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Reluctant Reconciliation: South Korea's tentative détente with North Korea in the Nixon era, 1969–72

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2019

CHOI LYONG*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and Sociology, Korea Military Academy Email: choiu2@kma.ac.kr

Abstract

This article discusses the impact and implications of Sino-American reconciliation on South Korea's policy towards its conflict with North Korea as well as its effect on South Korean politics in the early 1970s. Specifically, this article will examine how the Park regime altered its policy toward the North in response to the demands of the Nixon administration, before discussing the limitations of the policy in terms of the hostile approach of the Park regime toward Pyongyang during its talks with North Korea in 1972.

Based on recent findings in the South Korean and American archives, and an interview with former KCIA official Gang Indeok, this article contends that this particular focus provides an interesting case study to explain the impact of global changes on the domestic politics of specific nation(s) during the Cold War era. Along with many other American client states, the Republic of Korea misunderstood the objective of the United States before Nixon announced his Doctrine in 1969 and intention to reduce American support for Park. To be sure, it was not Washington's intention to build a democratic country in the Korean Peninsula. Rather, as Westad has indicated, the superpower sought greater control over the world and the expansion and extension of its power. This short article will thus demonstrate the process by which the client states of the United States—in particular, South Korea—came to understand the real aims of Washington and learned how to utilize these American intentions for their own national interest.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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Footnotes

Dr Lyong Choi is an assistant professor of political science at the Korea Military Academy. This work was supported by the Korea Military Academy Research Fund of 2018.

References

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34 ‘MAP and US Force Levels’, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70, Far East, Country Files, Box 541, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

35 National Security Decision Memorandum, Washington, 20 March 1970, Subject Files, Box 363, NSC Files, Nos. 1–50, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. Seoul on 25 March, transmitted a summary of this NSDM, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70, Far East, Country Files, Box 541, NARA.

36 Wukheui and Youngho, ‘Jeonhwangiui dongmaeng’, pp. 4–5.

37 ‘Letter from President Nixon to Korean President Park’, Washington, 26 May 1970, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea: President Park Chunghee, Box 757, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

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39 ‘National Security Decision Memorandum 17’, Washington, 26 June 1969. NSDM Files 17, Box H–210, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

40 The Taiwanese Clause was that Japan would allow the United States to use its base in Japan to defend Taiwan. See Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon (November 21, 1969), Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 953–957, accessed at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4731731.1969.001/1013?rgn=full+text;view=image, [accessed 23 May 2019]. For Zhou's speech in Pyongyang, see ‘Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai's visit to North Korea in April 1970’, 1970, Class Number 3598.725.32 CP, DA, ROK.

43 Shin Jongdae, ‘The Perception of South Korea on the Sino-US Rapprochement and its Ensuing Responses’, unpublished article, p. 11.

44 ‘Backchannel Telegram from the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)’, Seoul, 25 August 1970, 0910Z. Republic of Korea, August 1970. Vice President's Briefing Book, Subject Files, Box 406, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

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51 ‘Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research’, Washington, December 28, 1970, POL 15–1 KOR S, Central Files 1970–73, RG 59, NARA.

52 Chunghee, Park, President Park's Draft Collected Speeches, Vol. 8, pp. 380381Google Scholar.

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57 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 12–13.

58 Gang Indeok interview, 15 July 2009, Institute of Far Eastern Studies.

60 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 14.

61 ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, Washington, 1 September 1971, 9:30–11 am, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971, Far East, Country Files, Box 542, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

62 Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 751. See also Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 14.

63 ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State’, Seoul, 3 November 1971, 0728Z, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971, Far East, Country Files, Box 542, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

64 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 15.

65 ‘Untitled [After dinner at my residence the vice minister of foreign affairs Yoon Sukhun…]’, 1971.11.30, POL KOR S-US 9-27-71, Box 2429, RG 59, NARA.

66 ‘Letter from President Nixon to Korean President Park, Washington’, 29 November 1971, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Park Chunghee, 1971, Box 757, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

68 Kyunghyang sinmun, 11 January 1972.

70 During the inter-Korean Red Cross talks in Panmunjeom, Park declared a state of emergency in December 1971.

71 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 12–15.

72 ‘Letter from President Nixon to Korean President Park’, Washington, 29 November 1971, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Chung Hee Park, 1971, Box 757, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

74 ‘Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea’, Washington, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971, Far East, Country Files, Box 542, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

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77 Headline: Nixon's visit to China, Donga Ilbo, 21 February 1972.

78 Victor Cha describes this as ‘The regional détente trend extended to Korea’: Cha, V., Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999, pp. 4445Google Scholar.

79 In this official South Korean document, in both the Korean and English versions, the initial letter of ‘North’ was intentionally written in lower case.

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81 Gabje, Park Chunghee, p. 143. As mentioned above, he was not a staff member of the Red Cross but a KCIA official.

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87 Sangyun, ‘Anbowa minjujuui, geurigo Bak Jeonghuieui gil’, p. 174.

88 For instance, in 1967, KCIA agents kidnapped a number of Koreans in Europe, especially in West Germany, who were suspected as being agents of North Korea. The North Korean embassy in East Berlin provided funds for South Koreans in Europe to be educated on North Korean strategy. This has been called the ‘East Berlin’ incident. For details, see Gabje, Park Chunghee, Vol. 9, pp. 5–45.

89 ‘Yi[Lee] Hu Rak on Elections’, 4 July 1972, POL 14 KOR S 6/1/71, Box 2425, RG59, NARA.

91 For details, see Gabje, Park Chunghee, Vol. 10, p. 117.

92 Lee was born in 1924 and died in 2009. He was the director of the KCIA from 1970 to 1973. In the early 1970s, when the KCIA had more influence on Northern Policy, Lee was considered a possible successor to Park. See Junman, Gang, Hangukyeondaesa sanchaek [Modern Korea's Journey], Vol. 1: The 1970s, Inmul, Seoul, 2002, p. 196Google Scholar.

93 Gabje, Park Chunghee, p. 145.

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96 ‘Results of South Korean CIA Director's visit to North Korea, 2–5 May’, Memorandum from John A. Froebe, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 12 May 1972, Korea, Vol. V, 1972, Part 2, Far East, Country Files, Box 543, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

98 For the transcript of the Kim-Lee meeting, see Monthly Joongang, March 1989. The English translation can be found in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 23–24.

99 Lee's report to Park is not declassified.

100 The four powers are the United States, Japan, China, and the former Soviet Union.

101 ‘Results of South Korean CIA Director's visit to North Korea, 2–5 May’, Memorandum from John A. Froebe, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 12 May 1972, Korea, Vol. V, 1972, Part 2, Far East, Country Files, Box 543, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

102 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 23–24.

103 Seongjin, Kim, Park Chungheereul Malhanda [Talking about Park Chunghee], Life and Dream, Seoul, 2006, pp. 122156Google Scholar.

104 Gang Indeok interview, 15 July 2009, Institute of Far Eastern Studies.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Seongjin, Park Chungheereul Malhanda, pp. 132–156.

109 The books by Bruce Cumings and Don Oberdorfer, which discuss this subject, were published in the 1990s, and Kim Seongjin's work only appeared in 2006.

110 ‘Letter from President Nixon to Korean President Park’, Washington, 19 May 1972. Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1972, Box 757, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. The text of President Nixon's letter was transmitted in telegram 97271 to Seoul on 2 June, with a request that a copy should be delivered to President Park as soon as possible. Ibid., POL 15–1 US/NIXON, Central Files 1970–73, RG 59, NARA.

111 Ibid.

112 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 195.

113 Letter from President Nixon to Korean President Park’, Washington, 19 May 1972. Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1972, Box 757, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. The text of President Nixon's letter was sent by telegram 97271 to Seoul on 2 June, with a request that a copy should be delivered to President Park as soon as possible. Ibid., POL 15–1 US/NIXON, Central Files 1970–73, RG 59, NARA.

114 Nixon denied that the programme was discussed within the United States government several times in 1970. ‘The comment about reduction of US army in South Korea and reports on the press, 1969’, 1969, Class Number 729.23, DA, ROK. See also ‘National Security Decision Memorandum’, Washington, 20 March 1970, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1–50, Subject Files, Box 363, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA; Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70, Far East, Country Files, Box 541, ibid.

115 For details of the meeting of Park and Habib on 10 June, see ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State’, Seoul, 10 June 1972, 1119Z, POL KOR S–US, Central Files 1970–73, RG 59, NARA. For details of Lee and Habib's meeting and Lee's report, see ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, 13 June 1972’, 0939Z, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Far East, Country Files, Box 543, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

116 Lee's exaggeration of his role was criticized by others in the Park administration. See Seongjin, Park Chungheereul Malhanda, pp. 122–156.

117 Gabje, Park Chunghee, pp. 145–146.

118 Ibid., p. 146.

119 ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, 13 June 1972’, 0939Z, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Far East, Country Files, Box 543, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

120 Seungji, ‘Nambukwahaewa hanmidongmaeng gwangyeui ihae’, p. 109.

121 Selig Harrison, ‘Kim Seeks Summit, Korean Troop Cuts’, The Washington Post, 26 June 1972.

122 This analysis indicates that a few days after the release of this interview, on 4 July Seoul decided to agree to a joint communiqué with Pyongyang. ‘State's Analysis of North Korean Premier Kim Il-song's Proposals of 21 June’, Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 4 July 1972, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2, Far East, Country Files, Box 543, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

123 Donga Ilbo, 27 June 1972.

124 Kim already knew of Lee's visit to Pyongyang but was never told that Kim Ilsung and Lee had made agreements on the principles of Korean reunification. For details, see Daejung, Haengdonghaneun yangsim, p. 170.

125 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 26. Kim Seong Jin's quotes on Park are from Oberdorfer's interview with Kim on 24 May 1993.

126 Gang Indeok interview.

127 Gabje, Park Chunghee, pp. 158–159.

128 Korea International Cultural Association, Nambukdaehwa: nambukjojeolwiwonhoe, nambukjeoksibjahoedam [South-North Korean dialogue: South North Coordinating Committee and South-North Red Cross talks], Vol. 2, Korea International Cultural Association, Seoul, 1973Google Scholar.

129 Paul M. Popple, the director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, argued that inter-Korean talks affected both the status of the United States in Asia as well as ROK-US relations. ‘Memorandum from INR Paul M. Popple to Marshall Green’, 7 July 1972, POL 1 KOR S-US, Subject-Numeric Files 1970–73, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.

130 Ibid.

131 Yusin (lit. ’revitalization’) included constitutional amends that guaranteed Park Chunghee's additional and long-term presidency. The South Korean president indicated that the Sino-US reconciliation was one of the reasons for this institutional change. See ‘The Special Declaration’, 1972, Class Number 4783.701, DA, ROK.

132 ‘US Policy in Korea–Country Team Message’, 10 December 1972, POL 1 KOR S-US, 1973, Box 2429, RG 59, NARA; and ‘US Policy toward the Korean Peninsula’, 18 April 1973, POL, 27-7, KOR N, 5-5-70, Box 2421, ibid.

133 For the details of military conflicts between 1973 and 1974, see Lee Wanbeom, Kim Daejung napchisageongwa Park Chunghee jeogyeoksageon [Kidnapping of Kim Daejung and Assassination Attempt of Park Chunghee], Yeogsabipyeongsa, Seoul, 2007.

134 Gaddis, The Cold War, p. 198.

135 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 399.