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Containing the Crisis: Japan's Diplomatic Offensive in the West, 1931–33

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Sandra Wilson
Affiliation:
La Trobe University

Extract

Japan's departure from the League of Nations in 1933 over the Manchurian issue has often been portrayed as an act of national self assertiveness signifying a willingness to defy international opinion and pursue an independent course in world affairs. The physical act by Matsuoka Yosuke and his delegation of walking out of the League Assembly on 24 February promotes an image of a firm and uncompromising attitude on the part of Japan; and as time passed, the interpretation recorded in 1944 by Joseph Grew, US Ambassador to Japan from 1932 to 1942, became a standard one: ‘Nobody could miss the political significance of Japan's decision to quit the League of Nations. It marked a clear break with the Western powers and prepared the way for Japan's later adherence to the Axis’.

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 Grew, Joseph C., Ten Years in Japan (London: Hammond, Hammond, 1944), p. 73.Google Scholar

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7 There are many general descriptions of the Manchurian Incident and subsequent events. In English, see, for example, Ogata, Sadako N., Defiance in Manchuria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964);Google ScholarYoshihashi, Takehiko, Conspiracy at Mukden (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963);Google ScholarCrowley, James B., Japan's Quest for Autonomy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966);Google ScholarThome, Christopher, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972).Google ScholarIn this paper, ‘Manchurian Incident’ is used to mean the events near Mukden on 18 September 1931; ‘Manchurian crisis’ denotes the events between that date and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in February—March 1933 or alternatively, the truce of Tangku of May 1933.Google Scholar

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9 ‘Matsuoka Yosuke: The Diplomacy of Bluff and Gesture’, in Diplomats in Crisis: United States—Chinese—Japanese Relations, 1919–1941, ed. Burns, Richard Dean and Bennett, Edward M. (Santa Barbara, California and Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1974), p. 284.Google Scholar

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18 Debuchi to Foreign Minister, 15 March 1933, A. I.I.0.21–4–2, Vol. 9.Google Scholar

19 See Report on Matsuoka's visit to New York, Horinouchi Kensuke to Foreign Minister, 6 May 1933, A. I.I.0.21–4–2, Vol. 10. Matsuoka addressed, for example, the Japan Chamber of Commerce, 28 March 1933; the University of Oregon (of which he was a graduate), 7 April 1933. Matsuoka travelled from New York to Boston to Washington, visiting Yale and Harvard Universities amongst other places. He also spoke at Chicago and San Francisco before leaving for Japan on 12 April 1933. See also Lu, David J., ‘Matsuoka Yosuke—Kokusai renmei to no ketsubetsu’, Kokusai seiji, 2 (1976), pp. 94–5.Google Scholar

20 One speech by Ozaki is reported in the Foreign Ministry records: an address to 400 American and foreign dignitaries at the Eighth Conference of Major Industries in New York on 21 October 1931. See A. I.I.0.21–4–2, Vol. 1. The text of Ozaki's speech is also in the New York Times on 25 October 1931 (‘A Japanese Plea for World Cooperation’, Section 9, p. I).Google Scholar

21 See Report of Suzuki Bunji's tour, Sawada Setsuzo (head of the Japanese Secretariat at the League of Nations) to Foreign Minister, 3 February 1933, A. I. I.0.21–4–, vol. 9.Google Scholar

22 A. I.I.0.21–4–2, Vol. 5. A list of the organizations addressed by Holden, together with attendance numbers, is appended to this report. On Holden, see Doenecke, Justus D., When the Wicked Rise: American Opinion-Makers and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 (Lewisburg, London and Toronto: Bucknell University Press, Associated University Presses, 1984), p. 39.Google Scholar

23 Yonemura, , radio broadcast on 23 November 1931;Google ScholarNakazawa, , speeches on 15 December 1931 and 1 April 1932. All in A. I.I.0.21–4–2, Vol. 2.Google Scholar

24 A. I. I. 0.21–4–2, Vol. 11.

25 A. I.I.0.21–4–2, Vol. 10.

26 Debuchi to Foreign Minister, 15 April 1933, A. I.I.0.21–4–2, Vol. 9.Google Scholar

27 See Ota, , Part 4, Misuzu 294 (04 1985), esp. pp. 40–6;Google ScholarUshioda, Sharlie C., ‘Man of Two Worlds: An Inquiry into the Value System of Inazo Nitobe (1862–1933)’ in East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation, ed. Conroy, Hilary and Miyakawa, T. Scott (Santa Barbara, California and Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1972), pp. 199200.Google Scholar

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30 Teters, , ‘Matsuoka Yosuke’, p. 284.Google Scholar

31 Lu, , ‘Matsuoka Yosuke’, pp. 94–5.Google Scholar

32 Report of Suzuki Bunji's tour, Sawada Setsuzo to Foreign Minister, 3 February 1933, A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 9.Google Scholar

33 See, for example, A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, vols 4, 9, 10. For instance, one large pamphlet (379 pages, undated) by A. R. Tullie was produced in French. It was entitled ‘La Manchourie et le Conflit Sino-Japonais devant la Société des Nations’ (See Vol. 10).Google Scholar

34 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 8; ‘Japanese Attacks Policies of United States in Pamphlets Broadcast in Latin America’, New York Times, 23 November 1932, p. 1. There is a slight difference in wording in the passage cited between the New York Times original and the report in the Japanese Foreign Ministry records. Arai declared that ‘[t]he Japanese people do not harbor the slightest rancor against’ Spanish and Latin-American delegates at the League, despite their attacks on Japan. This was because ‘[f]rom the beginning it has been considered that such attacks were addressed indirectly at the United States as a reproach for her conduct respecting the countries in this hemisphere, for otherwise the attitude of those delegates cannot be understood’.Google Scholar

35 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, vols 2, 4, 5, 6; Wakasugi to Foreign Minister, 30 April 1932, Vol. 5.Google Scholar

36 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 10. A further sixty addresses in the USA are given in Vol. 11.Google Scholar

37 Kawakami, K. K., Manchoukuo: Child of Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 1933), vvi.Google Scholar A Kawakami article, ‘Manchuria Again’, was also reprinted from The Nineteenth Century and After. Three thousand copies of the resulting pamphlet were amongst the materials distributed by Wakasugi in California (see above). Kawakami, had previously published Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis (Macmillan, 1932).Google Scholar

38 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, vols 5, 6.

39 Rea, George Bronson, The Case for Manchoukuo (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century, 1935), viiviii.Google Scholar On Rea's career, see Hoyt, Frederick B., ‘George Bronson Rea: From Old China Hand to Apologist for Japan’, Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 69 (04 1978), pp. 6170. Despite an earlier pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese stance, Rea became, according to Hoyt, ‘Japan's most eloquent defender and the leading spokesman for American Japanese cooperation in Asia’ (p. 66). He was believed by other journalists to have been ‘bought’ by the Japanese side. See, for example, the Diaries of Captain Malcolm Duncan Kennedy, Vol. 23, 14 November 1931, Sheffield University Library. Rea died in 1936.Google Scholar

40 A pamphlet consisting of a selection of Woodhead's articles was distributed in Seattle, Alaska and elsewhere by the South Manchurian Railway Company. See also ‘Pregnant Points in the Manchurian Imbroglio’, by Mabel Ohgimi Jones, an English woman who was an interpreter at the Japanese Embassy in Madrid. A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, vols 6, 9. Vol. 9 also contains details of materials written by non-Japanese about Manchuria and other issues which were received by the Foreign Ministry and distributed within Japan. See also ‘Woodhead Debates Stimson's Doctrine’, University of Tokyo, Amerika kenkyu shiryo sentaa, Komaba. Papers of Takagi Yasaka, File 61.Google Scholar

41 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 6. See Vol. 4 for a list of names and addresses, mostly in Britain but also elsewhere in Europe, to which 480 copies of one publication were sent. See Vol. 9 for a list of influential people in Bangkok.Google Scholar

42 An established Japanese club called the ‘Thursday Club’ had co-operated in he formation of the Committee on Pacific Information and had been engaged in distributing pamphlets to Americans and in replying to anti-Japanese articles. Uchiyama also reported that an informal weekly meeting to discuss current problems had been started between Japanese and Americans. Report on Activities Relating to the Sino-Japanese Problem, Uchiyama to Foreign Minister, 26 May 1932, A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 5.Google Scholar

43 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 5. Matsuzawa's report includes a list of activities in China and a list of the more important of their Chinese contacts. The international YMCA, through its headquarters in Geneva, had appealed to all Christian churches and organizations throughout the world to support demands for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. It also advocated a boycott of Japanese goods.

44 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 10.

45 Lindley to Simon, 30 August 1932, FO 410/94, Foreign Office Papers, Public Record Office (PRO), London. On Lindley's views, see also Louis, William Roger, British Strategy in the Far East 1919–1939 (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1971), ch. 6.Google Scholar

46 Lindley, to Dawson, (editor of The Times), 2 09 1931,Google Scholar Geoffrey Dawson Papers, no. 76, fols 30–1, Bodleian Library, Oxford;Lindley to Dawson, 30 September 1931, no. 76, fols 46–9. See also Lindley to Dawson, 14 November 1931, no. 76, fols 59–71;Lindley to Dawson, 22 December 1931, no. 76, fols 77–81.

47 Lindley to Simon, 30 August 1932, p. 15, FO 410/94, PRO. See also Malcolm Kennedy's comments on Lindley's attitude: for example, the Kennedy Diaries, Vol. 26, 21 February 1933. Lindley's predecessor, Sir John Tilley, held very similar views of Japan and accepted Manchuria's importance for Japan, as did other British consular officials. Britain's representatives at Peking and Geneva, however, disagreed with Lindley: see Louis, British Strategy, pp. 175, 182–3. See also ‘The Banff Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations: an English Impression’ [Report by Archibald Rose to Chatham House?], Takagi Papers, File 75.Google Scholar

48 ‘Notes of a Talk with Simon at the F.O. on 14th March, 1932’, Dawson Papers, no. 76, fols 134–7, Bodleian Library. Quotations from the Dawson Papers are by permission of Mr and Mrs William Bell.Google Scholar

49 Journal, Forbes Papers, Vol. 8, 3 December 1931 (pp. 510–20), Houghton Library;Bates College Commencement Address, 13 June 1932 (p. 4), Speeches and Articles, Forbes Papers, Box 4. Quotations by permission of the Houghton Library. Forbes also believed that Japanese army officers were probably responsible for the explosion of 18 September 1931: see Journal, 3 December 1931 (p. 521); 10 January 1932 (pp. 540–1). He accepted that Manchuria and the rest of China were ‘banditridden’, but was aware that the ‘bandits’ were often soldiers or ex-soldiers who might have no other means of livelihood than ‘banditry’. See Journal, 10 January 1932 (pp. 539–40). On Forbes, see also Lensen, George Alexander, ‘Japan and Manchuria: Ambassador Forbes' Appraisal of American Policy Toward Japan in 1931–32’, Monumenta Nipponica, 23, 1 (01 1968), pp. 6689;CrossRefGoogle ScholarRoss, Gary, ‘W. Cameron Forbes: the Diplomacy of a Darwinist’, in Burns, and Bennett, (eds), Diplomats in Crisis, pp. 4964.Google Scholar

50 This paragraph is based on Kitaoka Shin'ichi, ‘Washinton taisei to “kokusai kyocho” no seishin: Makumari memorandamu (1935nen) ni yosete’, Rikkyo hogaku, no. 23 (1984), esp. pp. 101–10. On MacMurray and his memorandum, see also Buckley, Thomas, ‘John Van Antwerp MacMurray: the Diplomacy of an American Mandarin’, in Burns, and Bennett, (eds), Diplomats in Crisis, pp. 2748.Google ScholarIn Kitaoka's judgement, MacMurray could not be considered pro-Japanese in a personal sense. He preferred China and the Chinese and felt uncomfortable when living in Japan between 1917 and 1919. However, in policy terms he favoured Japan (see pp. 104ff.). Stanley K. Hornbeck, one of MacMurray's successors as Chief of Far Eastern Affairs and the State Department's foremost expert in East Asian affairs in the 1920s and 1930s, wrote a memorandum during the First World War which was very favourable to the idea of Japanese expansion into Manchuria, partly because ‘If we compel a strict interpretation of the “open door” in Manchuria may not doors be rudely burst open elsewhere which now are closed to Japanese; say in California?’Google Scholar(In Doenecke, Justus D., comp., The Diplomacy of Frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 as Revealed in the Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 5561.)Google Scholar

51 A. 1.1.0.21–4–2, Vol. 5.

52 Cohen, Warren I., The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American-East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 190.Google Scholar Ferdinand Mayer of the American Legation in China had argued in November 1927 that on ethical grounds the USA could not oppose Japanese plans in Manchuria ‘in view of measures we have taken in our correspondingly vital zone—the Caribbean’ (Ibid., p. 151.)

53 Ibid., p. 278.

54 Ibid., pp. 43, 278, 149, 280,176.

55 On US public opinion, see Thorne, , Limits of Foreign Policy;Google ScholarDoenecke, , When the Wicked Rise;Google ScholarRappaport, Armin, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931–33 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963);Google ScholarMay, Ernest R., ‘US Press Coverage of Japan, 1931–1941’ in Borg, and Okamoto, (eds), Pearl Harbor as History, pp. 511–17.Google Scholar

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57 Abbot, Willis J., ‘The Manchurian Situation’, Christian Science Monitor, 5 December 1931, in Takagi Papers, File 47. According to Thorne, the Christian Science Monitor in general terms openly supported Japan: Limits of Foreign Policy, p. 176.Google ScholarOn Abbot, see Doenecke, , When the Wicked Rise, pp. 38–9.Google ScholarAxling, William, ‘Be Just To Japan’, Christian Century (13 April 1932), included in Takagi Papers, File 61.Google Scholar

58 Rappaport, , Stimson and Japan, p. 21.Google Scholar See Ibid., pp. 18–21, 62–3 on British and French reactions; also Louis, British Strategy, ch. 6; Thorne, , Limits of Foreign Policy, pp. 174–5;Google ScholarMartin, Kingsley, ‘British Opinion and the Proposed Boycott of Japan’, in Japan's Aggression and Public Opinion, comp. and publ. National Southwest Associated University Library, Kunming, China (1938), p. 473.Google Scholar

59 Rappaport, , Stimson and Japan, p. 18.Google Scholar

60 Diaries, Kennedy, Vol. 26, 25 April 1933. For an outline of Kennedy's career and of the first part of the diaries,Google Scholarsee Pardoe, Jon, ‘The Diaries of Captain Malcolm Duncan Kennedy (1895–1984)’, Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, 11, ed. Chapman, John and Steeds, David (Centre for Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield, 1988), pp. 19. Kennedy produced several books. For a sympathetic treatment of Japan's problems, see especially The Problem of Japan, ch. 1. In this volume Kennedy emphasized the point that ‘irresistible economic pressure’ plus the necessity for Japan to safeguard itself against ‘the Soviet menace’ led to the Manchurian Incident (pp. 111–12).Google Scholar

61 Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 200–1.

62 Cited in Louis, British Strategy, p. 200.

63 Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 78, 124.

64 Attitudes to Japan's actions expressed by the smaller states belonging to the League of Nations are beyond the scope of this paper. However, it should be noted that they were often much more critical of Japan. See, for example, Thorne, , Limits of Foreign Policy, pp. 213, 332–4.Google Scholar

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66 Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Reel 82, 14 December 1931, Yale University Library (copy in University Library, Cambridge, England). See also Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, 25 February 1932, where Stimson expresses some sympathy with Japan's economic ‘rights’ in Manchuria.Google Scholar

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74 27 August 1932 et seq., pp. 198–9, Diary, Grew Papers (Letters, Vol. 58).

75 Letter to Hugh Wilson, 5 December 1932, Letters, Vol. 55.

76 Nakamura, , The Japanese Monarchy, p. 41. See also Herbert P. Bix's Preface to this volume, viii-ix, and Heinrichs, American Ambassador, pp. 192–6.Google Scholar

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81 1 June 1932, Stimson Diaries, Reel 4, Vol. 22; 27 February 1933, Reel 5, Vol. 26.

82 Letter to Stimson, 8 October 1932, Letters, Vol. 57, Grew Papers; Diary, 7 October 1932 (Letters, Vol. 58); Miscellaneous Notes, September 1933, after p. 694 in Letters, Vol. 65.Google Scholar

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90 Louis, , British Strategy, pp. 187–8. See also p. 200.Google Scholar

91 Cohen, , Chinese Connection, p. 181.Google Scholar

92 Rappaport, , Stimson and Japan, pp. 174–5;Google ScholarThome, , Limits of Foreign Policy, p. 124.Google Scholar

93 Cohen, , Chinese Connection, p. 280.Google Scholar

94 Halliday, Jon, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 353.Google Scholar

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100 Toshikazu, Inoue, ‘Kokusai renmei dattaigo no Nihon gaiko’, Hitotsubashi ronso 93, 2 (02 1985), pp. 210–29;Google ScholarOgata, , ‘Gaiko’, p. 50.Google Scholar

101 See Takafusa, Nakamura, Showashi I (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shinposha, 1993), pp. 164–6Google Scholar; on British overtures, Bennett, Gill, ‘British Policy in the Far East 1933–1936: Treasury and Foreign Office’, Modern Asian Studies 26, 3 (07 1992), pp. 545–68. It should be noted that Hirota Koki's ‘conciliatory’ foreign policy had hardened by late 1935.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

102 Grew, , Ten Years, p. 73.Google Scholar

103 See Tadashi, Fujino, ‘Showa shoki no “jiyushugisha”: Tsurumi Yusuke o chushin toshite’, Nihon rekishi, no. 415 (December 1982), p. 71.Google Scholar

104 This is Brooks’, Barbara J. argument in ‘The Japanese Foreign Ministry and China Affairs: Loss of Control, 1895–1938’, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1991, ch. 4.Google Scholar

105 Ibid.