 [hereinafter Draft Articles].

101. Id.

102. Id.

103. Id., Art. 2.

104. See statement by H.E.S. Jayakumar, Leader of Delegation of Singapore, Subcommittee 2 of the UN Seabed Committee, 29 March 1973, at 5.

105. Id.

106. See statements by delegations of Iran, Pakistan, Kenya and Thailand, in Summary Records supra n. 80, 243–44, 250, 253, 255.Google Scholar

107. Id.

108. Id., at 258.

109. Id. Art, 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf defines continental shelf as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coasts but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources …” UN Doc.A/Conf.13/L.55, 1958.

110. Id.

111. See “Economic Significance, in terms of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources of the Various Limits Proposed for National Jurisdiction. Report of the Secretary General”, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, UN Doc.A/AC. 138/87, 4 June 1973, at 18 [hereinafter Report].

112. Summary Records, Vol. II supra n. 80, at 240.Google Scholar

113. See Section 2 supra also see the explanatory paper supra n. 96, pp. 2–9. The explanatory paper reveals that the landlocked states not only want to protect their former treaty rights but also are trying to reinstate those rights in the future law of the sea treaty.

114. See Report supra n. 111, at 37.Google Scholar

115. For example, the oil resources of the Persian Gulf States (excluding Saudi Arabia) are expected to be exhausted or substantially reduced in only two decades and the governmental economic projects have already been prepared by those states for the same period of time. Therefore, it is most unlikely for a Persian Gulf state to share its oil resources with any state of the LL/GDS. For detail on oil in the Persian Gulf and its elements, see generally Mirvahabi, F., “Claims to the Oil Resources in the Persian Gulf: Will the World Economy be Controlled by the Gulf in the Future?”, 11:1 Tex. Int'l L. J. 75 (1976), and p. 111.Google Scholar

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117. See the Draft Articles supra n. 100.

118. Id.

119. Id.

120. Id.

121. See Draft Articles on the Economic Zone, sponsored by Byelorussia SSR, People's Republic of Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, Ukrainian SSR, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.38, 5 August 1974.

122. Id., Art. 16(b).

123. Id., Art. 19.

124. Id.

125. See Draft Articles on Fisheries, sponsored by Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.40, 5 August 1974.

126. Art. 8(2)(b)(e), id.

127. US Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, Part II. Fisheries, UN Doc./A/Conf.62/C.2/L.47, 8 August 1974.

128. Id., Art. 15.

129. Pakistan: Draft Articles on Landlocked States, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.48, 8 August 1974.

130. See n. 128 supra.

131. Section B.1.2. See n. 129.

132. Section B.I, id.

133. Nigeria: Draft Articles on the Exclusive Economic Zone, UN Doc./A/Conf.62/C2/L.21, Rev. 1, 5 August 1974.

134. Art. 2(3), id.

135. See Draft Articles on the Exclusive Economic Zone, sponsored by Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leona, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, the United Republic of Cameroon and the United Republic of Tanzania, UN Doc./A/Conf.62/C.2/L.82, 28 August, 1974, Art. VI.

136. Art. VI(1), id.

137. See n. 134 supra.

138. See, e.g., Section B of the Pakistani proposal, n. 129 supra.

139. Bolivia, and Paraguay, : Draft Articles on the “Regional Economic Zone”Google Scholar, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.65, 16 August 1974 [hereinafter cited as Bolivia and Paraguay Proposal].

140. Id.

141. Id., Compare with Arts. 2 and 3 of the Zambian Draft Articles, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.95, 20 September 1976.

142. Art. 5, id., Bolivia and Paraguay Proposal.

143. Art. 9, id.

144. Art. 7, id. On International Seabed Authority, see ICNT supra n. 83, Part XI.

145. Art. 3, id.

146. See Statement by delegations of Peru, and Ecuador, , in Summary Records, Vol. II supra n. 80, 250, 257.Google Scholar

147. Interview with Ambassador S.K. Upadhyay, the Permanent Representative of Nepal to the UN, 17 January 1978 [hereinafter cited as the Interview]. For Nepal's problems, see n. 13–15 and the accompanying text supra.

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149. The Evensen Group Draft – The Economic Zone, 6th Rev., 16 April 1975, conveniently found in Miles, supra n. 1, 326–334.Google Scholar

150. UN Doc.A/Conf.62/WP., May 1975.

151. See Miles, supra n. 1, 304, 313–318.Google Scholar

152. Id., at 313.

153. Miles, E., “An Interpretation of the Geneva Proceedings – Part I”, 3 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 189 (1975–1976).Google Scholar

154. Id.

155. Id. See the explanation of the Group of 77, n. 156 infra.

156. Miles, supra n. 1, at 313Google Scholar. Group of 77, which presently has more than 110 members, includes developing states from Latin America, Asia and Africa. See Keesing's Contemporary Archieves, 1972, at 25377Google Scholar. For the role of the Group in the UNCLOS, see generally Miles, id., 304–08, 313–26; Miles, supra n. 153, 187–214.Google Scholar

157. Id., Miles, supra n. 1, at 313.Google Scholar

158. Id., 313–314. On SNT, see n. 159 infra.

159. See Arts. 47, 57–59; 108–116 of SNT, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/WP.8/Part II, 7 May 1975.

160. For minor changes of the three texts concerning the rights of the LL/GDS, see Final Report supra n. 1, 1–4.

161. See generally Section 3 supra.

162. UN Doc.A/Conf.62/WP.10, 15 July 1977. The Seventh Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was partly held in Geneva (28 March to 19 May) and in New York (21 August to 15 September), did not produce a new text. Therefore, the Conferences latest text, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, will be the basis of discussion in the study. At the end of the New York Session the Conference decided to hold its following session in Geneva from 19 March to 27 April 1979. See United Nations Press Release, SEA/333, 15 09 1978Google Scholar. For detail on the Seventh Session of the Conference see generally United Nations Press Release, SEA/311, 18 05 1978Google Scholar, SEA/315, 19 May 1978, SEA/322, 22 May 1978, SEA/327, 28 August 1978, SEA/328, 11 September 1978, SEA/333, 15 September 1978; UN Doc.A/Conf.62/69, 14 September 1978, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/BUR/SR.44, 19 September 1978.

163. See n. 59 and the accompanying text supra.

164. See n. 162 supra.

165. See, e.g., Arts. 4, 5, 6, n. 59 supra.

166. ICNT, n. 162 supra.

167. Id., Art. 82.

168. Id., Art. 82(4).

169. Part XI, ICNT, id.

170. Arts. 140, 141 only mention landlocked states but other articles refer to LL/GDS. ICNT, id.

171. Id.

172. Id. On the function and authorities of the International Seabed Authority, see Part XI, ICNT, id.

173. Id., ICNT.

174. Id.

175. Id.

176. Id., para. 3.

177. Art. 70, id.

178. Id.

179. Arts. 69, 70, id. There is obviously no mention of the rights of the developed geographically disadvantaged states.

180. Art. 70, id. The provision in Article 16 of the Socialist Group proposal on the economic zone is a better definition, whereas nutritional needs of a country's population as a criterion for recognition of a disadvantaged state can be very misleading. See n. 121, 122 (on Socialist Group proposal) and the accompanying text supra. Compare with Art. 5 (definition of the geographically disadvantaged states) of the Jamaican Draft Articles, UN Doc.A/Conf.62/C.2/L.36, 5 August 1974.

181. Arts. 69, 70, ICNT, id.

182. Id.

183. Id.

184. Id.

185. Fulton, T.W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, (1911), 3–6.Google Scholar

186. Id. 66–85; Welwood, W., An abridgment of all Sea-Laws, (1613), Ch. XXVIIGoogle Scholar; Fenn, P.T., The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Waters, (1926), 175–177Google Scholar; Selden, J., Mare Clausum, (Nedham, tr. 1652), bk. 1, pp. 2, 12Google Scholar, Chs. 7, 20. For Grotius doctrine see n. 73, 76 supra.

187. Id., Fenn.

188. On offshore areas closed as the result of the 200-mile economic zone and problems of closed and semi-enclosed seas, see generally, Alexander, L., “Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-enclosed Seas”, 2 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L., 1974, 155–185CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Alexander, L., “Indices of National Interest in the Oceans”, 1 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 1973, at 25 & n. 12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

189. See n. 185 supra.

190. For discussion on sovereignty over space and celestial bodies, see generally Bloomfield, L.P., Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society, (1962), 49–50Google Scholar; “The Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, (1967), TIAS, No. 6347Google Scholar; Mirvahabi, F., “Domestic Relations in Outer Space”, 3 Rev. de Droit Int'l de Sciences Diplomatique et Politique, Juillet-Septembre, 209 (1977).Google Scholar

191. See generally Section 3 supra.

192. Id. Section 3.2.

193. Id. Also see n. 139–145 and the accompanying text supra.

194. See n. 163–184 and the accompanying text supra.

195. See n. 183, 184 and the accompanying text supra.

196. See Mirvahabi, supra n. 79, at 245–45 and n. 106–109.Google Scholar

197. See n. 156, 157 and the accompanying text supra.

Notes 198 and 199 omitted.

200. See the statements by some Latin American coastal states in Summary Records, Vol. II supra n. 80, 250–251, 256.

201. Id.

202. For example, no regional machinery can bring together the People's Republic of China and Taiwan; Israel and the Arab countries; or India and Pakistan for regional co-operation. Furthermore, for a country such as Nepal, which has only one transit state (India), regional economic zone would not really help. On Nepal, see n. 147 supra.

203. The problem of delimitation has been recognized by the UNCLOS, see, e.g., Art. 74 of ICNT, n. 162 supra.

204. See n. 188 and the accompanying text supra. In this context, also see n. 122, 123 of ICNT supra n. 162.

205. Such a restriction is reflected in Art. 72 of ICNT, ICNT, n. 162 supra.

206. Para. 2 of Art. 72 allows technical help from a third state or international organizations. Id.

Note 207 omitted.

208. See generally Arts. 17, 69–72, 82, 87, 90, 124, 141, 148, 150, 151, 159, 203, 204, 255, 267, 273, 275, ICNT supra n. 162.

209. Other than their enforcement right as flag states, the landlocked states, for example, cannot assume any role in decisions made on marine pollution. See generally Part XII, Section 4 of ICNT, also Art. 218, id.

210. Art. 203 of ICNT requires the “states” to provide scientific and technical assistance to the developing states. This Article can be invoked by the developing LL/GDS; nevertheless, this sort of assistance only depends on the willingness of the states concerned, Id. ICNT.

211. The rights and interests of the LL/GDS, for example, are not mentioned in Art. 123 of ICNT, which requires co-operation of the states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed areas. See Art. 123, ICNT, id.

212. Uruguay: Draft Articles, UN Doc.A/AC.138/SC II/L.24, 1973.

213. Pardo, A., “A Statement on the Future Law of the Sea in Light of Current Trends in Negotiations”, 1 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 324 (1973–1974).Google Scholar

214. Id.

215. Id.

216. Interview with Mr. J. Bustani, the law of the sea delegate of Brazil. Mr. Bustani stated that “Of course, there are some open-minded coastal states like Brazil that are willing to make concessions to the developing LL/GDS, nevertheless these states have to follow the decisions of the coastal states as a group”.

217. The transit states that had not signed any of the landlocked transit trade treaties have nevertheless followed principles, rules and regulations embodied in those treaties. See, for example, the 1965 Transit Trade Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, conveniently found in Glassner supra n. 1, 270–277. But see statement by the Pakistan delegate at the UNCLOS, referring to the landlocked state's transit as “an encroachment on the sovereignty of the transit state”, Summary Records, Vol. II supra n. 80, at 250.

218. Final Report supra n. 1, at 9. The group has various problems within itself. The Vatican City, for example, left the group because “it was becoming too political”. But Syria and Cameroon joined the group in 1977. Israel still cannot join the group because of Arab members' opposition. Other problems of the LL/GDS group relates to lack of strong leadership, poor communication between the European and the non-European members and lack of participation by some poor small members of the group. Id., Final Report, 10, 11.

219. Id.

220. Id., at 10.

221. See generally Section 3.1.2 supra.

222. See generally Section 2 supra.

223. See n. 86–88 and the accompanying text supra.

224. Id.

225. Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter states that: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. Para. 4 of the Article further adds that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. Art. 1 of the UN Charter, while enumerating the purposes of the United Nations, inter alia, refers to “friendly relations among nations” and “international co-operation” in solving international economic problems. Nonrecognition of the legitimate rights of the LL/GDS with respect to ocean uses can be interpreted as non-recognition of their sovereignties or establishing a de facto sovereignty for them. This, of course, creates sovereign inequality which goes against the heart of Art. 2 of the Charter. See Arts. 1, 2 of the UN Charter, conveniently found in Basic Documents of the United Nations, Sohn, L., ed., (NY 1968).Google Scholar

226. Id.

227. See n. 209, 210, 211 and the accompanying text supra.

228. Id.

229. See Final Report supra n. 1, at 10.

230. Barcelona Convention is discussed in Section 1 supra.