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Opposition in International Law – Alternativity and Revisibility as Elements of a Legitimacy Concept for Public International Law



As international law is widening in regulatory scope and intensity, it arguably suffers from a legitimacy deficit. This article conceives of this deficit as a deficit in possibilities to politicize, criticize, and contest international law-making proposals in the way a loyal opposition does in a domestic constitutional context: through the representation of relevant societal interests, the voicing of critique, and the safeguarding of alternative proposals for the future. The author of this article tries to bring together the current debate in political theory on the value of legitimate disagreement and dissent in political institutions and the ongoing discussion on the legitimacy of international law. Therefore, a concept of an institutionalized opposition for international law-making processes is developed, referencing authors such as Hannah Arendt and Claude Lefort. Next, the author analyses whether one can already find instances of an institutionalized opposition in international law – in parliamentary assemblies and in international agreements which are designed to present a legal–political counterweight to specific legal concepts and institutions.



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1 See Charnovitz, S., ‘Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law’, (2006) 100 AJIL 348, at 348–72; A. Peters, Jenseits der Menschenrechte – die Rechtsstellung des Individuums im Völkerrecht (2014).

2 See the first two volumes of the project International Public Authority: Bogdandy, A. v. et al. (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (2010); Bogdandy, A. v. and Venzke, I. (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking (2012).

3 See J. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2005), at 121; J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2009), 227.

4 A highly-instructive account of the sectoralization of public international law as a loss of universal political means of expression can be found in Bast, J., ‘Das Demokratiedefizit fragmentierter Internationalisierung’, in Brunkhorst, H. (ed.), (2009) 18 Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft, Soziale Welt, special issue, at 185–93.

5 See J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999); J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (1999).

6 Established by UN SC Res. 1267 (1999) and modified several times; for details see (accessed 7 August 2015).

7 See Almquist, J., ‘A Human Rights Critique of European Judicial Review: Counter-Terrorism Sanctions’, (2008) 57 ICLQ 303; Fassbender, B., ‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process’, A Study commissioned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs and Follow-Up Action by the United Nations, 20 March 2006 (final), (2006) 3 International Organizations Law Review 437, at 437–85.

8 However, there is an abundance of scholarly debate on the binding force of human rights in international organizations: see C. Janik, Die Bindung internationaler Organisationen an internationale Menschenrechtsstandards (2012); Simma, B. and Alston, P., ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, (1992) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law 82, at 82–108.

9 C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against their Will’, (1993) IV RdC 241, at 195, 269ff.; J. Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law’, (2004) 64 ZaöRV 547, at 547, 557; L. Helfer, ‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’, (2008) University of Illinois Law Review 71; Simma, B., ‘Consent: Strains in the Treaty System’, in Macdonald, R. St. J. and Johnston, D. M. (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law (1983), at 485; B. Simma, ‘From Bateralism to Community Interest in International Law’, (1994) RdC 250, at 217.

10 To paraphrase Renaud Dehousse, who has described this phenomenon in the context of the EU: Dehousse, R., ‘Constitutional Reform in the European Community. Are there Alternatives to the Majority Avenue?’, in Hayward, J. E. S. (ed.), The Crisis of Representation in Europe (1995), at 118, 123; see also J. Weiler, ‘Europe in Crisis – On “Political Messianism”, “Legitimacy” and the “Rule of Law”’, (2012) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 248, 248, 251 et seq.

11 G. Leibholz, Repräsentation, in Evangelisches Staatslexikon II (1987), at 2988; See G. Leibholz, Das Wesen der Repräsentation und der Gestaltwandel der Demokratie im 20. Jahrhundert (1966), at 196 et seq.; Luhmann, N., ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, (1971) 57 ARSP 1, 19, 27.

12 For a critical perspective: Slaughter, A.-M., ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, (1995) 6 EJIL 503, at 503–38; Petersen, N., ‘The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law’, (2008/2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 33, at 33–84.

13 S. H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies in International Law (1927), at 81.

14 See the case of the The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, [Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 26.3.] PCIJ Rep., (1925) Series A No. 5, at 50; for a general perspective, see J. Klabbers, International Law (2013), at 288ff.

15 For an important moment of development of this idea during the French Revolution M. Troper, Les rélations exterieur dans la constitution de l´an III, in his La Théorie, Le Droit, L´État (2001), at 129.

16 For Germany: C. Schönberger, Parlament im Anstaltsstaat – Zur Theorie parlamentarischer Repräsentation in der Staatsrechtslehre des Kaiserreichs (1871–1918) (1997), at 301 et seq.; for France: Bates, D., ‘Political Unity and the Spirit of the Law: Juridical Concepts of the State in the Late Third Republic’, (2005) 28 French Historical Studies 1, at 69.

17 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (2006 [1955]), at 530 et seq.: ‘in the Continental systems this representation of the nation as a whole had been the “monopoly” of the state’.

18 With respect to the EU, see Koskenniemi, M., ‘International Law Aspects of the CFSP’, in Koskienniemi, M. (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union (1998), 2730.

19 See Jennings, R. and Watts, A. (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law (1992), § 36.

20 On the history of the concept, see K. D. Wolf, Die Neue Staatsräson (2000), at 35 et seq.

21 F. Meinecke, Machiavellism – The Doctrine of Raison D'Etat and its Place in Modern History (1984 [1924]), ‘Introduction’, at 1.

22 J. Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (1995), at 210.

23 See the exhaustive research of Cogan, J. K., ‘The Regulatory Turn in International Law’, (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 321.

24 Keohane, R. O., Macedo, S., and Moravcsik, A., ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism’, (2009) 63 International Organization 1, at 1–31.

25 J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999), at 10; see a similar argument in Kelsen, The Essence and Value of Democracy (2013 [1929]), at 82.

26 Lefort, C., ‘The Question for Democracy’, in Lefort, C., Democracy and Political Theory (1988), 1, at 15, et seq, 18 et seq.

27 In its mitigated form, this also applies to agreement types and organizations that operate on the basis of consensus decision-making, e.g. according to footnote 1 of Art. IX(1) WTO agreement; a more detailed exposition of these issues is to be found in chapter three of I. Ley, Opposition im Völkerrecht (2014), at 31 et seq.

28 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007), at 158; during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala in June 2010, the UK and France did not prevent the consensus of the compromise, but they did make declarations regarding their dissenting positions.

29 In social science, the phenomenon is called ‘negative integration’; see Caro de Soursa, P., ‘Negative and Positive Integration in EU Economic Law: Between Strategic Denial and Cognitive Dissonance?’, (2012) 13 German Law Journal 979, at 979–1012.

30 Peters, A., ‘Dual Democracy’, in Klabbers, al., The Constitutionalization of International Law (2011), at 263, 289.

31 S. C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will’, (1993) 241:IV RdC 195, at 195–374.

32 Wolfrum, J., ‘Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory Comments’, in Wolfrum, J. and Röben, V. (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (2008), at 1, 17.

33 N. Luhmann, Die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft, in his Soziologische Aufklärung 4 (2005 [1987]), at 69, 91 et seq.; on this element in the theory of Lefort: B. Flynn, The Philosophy of Claude Lefort (2005), 54.

34 J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Governmment (1995 [1861]), at 457.

35 Dahl, Vgl. R., ‘Reflections on Opposition in Western Democracies’, (1966) 1 Government and Opposition 2, at 7, 11ff.: ‘If freedom of dissent is thought (by most libertarians and democrats) to be a desirable freedom in itself, advocates of libertarian democracy have usually contended, as John Stuart Mill did, that an opportunity for the expression of dissenting opinions is also a necessary (though definitely not sufficient) condition for “rational” political action. The citizens of any country, in this view, need dissenters and oppositions in order to act wisely, to explore alternatives, to understand the advantages and disadvantages of different alternatives, to know what they want and how to go about getting it.’ On the historical achievement of the development of oppositions, see the editor's preface in Dahl, R. (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (1966), at xixix.

36 Lepsius, O., ‘Die erkenntnistheoretische Notwendigkeit des Parlamentarismus’, in Bertschi, et al. (eds.), Demokratie und Freiheit (1999), at 123.

37 P. Pettit, Republicanism (1997), at vii et seq., 21 et seq.

38 P. Rosanvallon, La contre-démocratie (2006), especially at 22 et seq., 126 et seq.

39 For an introductory overview see Peters, supra note 30, at 270 et seq.

40 Luhmann, , ‘Theorie der politischen Opposition’, (1989) 36 Zeitschrift für Politik 1, at 13, 20 (transl. by Ç. Yildiz).

41 Lefort, C., ‘The Question for Democracy’, in Lefort, C., Democracy and Political Theory (1988), 1, at 15, et seq, 18 et seq.

42 On the distinction between systematic and functional opposition, i.e. one that refers to concrete issues, see Mair, P., ‘The Europeanization Dimension’, (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 2, at 337, 343.

43 A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970), at 21 et seq.

44 For the importance of contestation in public international law, see Kingsbury, B. and Donaldson, M., ‘From Bilateralism to Publicness in International Law’, in Fastenrath, al. (eds), Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (2011), at 79; on the centrality of revisability: N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: the Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010), at 273.

45 Kennedy, D., ‘Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance’, (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 5, at 5; Marks, S., ‘Big Brother is Bleeping Us – With the Message that Ideology Doesn't Matter’, (2001) 12 EJIL 1, at 109; Shapiro, M., ‘“Deliberative”,“Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the EU?’, (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 341; Koskenniemi, M., ‘The Fate of Public International Law’, (2007) 70 MLR 1, at 1; Koskenniemi, M., ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset’, (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1, at 9; see also the critical account of the alleged neutrality of the European Commission by Weiler, J., ‘The Transformation of Europe’, (1991) 100 (8)The Yale Law Journal 2403, at 2476 et seq.

46 Kelsen, supra note 25, at 100; see the related account in J. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1954), at 69 et seq.; and fundamentally dissenting C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1988), on the contradiction between parliamentarism and democracy, for instance at 9 et seq.

47 H. Arendt, On Revolution (2006 [1963]), at 228; see M. Canovan, Hannah Arendt (1992), at 145, 224.

48 In the European or global spheres, however, democracy theories that do not depart from intersubjectivity or collectivity, but from the individual, are dominant, Bogdandy, A. v., ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’, (2012) 23 (2)EJIL 315, at 315, 323ff.

49 Calliess, C., ‘Das Demokratieprinzip im Europäischen Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund’, in Bröhmer, al. (eds.), Internationale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte (2005), at 399; Bogdandy, A. v., ‘Grundprinzipien’, in von Bogdandy, A. and Bast, J. (eds.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (2009), at 13, 64 et seq.

50 Art. 140(1)(b), Art. 141(1)(d) Swiss Federal Constitution.

51 Comprehensively: B. Habegger, Parlamentarismus in der internationalen Politik (2005); S. Marschall, Transnationale Repräsentation in Parlamentarischen Versammlungen (2005).

52 On the parliamentarization of public international law, see Ch. 12 in Ley, supra note 27.

53 See the comprehensive, so-called Cardoso-Report, UN GA of 11.6.2004, A/58/817.

54 See below (3.3).

55 See I. Feichtner, The Law and Politics of WTO Waivers – Stability and Flexibility in Public International Law (2011); Feichtner, I., ‘The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests’, (2009) 20 (3)EJIL 615, at 615–45.

56 Art. 6.2 PACE Rules of Procedure: ‘Insofar as the number of their members allows, nations delegations should be composed so as to ensure a fair representation of the political parties or groups in their parliaments . . .’

57 P. Schieder, ‘Die Rolle der Fraktionen im Europarat’, in Holtz, U. (ed.), 50 Jahre Europarat (2000), at 101 et seq.

58 Stegen, J., ‘Die Rolle der Parlamentarischen Versammlung als Motor des Europarats’, in Holtz, U. (ed.), 50 Jahre Europarat (2000) at 79, 82.

59 See (20 August 2014) (accessed 7 August 2015).

60 Schieder, supra note 57, at 101, 104 et seq.

61 See the investigation cited by Habegger, according to which both frontiers of conflict had approximately the same impact on voting between 1983 and 1994; Habegger, supra note 51, at 89. The seating arrangements in the Chamber [during sessions] reflect neither a national, nor a party-political order; instead, members appear as individual representatives. See M. Wittinger, Der Europarat (2005), at 140, para. 129.

62 See, for instance, A. Nothelle, ‘The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – Driving Reform’, OSCE Yearbook 2006, at 374, 377.

63 Statute of the Council of Europe.

64 Arndt, F., ‘Parliamentary Assemblies, International’, in Wolfrum, R. (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008), online edition, at para. 14; Habegger, supra note 51, at 118, 153 et seq.

65 Habegger, supra note 51, at 153 et seq; M. Wittinger, Der Europarat (2005), at 156.

66 Art. 36(b) CoE Statute.

67 In the version of Protocol No. 11.

68 On the procedure for the election of ECHR judges, see A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (2014), at 163 et seq.

69 According to Art. 36(b) CoE, he is appointed by the PACE, but in practice, the Secretary-General is mostly nominated from among the ranks of the Assembly. In the elections of 2009, however, the Committee of Ministers reserved the right to nomination, in order to appoint someone with governmental experience and thus improve the image of the Council of Europe; Agence France Presse, 24 June 2009: ‘Wahl des neuen Generalsekretärs im Europarat geplatzt’.

70 H. Klebes, Die Rechtsstruktur des Europarats und insbesondere der Parlamentarischen Versammlung (1996), at 14.

71 Habegger, supra note 51, at 121, n. 471.

72 H. Schermers and N. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2003), § 435.

73 Habegger, supra note 51, at 121, n. 469; Schieder, P., ‘Die Rolle der Fraktionen im Europarat’, in Holtz, U. (Hrsg.), 50 Jahre Europarat (2000), at 101; against established practice, however, the Committee of Ministers reserved the right to nomination in 2009, in order to nominate someone of high visibility for the position. Subsequently, the PACE refused to confirm the candidate during the first round of voting; press release of the PACE, 29 September 2009, ‘Thorbjørn Jagland elected Secretary General of the Council of Europe’, available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

74 See the Co-operation Agreement Concluded between the Parliamentary Assembly and the President of the ICRC – Exchange of Letters, reprinted in the Rules of Procedure of the PACE, at 244 et seq.

75 Schermers and Blokker, supra 72, at § 1725.

76 Holtz, U., ‘Der Europarat und die Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung’, in Holtz, U. (ed), 50 Jahre Europarat (2000), at 271.

77 Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, and USA.

78 Reprinted in the Rules of Procedure of PACE, at 226–40.

79 But according to Art. VIII (1) of the Rules of Procedure without the right to vote.

80 See the Co-operation Agreement between the organizations: ‘Arrangement entre le Conseil de l'Europe et l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économique’, November 1962, in particular Art. 11–13.

81 Co-operation Agreement Concluded between the Council of Europe and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – Exchange of Letters between the President of the Parliamentary Assembly and the President of the EBRD on co-operation between the Assembly and EBRD (1992), reprinted in the Rules of Procedure of the PACE, at 242.

82 Under the auspices of the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development.

83 See Ley, supra 27, at ch. 14.

84 This impression was confirmed during a telephone interview with with an employee of the Secretariat of the responsible Committee on Social Affairs, Aiste Ramanauskaite. According to her, there is a constant exchange between PACE and the EBRD; the expertise that the Parliamentary Assembly has gained in matters regarding Eastern Europe through its own missions is consulted and used particularly frequently. Thus, the co-operation goes far beyond the annual plenary debate.

85 See the proposals in Res. 1064 (1995), at para. 3.

86 See PACE Res. 1002 (1993), at para. 12: ‘The Assembly questions the need for the Bank to have such an expensive and prestigious headquarters. In order to ensure proper use of taxpayers’ money and to avoid the creation of a negative public image prejudicial to the Bank's work . . ., the Assembly urges the Bank to observe strict standards of cost-effectiveness in its internal administration, and to abstain from all conspicuous forms of representation, and to establish tighter budget controls and auditing of all its operations. The Assembly asks that the auditors’ report following their investigation into allegedly extravagant expenditure by the Bank be made available to its Committee on Economic Affairs and Development’.

87 See the affirmative statement in Res. 1040 (1994), at para. 2 und Res. 1064 (1995), at paras. 1, 2, Res. 1094 (1996), at para. 1, which nevertheless adds the proposal in para. 2 ‘that administrative expenses may be further reduced by making the bank's so far resident board of directors non-resident as well as smaller in size, thereby liberating resources for operational activities’.

88 See Ley, I., ‘Zur Politisierung des Völkerrechts – Parlamentarische Versammlungen im Außenverhältnis’, (2012) 50 Archiv des Völkerrecht 191, at 191–217.

89 Habegger, supra note 51, at 189 et seq.

90 Art. 1 WHO: ‘The objective of the World Health Organization . . . shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health’.

91 Habegger, supra note 51, at 219, 233ff.

92 Termed ‘Contested Multilateralism’ by J. Morse and R. Keohane, see J. Morse and R. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, The Review of International Organizations, March 2014, Open Access Publication, available at: (9 September 2014) (accessed 7 August 2015).

93 For representatives of the abundant literature on the conflict of regimes, see J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (2003).

94 For a definition of ‘living modified organism’, see CPB Art. 3(g): ‘“Living modified organism” means any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology”.

95 See N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (2010), at 189 et seq.

96 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 20 October 2005, available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

97 Art. III (2) GATT is of particular relevance, as it stipulates that no internal taxes or charges on imported products shall be levied, if no such taxes or charges are levied on ‘like’ domestic products.

98 Footer, M. and Graber, C., ‘Trade Liberalization and Cultural Policy’, (200) 3 JIEL 115, 119.

99 For an overview of the measures, see ibid., at 122–26.

100 See Art. 4(1) (cultural diversity), Art. 4(3) (cultural expressions), Art. 4(4) (cultural activities, goods and services); T. Voon, ‘Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization’, Melbourne Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 342, at 19, lists under ‘cultural goods’ films, videos, radio, TV, audio records, books, magazines, newspapers, and related services.

101 As formulated by Bill Clinton (cited in Azzi, S., ‘Negotiating Cultural Space in the Global Economy’, (2005) 60 International Journal 765, at 765, 767); see WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Audiovisual Services: Background Note by the Secretariat, 15 June 1998 (S/C/W40), at 30.

102 On the course of negotiations during the Uruguay Round with respect to this question, see J. Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (1999), at 212–15, 243–4, 310–12, 320, 324–27.

103 In terms of international treaty law, these are qualifications in compliance with Art. 19 VCLT.

104 Voon, supra note 100, at 25. See WTO, ‘Services Database: Predefined Report – All Countries’ MFN Exemptions, available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

105 See Ruiz-Fabri, H., ‘Jeux dans la Fragmentation’, (2007) 111 Revue générale de droit international public 1, at 43, 47–56.

106 UNESCO Constitution, 16 November 1945, available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

107 J. Pauwelyn, ‘The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, and the WTO’, ASIL Insight, 15 November 2005.

108 See Ruiz-Fabri, supra 105, at 43, 52 et seq.

109 Argued in particular by the Canadian Minister of Education, Sheila Copps; see Azzi, supra note 101, at 765, 768.

110 Azzi, supra note 101, at 765, 767.

111 Canada − Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/A/R of 30 July 1997.

112 Azzi, supra note 101, at 765, 767.

113 After the conclusion of a preliminary enquiry; see Preliminary Study on the technical and legal aspects relating to the desirability of a standard-setting instrument on cultural diversity, 12 March 2003 (166 EX/28), available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

114 Resolution 32C/34 of July 2004 (CLT/CPD/2004/CONF.201/5), available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

115 Burri-Nenova, M., ‘Trade and Culture’, (2008) 5 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 3: ‘entered into force on 18 March 2007 after an incredibly swift ratification process’.

116 The USA had left the UNESCO on 31 December 1984; owing to the increasing number of former colonial and socialist states, it perceived the organization as too ideological; in particular, the withdrawal came amid controversies over the New World Information order, which the US saw as an attack on press freedom. The re-entry of the US in 2003 is attributed to the fact that it wanted to influence the formation and contents of the UNESCO Convention.

117 Preliminary Draft of A Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions, UNESCO Doc. CLT/CPD/2004/CONF-201/2 of July 2004, available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

118 UNESCO, ‘What were the stages that led to the adoption of the Convention?’, (26 April 2013) (accessed 7 August 2015)

119 Details on the negotiations can be found in Conrad, Öffentliche Kulturförderung und Welthandelsrecht (2008), at 417–22.

120 According to Art. 29 of the Convention.

122 On this Footer and Graber, supra note 98, at 115, 119.

123 Exemption for measures that are necessary for the application of laws and other regulations, provided that they are not inconsistent with the GATT.

124 Exemptions for the protection of national cultural goods of artistic, historic, or archeological value.

125 On the possibilities opened up by the Agreement, see Wouters, J. and de Meester, B., ‘The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and WTO Law’, (2008) 42 JWT 205; Khachaturian, A., ‘The New Cultural Diversity Convention and its Implications on the WTO International Trade Regime’, (2006) 42 Texas ILJ 191.

126 See Burri-Nenova, supra note 115, at 2.

127 Graber, C., too, demands a ‘procedural interface between the law of the WTO and the CCD’, in his ‘The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity – A Counterbalance to the WTO?’, (2006) 9 (3)JIEL 553, 571; on the role that the Intergovernmental Committee of the UNESCO Convention could play, see at 574.

128 Ibid., at 553.

129 See Meidinger, E. E., ‘The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification’, (2002–2003) 10 (1&2)Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 211, at 211–316; Guéneau, S., ‘Certification as A New System of Non-State Global Forest Governance System’, in Peters, A. et al. (eds.), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (2009), at 379 et seq.

130 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, reprinted in the appendix to Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds – Request for a Waiver, G/C/W/431, at 6–21; available at: (accessed 7 August 2015).

131 See the definition in Section I, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: ‘ROUGH DIAMONDS mean diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 7102.10, 7102.21 and 7102.31’.

132 For a nostalgic obituary, See Koskenniemi, M., ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques and Politics’, (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1, at 1–30.

* Senior research fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg [].


Opposition in International Law – Alternativity and Revisibility as Elements of a Legitimacy Concept for Public International Law



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