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Government, Unions and Stagflation in the UK

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

Marcus Miller
Marcus Miller*
Affiliation:
University of Warwick
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Abstract

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Type
Articles
Information
National Institute Economic Review , Volume 109 , August 1984 , pp. 68 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © 1984 National Institute of Economic and Social Research

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Footnotes

∗

Thanks are due to Peter Law for comments and suggestions and to Mark Salmon for prolonged discussion of the techniques used here, developed in joint work we pursue elsewhere. Views expressed here and errors are my own.

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