1. S/Res/253 (1968). This resolution had been preceded by S/Res/217 (1965), S/Res/221 (1966) and S/Res/232 (1966) in which the Security Council had progressed from voluntary to selective mandatory sanctions. It was followed by S/Res/277 (1970), S/Res/288 (1970), S/Res/ 314 (1972), S/Res/318 (1972), S/Res/320 (1972), S/Res/333 (1973), S/Res/388 (1976) and S/Res/409 (1977).

2. Rule 28 of Prov. Rules of Procedure: The Security Council may appoint a commission or a committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

3. Its formal name was “Committee established in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 253(1968)” to which in 1972 the phrase “concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia” was added.

4. A/1891 (GAOR 6th Sess. Suppl. No. 13) pp. 21, 33.

5. Ibid. p. 21

6. Brown-John, C. Lloyd, Multilateral Sanctions in International Law, A Comparative Analysis, New York 1975 p. 76.Google Scholar Sec also: Highley, Albert E., The Actions of the States Members of the League of Nations in Application of Sanctions against Italy, 1935/1936, Thèse Genève 1938Google Scholar, Chapters 6 and 7 and Levitch, Raphael A., La Collaboration dans l'Application des Sanctions prévues à l'Article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations, Paris 1938, esp. p. 87 et seq.Google Scholar

7. LoN O.J. Special Suppl. No. 146 pp. 50–51.

8. Ibid. Special Suppl. Nos. 147, 149.

9. Landy, E.A., The Effectiveness of International Supervision, 30 years of ILO Experience, London 1966 p. 20 (n. 1)Google Scholar; in 1947 this mandate was adapted to the changed circumstances as follows: … “to examine the annual reports under article 22 of the Constitution on the measures taken by members to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which they are parties and the information furnished by members concerning the results of inspection”.

10. See A/Res/332(IV) for the mandate of the Committee on information under Art. 73e and A/Res/1654(XVI) for that of the Committee of 24 (see also A/Res/1810(XVII)).

11. See for instance A/Res/647(VII) and Barbier, Maurice, Le Comité de Décolonisation des Nations Unies, Paris 1974 pp. 149–209.Google Scholar

12. The taxonomy used and adapted here has been borrowed as appropriate from Landy, op.cit., n. 9.

13. Lake, , The “Tar Baby” Option, New York 1976 pp. 189–191Google Scholar, although it seems that the British in their own legislation did not use the narrow interpretation ibid. pp. 192–193.

14. See my The Implementation of International Sanctions: The Netherlands and Rhodesia, Alphen aan den Rijn 1978 pp. 79–80, 182–187, and 204.Google Scholar

15. S/PV.1645 p. 3.

16. Interviews with representatives of Member States, 8 and 15 09 1975, New York.Google Scholar

17. See Park, & Lake, , Business as Usual, Transactions Violating Rhodesian Sanctions, Carnegie Endowment 1973 pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

18. S/11913, Special Report on the Expansion of Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia p. 5.

19. S/10580 and S/10593. See also S/Res/314, S/Res/318 and S/Res/320 (1972).

20. Cf., note (Steven J. Kilworth), Diggs, v. Schultz, , 14 Va. J. Int. Law 1974 pp. 185–194Google Scholar and note (Ronald A. Brand), Security Council Resolutions: When Do They Give Rise to Enforceable Legal Rights? The United Nations Charter, The Byrd Amendment and a Self-Executing Treaty Analysis, 9 Cornell Int. Law. J. 1975–1976 pp. 298–316.Google Scholar

21. S/11178/Add. 1, Annex II p. 2.

22. S/10580/Annex.

23. See S/11178/Add.1, Annex II p. 21, Case USI-8, Marne-Lloyd, Musi-Lloyd, Merwe-Lloyd.

24. Op.cit., n. 14 pp. 199–202.Google Scholar

25. See S/8786 and Addenda 1–11.

26. See para. 8 of S/Res/253 and para. 9(b) of S/Res/277.

27. See S/11927 Annex V p. 24.

28. For further details see Lake, , op.cit., n. 38 p. 183.Google Scholar Although in the past US passports have been stamped “not valid for travel to the People's Republic of China” (or: North Vietnam etc.), such restrictions have been found unconstitutional by the Courts: interviews with representatives of Member States, 15 and 16 September 1975, New York.

29. Switzerland is not a Member of the UN and accordingly not bound by the Security Council resolutions. As a member of various specialized agencies however, it could be questioned by the Watchdog Committee.

30. See S/9844, Annex VI, A p. 16; S/10229/Add. 1, Annex I p. 45 and S/10852/Add. 1, Annnex II p. 72.

31. See S/11178/Add. 1, Annex I p. 61. In support were cited the Lotus case, PCIJ Series A pp. 9–26, at 18–19 and various Trading with the Enemy Acts.

32. S/11594/Add. 1, Annex II pp. 79–80. The policy of “courant normal” implied that Switzerland would hold its trade at the average level of the three years preceding sanctions, see Bindschedler, , Das Problem der Beteiligung der Schweiz an Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen besonders im Fall Rhodesiens, 28 ZaöRV 1968 pp. 1–15.Google Scholar

33. In one specific case the Swiss Government provided the names of the members of the Board of directors of Nitrex A.G., a firm which had been specifically set up in Switzerland in order to co-ordinate the sales of a number of large European fertilizer producers and which was suspected of curcumventing the sanctions. In that case the Committee has tried to attack the company through the countries which had nationals on the board of Nitrex but it has not been very successful. The Netherlands and Belgium, for instance, refused to co-operate, see S/11927/Add. 1, Annex II pp. 57–58. France and Italy were also non-co-operative, but Norway and the FRG gave some more information and the latter considered the possibility of taking action against its nationals on the Nitrex board, S/12265/Add. 1, Annex II pp. 94–96.

34. S/11178/Add. 1, Annex 1 p. 63. For such clauses, see S/Res/253 (1968), paras. 3(b) and (d).

35. S/PV.1666 p. 6 (29 September 1972). He added that one of those two was the US, the other presumably being the UK. It should be noted that on that particular day, apart from the Council members, many African countries were represented in the Council chamber.

36. Interviews with representatives of Member States, 8–22 September 1975, New York.

37. Report of the Committee of Experts to the Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee, LoN O.J., Special Suppl. No. 147 p. 12. See also the Minutes of the Committee of Experts, ibid. p. 20.

38. Ibid. p. 12. Highley, , op.cit., n. 6 p. 147Google Scholar, also says: “The analysis of legislative texts … is valuable if not conclusive evidence of the effectiveness with which sanctions were operating”

39. Cf., the Netherlands, ibid. p. 26 and p. 38; and Chile ibid. p. 22 and pp. 31–33.

40. Cf., van Asbeck, F.M., Une Commission d'Experts, in: Symbolae Verzijl, Leiden 1958 pp. 9–22, at 20.Google Scholar

41. The problem that the UN had many more members than the League could have been dealt with by starting at least with Rhodesia's most important trading partners.

42. See the declarations of the Argentine representative in S/PV. 1664 p. 8 and in S/10580/ Add. 1 and the Indonesian reply at S/11927/Add. 1, Annex II p. 37. For Belgium, however, membership of the Security Council 1972–1973 has not proved to be an incentive to improve its legislation.

43. S/10229 p. 14 and S/10852 p. 18.

44. S/11927 p. 6. It seems, however, that the Committee does not always adhere to its own directives with respect to delays and reminders. In particular, when a Government has exhausted the maximum delay, but still manages to reply before the (quarterly) publication of the blacklist, the Committee usually will not include it in the list.

45. S/12265 p. 4 and Annex 1.

46. For examples of this delinquency see the Annex cited in n. 45.

47. Of the eight cases declared closed in the 8th report (S/11927), five involved members, of the Committee and one a Member State whose representative had recently left it. Such bias is no longer obvious, however, with respect to the 17 cases declared closed in the Ninth Report (S/12265).

48. Landy, , op.cit., n. 9 p. 153.Google Scholar

49. S/11178 p. 35. If objections are made, the normal procedure is followed. The experience with the semi-automatic procedure is evaluated positively by the members of the Committee. Only one representative held that the Committee has sent out notes as a consequence of this procedure, which contained information not worthy of consideration; interview with representative of a Member State, 17 September 1975, New York.

50. Lake, , op.cit., n. 13 p. 64Google Scholar and Kuyper, , op.cit., n. 14 pp. 131–144.Google Scholar

51. Interview at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 23 10 1975.Google Scholar

52. But see the suggestion of the representative of Kenya, S/PV.1714 p. 3 (17 05 1973).Google Scholar

53. Interview in New York, 15 September 1975.

54. S/9844/Add. 1, Annex VI.

55. S/10852/Add. 1, Annex II p. 83.

56. S/10299p. 18.

57. S/10920 p. 3.

58. Information obtained through interviews, September 1975, New York.

59. S/12265 p. 5.

60. Interview with Customs Administration, Rotterdam, 19 January 1977. If they had been “brought to the attention” of customs officials, that would have been insufficient in any case. In order to be enforceable, the notes should have been included in customs regulations. The notes have been used, however, by the administrative service charged with issuing licenses for Rhodesian imports (Centrale Dienst In- en Uitvoer).

61. S/9844 p. 33 and S/10229 p. 19.

62. For a Dutch refusal see S/9844/Add. 2 Annex VII pp. 19–22. For a similar German refusal, see S/10852/Add. 1 Annex II p. 49. A somewhat similar South African policy became apparent during 1975, see S/11927/Add. 1, Annex II p. 6. See also Case 239 involving Japan at S/12265/Add. 1, Annex II p. 63.

63. See S/1 1178/Add. 1, Annex II p. 11. For greater detail, see Kuyper, , op.cit., n. 14 pp. 224–228Google Scholar

64. See S/10920 p. 3 for the initial decision; S/l 1954 p. 26 for the actual establishment of the list; S/11594/Add. 2, Annex VIII for the list itself; and S/12265/Add. 1, Annex II p. 56 for a (vain) attempt to use the services of one of these experts, be it on a government to government basis.

65. On Zambia, see Zacklin, , The United Nations and Rhodesia, New York 1974 pp. 65–72Google Scholar. See also S/9252, paras. 11, 12. After the Mozambique border closure in March 1976, a similar effort was undertaken as after the Zambia border closure, see S/1 2005, S/l 2009, S/Res/386 (1976), E/5812 (Report of the mission to Mozambique) and E/Res/1987 (LX). Recently Malawi has also served what could be termed a claim of economic losses on the Security Council, sec S/12265/Add. 1, Annex II p. 188.

66. S/10229/Add. 1, Annex III p. 128.

67. Ibid. pp. 132–133.

68. Adler-Karlsson, , Western Economic Warfare 1947–1967. Stockholm 1968 p. 65.Google Scholar

69. Lastly S/12265 p. 5.

70. Cf., Landy, , op.cit., p. 119 et seqGoogle Scholar. She remarks on a reluctance of governments to admit economic difficulties (p. 121).

70a. Cf., Kuyper, , op.cit., n. 14 p. 202.Google Scholar

71. Lake, , op.cit., n. 38 pp. 283–84.Google Scholar

72. In what followes South Africa and Portugal will be left out of consideration.

73. Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State, Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford 1964 pp. 91–92.Google Scholar

74. Ibid. pp. 93–103.

75. Ibid. pp. 104–111.

76. Ibid. Part II.

77. Ibid. p. 254.

78. See S/8697 and S/9951.

79. See Van Ussel, (Belgium), S/PV. 1654 pp. 20–21Google Scholar. Article 29 of the Charter reads: “The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”.

80. See Van Ussel, ibid.

81. Interview with representative of a Member State, 10 September 1975, New York.

82. S/PV.1530 – 1534. Draft res S/9697 (UK) and S/9696.

83. Kuyper, , op.cit., n. 14 pp. 210–219.Google Scholar

84. S/PV.1666 p. 8. Note the presumption that the national legislation on sanctions will be in order.

85. S/PV.1645 p. 3.

86. S/9844 p. 30.

87. S/10632 p. 3 and S/10920.

88. See for instance S/AC.15/SR.172.

89. See Barbier, op. cit., n. 11.

90. See S/10920, S/11927 Annex I and S/12296.

91. S/PV.1655 (prov.) pp. 8–10.

92. S/PV.1715 (prov.) pp. 14–16. Colin Crowe (UK): “… the Committee cannot ignore the technicalities. There is indeed a lot of hard down-to-earth technical work to be done”. Also: “Cases – concrete cases – are what the Sanctions Committee's work is all about”.

93. S/PV.1666 p. 7 (US repr. Philips).

94. S/PV.1714 p. 3 (Kenyan repr. Odero-Jowi).

95. See their proposals in S/10920 pp. 6–8.

96. S/11927 p. 5 and S/12265 pp. 3–4. It seems that the 3:2 ratio led to a proliferation of relatively unimportant sports cases (19 and 23 new ones being reported respectively in the Eighth and Ninth reports), which left too little time for the discussion of some serious cases of sanctions breaking.

97. See S/11913.

98. Haas, , op. cit., pp. 97–102, and 117 et seq.Google Scholar

99. U Thant repeatedly noted that sanctions did not achieve the desired result and laid the blame largely at the door of Portugal and South Africa; Waldheim restricted himself mostly to appeals for greater respect for Security Council decisions, see Introductions to the Report of the Secretary-General 1965–1976.

100. This is the highest professional rank under that of Director. Other Special Committees, such as the Committee against Apartheid and the Committee of 24, also had P-5 Secretaries.

101. S/10632 p. 3.

102. S/11178 pp. 21–22 and S/11594 p. 29. If one considers, that the Centre against Apartheid which services the Special Committee against Apartheid, consists of one Director, eight Professionals and five G.S. people, and that the Secretariat of the Special Committee of 24 is just as large as that of the Watchdog Committee, but is backed up by the complete Trusteeship and Decolonization Division, there seems to be something wrong with the priorities of the UN Secretariat. Data from A/C.5/31/L.2.

103. The Secretary himself was a French national, several other Staff members were also from Western countries. For official praise, see S/PV.1712 p. 3 (Jeanne Martin Cisse). Doubts were expressed in various interviews with the writer during September 1975.

104. S/8702. An interline agreement, inter alia, enables airlines to make bookings for each other and to pay for these bookings through bilateral or multilateral clearing.

105. S/11594/Add. 2, Annex V pp. 9–48.

106. Interview 17 September 1975, New York.

107. See for instance S/10633 p. 3.

108. Cf., Lindberg, & Scheingold, , Europe's Would-be Polity, Englewood Cliffs 1970 p. 130Google Scholar et seq.

109. During its non-plenary stage (1968–1970) the Committee had a bi-monthly rotating chairmanship. In its plenary stage initially the chairmanship rotated on a monthly basis, as in the Security Council, see S/9951. From late March 1972 onwards the Committee has worked with a Chairman for one year, assisted by two Vice-Chairmen. The Chairmanship has been held by the following Permanent Representatives: 1972 – Rahmatalla Abdulla (Sudan); 1973 – Jeanne Martin Cissé (Guinea); 1974 – Charles Maina (Kenya); 1975 – Salim A. Salim (Tanzania); 1976 – Iqbal A. Akhund (Pakistan); 1977 – Mansur R. Kikhia (Libya).

110. S/10632 and S/10920.

111. Haas, , op. cit. p. 119Google Scholar. Other requirements mentioned by him, such as specificity and differentiation, need not be discussed here.

112. The expression has been coined by the Kenyan representative, Odero-Jowi, who used it to denote the way of operating employed by the US and the UK in the Committee and the Security Council, S/PV.1716 p. 3.

113. If any rules are applicable, they must be the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council.

114. S/9844/Appendix II.

115. Interview with representative of a Member State, 15 September 1975, New York.

116. Haas has used the analytical scheme of Thompson, and Tuden, to clarify his ideas, op. cit., p. 105.Google Scholar

117. Cf., the Indonesian representative Socgomo who regretted the absence of censure in the Committee's report, S/PV.1713 (prov.) p. 17.

118. Interview with representative of a Member State, 12 September 1975, New York.

119. Thus the USSR prevented a critical note from being sent to Czechoslovakia concerning Case 31, S/11178/Add. 1, Annex I p. 5 and S/AC.15/SR.172 p. 2.

120. See S/10632 pp. 5–6 and S/10920 pp. 9–13.

121. Haas, , op. cit., pp. 110, 256.Google Scholar

122. S/10632 p. 4 and S/11178 p. 18.

123. S/10632 p. 4 and S/10920 pp. 4–5.

124. Interim reports S/10408, S/10580 and S/10593, RISCO-report, S/11597.

125. S/11927, Annex I pp. 7–8.

126. S/12265 p. 5 and supra.

127. See the special annexes on so-called INGO-cases to S/11178, S/11594, S/11927 and S/12265.

128. Interviews with representatives of Member States, September 1975, New York.

129. S/11594/Add. 2, Annex V pp. 49–56. On the activities of AABN in the Netherlands see Kuyper, , op. cit., n. 14 pp. 166–173.Google Scholar

130. Interview with AABN members, 27 October 1976.

131. S/11927/Add. 1, Annex II pp. 141–149. Later a new controversy developed over the alleged discrepancy of his testimony to the Austrian authorities with that to the Research Group, which thus far has not been cleared up, see S/12265/Add. 1, Annex II pp. 168–179.

132. For the distinction between task and task-type (organizational task as a general category) see: Citrin, Jack, United Nations Peacekeeping Activities: A Case Study in Organizational Task Expansion, University of Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs Vol. 3, No. 1 p. 5.Google Scholar

133. van Asbeck, F.M., Quelques aspects du controle international non-judiciairc de l'application par les gouvernements de convention internationales, Liber Amicorum François, Leiden 1959 pp. 27–41Google Scholar and Berthoud, Paul, Le contrôle international de l'exécution des conventions collectives, Genève 1946Google Scholar. I am indebted to H.A.H. Audietsch, Communautaire Controle, Deventer 1975, for drawing my attention to the latter publication.

134. Van Asbeck, , op. cit., n. 133 pp. 28–29.Google Scholar

135. Berthoud, , op. cit., pp. 284–289.Google Scholar

136. Van Asbeck, , op. cit., n. 133 p. 33 and, op. cit., n. 40 p. 20.Google Scholar

137. Van Asbeck, , op. cit., n. 40 p. 21.Google Scholar