1. [1991] 1 AC 107.

2. In order to avoid extensive use of expressions such as himself or herself, it will be assumed for the purposes of the discussion that A is male and B is female. This is the commonest situation in the cases, but is not universal: eg, Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, Thomas v Fuller-Brown [1988] 1 FLR 237 and Huntingford v Hobbs [1993] 1 FCR 45, where B was male. It makes no difference where the parties are unmarried, and even where they are married the presumption of advancement from husband to wife is unlikely to be decisive. In McGrath v Wallis [1995] 2 FLR 114, Nourse U's judgment begins: ‘Ever since the decision of the House of Lords in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, it has been my understanding that, in its application to houses acquired for joint occupation, the equitable presumption of advancement has been reclassified as a judicial instrument of last resort, its subordinate status comparable to that of the contra preferentem rule in the construction of deeds and contracts …’

3. See further below n 35, and text thereto.

4. See further below n 132, and text thereto.

5. It may be objected that this thesis, though acceptable as an argument for the way the law ought to develop, can no longer be accepted as a statement of what the law is, given that in many of the recent cases, including Lloyds Bank v Rosset itself, the analysis is in terms of common intention. It is possible, however, that the term ‘common intention’ is merely being used in a loose fashion, to describe A's intention to settle the property on trust, and whatever intention it is necessary to ascribe to B for her to show detrimental reliance. If by common intention is meant something else, more akin to the intention required for the parties to come to an agreement, then it necessarily follows that special principles are being applied in this area of law alone, in which case it is our view that such a development is contrary to both authority and principle.

6. [1986] Ch 638.

7. [1984] Ch 317.

8. See above n 1.

9. The categories are taken from Lord Bridge's speech, op cit n 1, at 132E-133G. Rosset itself was argued as a second category case.

10. It was claimed, for example, that Lord Bridge's speech became ‘the new orthodoxy’: Clarke (1992) 22 Fam Law 72 at 73 (col 2); Ferguson (1993) 109 LQR 114 at 115.

11. See above n 1, at p 132G. Hayton argues that Lord Bridge is equating these concepts: D Hayton, [1990] Conv 370 at 376, a view apparently shared by Morritt LJ in Lloyds Bank plc v Carrick [1996] 2 FCR 771 and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in Austin v Keele (1987) 61 AJLR 605 at 609. However, this is by no means clear from Rosset itself. See also P Ferguson, above n 10, at 118. Even Morritt LI in Lloyds Bunk plc v Carrick seemed prepared to accept that estoppel might raise different issues, and indeed dealt with estoppel separately, when considering (and rejecting) the first category Rosset argument advanced by Mrs Carrick.

12. Eg, Ungurian v Lesnoff [1990] 1 Ch 206, decided a few months prior to Rosset. There are, however, difficulties with analysing this case in trust terms: below n 49–51, and text thereto.

13. Ibid. An explicit example of this approach can be found in Stokes v Anderson [1991] 1 FLR 391, and the only recent exception, where estoppel was successfully argued, was Baker v Baker (1993) 25 HLR 408.

14. Above n 11; also D Hayton, (1993) 109 LQR 485 at 486, n 10, where he argues that apart from resulting trust cases, the only other category is equitable estoppel. The inference is that the first category must be equitable estoppel.

15. Eg, Stokes v Anderson, above n 13, and also the excuse cases, eg, Grant v Edwards, above n 6 and Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338.

16. Lord Bridge thought, at 133A that it was extremely doubtful whether anything less than direct contributions to the purchase price by B, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments, would suffice, at any rate for the creation (as opposed to quantification) of an interest. However, it has been argued that this is inconsistent with earlier authorities, and that it is unclear whether Lord Bridge intends to change the law: eg, P Ferguson, above n 10, at 118.

17. This proposition, which is central to our thesis, can be inferred from Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 and Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, and express statements can be found in Gissing v Gissing, per Lord Diplock at 904H, Cowcher v Cowcher [1972] 1 WLR 425, per Bagnall J. at p 429E, Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, per Lord Denning MR at p 520F, Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638, per Mustill LJ at p 651G.

18. The clearest example is Midland Bank plc v Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562, [1995] 2 FLR 915, which we argue is wrong: below n 111–112, and text thereto.

19. Eg, in Cook v Head, above n 17, and Eves v Eves, above n 15. There is new authority, which we contend is wrong, for the re-emergence of the constructive trust to determine quantification alone: see below n 111–112, and text thereto.

20. Gissing v Gissing, above n 17, per Lord Diplock at 905B.

21. Eekelaar [1987] Conv 93, criticises the concept of common intention, at pp 95–99, but does not cover the points we make here.

22. [1968] 1 WLR 180 at 188G–189D.

23. [1970] AC 777, per Lord Upjohn at 813E ff, per Lord Diplock at 821F ff. The words ‘common intention’ are used by Lords Morris, Hodson and Diplock, but Lord Upjohn's reasoning is essentially as stated here.

24. In Pettitt v Pettiti, Lords Reid and Diplock were prepared to impute intentions, but later authorities show that they must be inferred.

25. Re Ellenborough, Towry Law v Byrne [1903] 1 Ch 697.

26. [1971] AC 886 at 905E.

27. See above n 17.

28. He contrasts this with the ‘interest consensus’, where the parties make an agreement as to the interest directly, which postulates an express trust, which must comply with s 53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925.

29. [1975] 1 WLR 1519 at 1525 B-E.

30. Since, in the following discussion, we are stating the law as we would contend it is, rather than merely as it ought to be, we must necessarily also contend that “common intention” has the meaning we have ascribed to it, above n 5.

31. In Drake v Whipp, The Times, 19 December 1995, Peter Gibson v said (obiter since the case was not eventually decided on resulting trust principles) that the ‘resulting trust … operates as a presumed intention of the contributing party in the absence of rebutting evidence of actual intention.’ The contributing party is B in our analysis. In the light of Westdeutsche v Islington BC [1996] 2 All ER 961, we must now accept that A's conscience needs to be affected, but that seems to require no more than that A is aware of the situation, and does not otherwise affect our thesis.

32. See above n 5.

33. [1991] 1 AC 107 at 129C; Gissing v Gissing, above n 17 at 905 A-B.

34. Ibid, at 905A.

35. Ibid, at 905B. See also Midland Bank plc v Dobson [1986] 1 FLR 171, where there was no reliance by B and hence no interest. We are not convinced that a constructive trust is actually necessary on the principles of Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 1996, applied in Hodgson v Marks [1971] 1 Ch 892, per Ungoed-Thomas J at first instance, at 907G-909B, per Russell LJ at 933, but to argue this fully would be to go beyond the scope of this article.

36. In Midland Bank plc v Cooke, above, n 18, the Court of Appeal also used a constructive trust to quantify B's interest, it being otherwise clear that there was a trust. There is no other authority for this approach, except for rather inconclusive dicta in Drake v whipp, above n 31, and if the case is correct Springette v Defoe [1992] 2 FCR 561 and perhaps Huntingford v Hobbs, above n 2, are wrong. We contend that it is Midland Bank v Cooke which is wrong. See further below, n 111–112, and text thereto.

37. In Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, B obtained a half share on the basis of A's declaration of trust, not having done anything significant that was referable to the property. B was also better off under the first category in Drake v Whipp, above n 31. Springette v Defoe, above n 36, is unusual in that B was better off in the absence of a declaration of trust.

38. See, eg, Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR Eq 11 at 14, where Sir George Jessel MR concentrates on the words used, observing that ‘however anxious the Court may be to carry out a man's intention, it is not at liberty to construe words otherwise than according to their proper meaning.’; Re Kayford (in liq) [1975] 1 WLR 279 at 282A where Megarry J talks in terms of an intention being manifested. Furthermore, all sorts of problems of uncertainty arise if a subjective test is adopted. Unlike the second category cases, however, the courts do not have to rely on presumptions, which can be rebutted. For this reason, if a case is arguable under either the first or second category, it will take effect under the first: the presumptions as to intention in Spritzgetre v Defoe, above n 36, were overridden in Savill v Goodall (1993) 25 HLR 588, where there was express (but arguably not very good) evidence of intention.

39. In Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527 at 531H, the statement, ‘The money is as much yours as mine’ was held sufficient by the Court of Appeal.

40. Below n 118.

41. Not legal and beneficial ownership, since transfer of legal and equitable title does not impose the obligations of trusteeship on A. This is why a perfect trust will not be inferred from an imperfect gift. Additionally, of course, A must not already have parted with the beneficial interest. In Lloyds Bank plc v Carrick, above, n 11, the existence of an estate contract, enforceable by B against A, prevented B from acquiring an additional interest under the first category in Rosset. Morritt LJ expressed the view (obiter) that by virtue of the estate contract (where the entirety of the purchase price had been paid and the purchaser entered into occupation), the vendor held the property on bare trust for the purchaser, and had therefore already parted with the beneficial interest. It was unfortunate for the purchaser, who had not registered her estate contract under the Land Charges Act 1972, and therefore lost her interest to a mortgagee with constructive notice. By contrast, a bare trust under the first category in Rosset does not require registration under the 1972 Act, but binds a mortgagee with notice.

42. Richards v Delbridge, above n 38 at 14.

43. Re Ellenborough, above n 25.

44. Gardner, (1993) 109 LQR 263 at 264–265. However, since in neither case did A actually intend to create a trust, these cases are good examples of B obtaining a share where there was no common intention.

45. Gissing v Gissing, above n 17, per Lord Diplock at 906B. It is not clear what, if anything, is the relevance of Gardner's observation, op cit n 44, at p 282 that the reasons given in each case were ‘objectively bad’, since the relevant test is what B might reasonably have thought.

46. In Eves v Eves, above n 15, the statement appears to have been made at the time of purchase. It may have been made earlier in Grant v Edwards, above n 6, but there is no problem in construing the defendant's intention as continuing until title was conveyed to him, at which point it became irrevocable.

47. Above n 17, at 521D. This may not have been the reason for the decision, however, and Karminski LJ certainly decided the case on a different basis: see below n 98.

48. See above n 39.

49. See above n 12.

50. Ibid, at 214F and 220F.

51. This should therefore have failed as an attempt to create a trust of future property, as in Re Ellenborough, see above n 25.

52. See above n 37.

53. Ibid, at 1131E.

54. Ibid, at 1131D.

55. Note that Vicky Mitchell's reliance was unconnected with the property in which she obtained a half share. Although there is limited authority that unlike estoppel, reliance needs to be linked in some way to the property for a constructive trust, in both cases, all reliance does is to get over the fraud hurdle, and we would suggest that there is no need for such a link. See further on the analysis of Ungurian v Lesnoff and Hammond v Mitchell, Glover and Todd, [1995] 5 Web JCLI.

56. See above n 38.

57. See above n 38.

58. There was no such communication in Re Kayford. In any case, there is no general requirement for a beneficiary to be aware of the existence of a trust.

59. See above n 36.

60. See, eg, the views expressed by Dillon LJ in the later case of McHardy & Sons v Warren [1994] 2 FLR 338, which are difficult to reconcile with his much stronger remarks in Springette v Defoe (which was not cited in the later case).

61. Steyn LJ was of the view in springette v Defoe that this was unacceptable:' Our trust law does not allow property rights to be affected by telepathy': see above n 36, at 558.

62. Midland Bunk plc v Cooke, above n 18, appears to hold the contrary, but it is probably not a first category case at all, rather a second category case where the only issue was quantification. See further below n 111–112, and text thereto, and Glover and Todd, [1995] 4 Web JCLI, where we argue that the case is wrong.

63. In Paul v Constance, above n 39, at 532 D-E, Scarman LJ observed that it was difficult to pin-point a specific moment of declaration. He also observed that this was a borderline case, and we would suggest that had it been impossible to pin-point such a moment, then no declaration of trusteeship ought to have been inferred.

64. Ferguson, above n 10, at 120-1; Re Sharpe [1980] 1 WLR 219, but note Browne-Wilkinson J's reservations about the position of a purchaser at 226G. The citations by Ferguson of Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd v Boland and Lloyds Bunk plc v Rosset are arguably inapposite since both of these cases could be argued as resulting trusts.

65. Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359, per Megaw and Stephenson LJJ; Ungurian v Lesnoff, above n 12, at 224E ff. See also Glover and Todd, op cit n 62.

66. Hayton, above n 11, at 380.

67. Lloyds Bunk plc v Rosset, above n 1, at 129C.

68. Gissing v Gissing, above n 17, at 905B.

69. Lloyak Bank v Rosset is less clear on this point, above n 1, at 129C and 132 F-G.

70. [1991] 1 FLR 391. Also Passee v Passee [1988] 1 FLR 263.

71. In Cowcher v Cowcher, n 17, Bagnall J observed, at 430D, that ‘[t]here can be no trust unless the nature and quantum of the several beneficial interests are certain at the inception, and during the whole life, of the trust’.

72. Eves v Eves, n 15, per Brightman J. at 1345G; Grant v Edwards, n 6, at p 6576. Note that in Hammond v Mitchell, above n 37, a half share could be inferred from the declaration.

73. But it was not altogether clear why it was rebutted by Brightman J in Eves v Eves. In Drake v Whipp, above n 31, Mrs Drake was awarded a third share, Peter Gibson LJ observing that ‘in constructive trust cases, the court can adopt a broad brush approach to determining the parties’ respective shares. ‘This seems wrong in principle where A's intention is clear from his declaration, but it was not in Drake v Whipp itself, and Mrs Drake's share appears to have been determined from all the evidence, including the respective contributions of the parties. Since she had never claimed more than a 40% share, it would clearly have been reasonable to rebut the half share presumption in the light of contrary evidence. The parties’ entire course of conduct together was considered relevant, and maybe this can be justified on an analysis similar to that in Stokes v Anderson, n 70).

74. As in Drake v Whipp, n 31, and Eves v Eves, per Brightman J. Lord Denning MR decided the case on different principles, as a pure constructive trust, but his views can no longer be supported in the light of Burns v Burns, above n 7, and Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1512.

75. Eg, as in Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340. It would have been impossible to reach the same conclusion on constructive trust reasoning.

76. This definition, which we assume is uncontroversial, is taken from AJ Oakley Parker & Mellows, The Modern Law of Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edn, 1994) p 189. There is a similar definition at p 27.

77. [1971] 1 Ch 892. Different reasoning was adopted by Ungoed-Thomas J at first instance, since Mrs Hodgson disclaimed relying on a resulting trust: [1971] 1 Ch 892, at 967C–969C.

78. Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq Cas 92, per Eyre CB at 93. The presumption can be rebutted if there is evidence to the contrary, for example that B intended to make a gift of the money.

79. On the principles stated by Sir George Jessel MR in Re Hullett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 at 708 (bottom of page).

80. Above n 17, at 431E. This would include a loan by V, where payment for the property is deferred.

81. [1986] 1 FLR 526.

82. Above n 2. Steyn LJ concurred only reluctantly that liabilities, as opposed to actual contributions, were to be taken into account at all: at 61H, although the possibility had been alluded to (eg) in Burns v Burns, above n 7, per Fox W at 3276. There is an alternative Rosset first category explanation, which Helen Norman appears to adopt, [1992] Conv 347, at 353, since formally both parties were liable to repay the mortgage, but there was a clear agreement and understanding between the parties that Huntingford would pay all the interest and endowment policy premiums: n 2, at 55.

83. Philip Wylie, [1993] Fam Law 176, has observed that the actual calculation was incorrect, because the interests of the parties were calculated on the net proceeds of sale after the mortgage had been repaid. The correct approach would have been to calculate them on the total value of the property, deducting from Huntingford's 39% share the outstanding debt on the mortgage.

84. Above n 1, at 133A.

85. On mortgage instalments, see also Gissing v Gissing, above n 17, at 907E-W8E, per Lord Diplock; Burns v Burns, above n 7, per Fox LJ at 327D, per May LJ at 344G.

86. Gissing v Gissing, per Lord Diplock at 909G; Burns v Burns, per Fox ff at 328H-329C; per May LJ at pp 344H-345C; Ferguson, op cit n 10, at 116. The statements apply to acquisition of a share, but we suggest, below n 109–112, and text thereto, that there is no good basis for a distinction between acquisition and quantification of B's share.

87. See below n 92, and text thereto. See also Marsh v Von Sternberg, above n 81.

88. See above n 36.

89. See especially per Dillon LJ at 556. See above n 59, and text thereto for reasons for rejecting an express declaration of trusteeship by A.

90. See above n 81.

91. [1995] 2 FCR 313, at 319D.

92. This is essentially the money consensus approach from Cowcher v Cowcher, n 17. In Gissing v Gissing, n 17, Lord Diplock, at 906 E-H, took the view that any conduct subsequent to acquisition could, in the absence of a fresh agreement, be relevant only if it provided evidence as to the common intention of the parties at initial acquisition. This is similar to the position we adopt here, except that we would suggest that Lord Diplock should have been looking for evidence as to an initial declaration of trust by A, rather than an intention common to A and B.

93. Above n 7, at 327D.

94. This is the ratio of Williams & Glyn 's Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] AC 487. See also Hodgson v Marks [1971] 1 Ch 892, where the Court of Appeal decision was that a third party was bound by Mrs. Hodgson's resulting trust interest, and Jones v Jones [1977] 1 WLR 438, where an administratrix was bound by a quarter share determined on resulting trust principles. The assumption in Lloyds Bank v Rosset was also that the bank would have been bound had Mrs Rosset successfully claimed an interest under the second category.

95. It is suggested, however, that this is purely a matter of semantics. The substantive distinction discussed in Re Densham [1975] 1 WLR 1519 does not apply, because B has given value for her interest.

96. See above n 86.

97. Burns v Burns, n 7, per Fox LJ, at 329C.

98. Eg, Cook v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, per Karminski LJ at 522H.

99. See above n 7, at 328H.

100. Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129.

101. As in Thomas v Fuller-Brown, above n 2.

102. See above n 2.

103. [1970] AC 777 at 794–795. He rejected Pettitt's claim to a beneficial interest solely on the ground that his improvements were of an ephemeral character, and that it would be unreasonable for him to obtain a permanent interest in the house in return for making improvements of this character: at p 796E.

104. Above n 17, one of the factors in assessing Miss Cooke's share being the value of her labour. See also Drake v Whipp, n 31, where subsequent improvements were taken into account. Although this was a first category case, the reasoning is essentially similar to that adopted here, in that the subsequent improvements were (we would suggest) taken to be evidence of A's intention at the time of acquisition.

105. [1972] 1 WLR 1286. The inference here must have been a declaration of trust by A post-acquisition.

106. This point was not taken in Hussey v Palmer; presumably, had property values risen, Mrs Hussey could have claimed more than the £607 paid by her for the extension.

107. But cf Drake v Whipp, n 31, where there were, sufficient at any rate to justify the acquisition of an interest by Mrs Drake, even if too vague to quantify it.

108. Essentially the situation in Midland Bank v Cooke, n 18. It should also be noted that Lord Bridges's views in Rosset, n 84, and those of Fox and May LJJ in Burns v Burns, n 86, relate only to acquisition.

109. See below n 151–155, and text thereto.

110. As Bagnall J observed in Cowcher v Cowcher, n 17, at 432 D-E.

111. See above n 18.

112. Similar views were also expressed in Drake v Whipp, above n 31, a first category case, but we would suggest that Drake v Whipp is in fact explicable on the principles discussed above: see above n 73.

113. Eg, the cases cited above n 17.

114. Above n 36.

115. Above n 2.

116. See further our arguments advanced, above n 55.

117. Ibid.

118. Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498, at 1508-9, and see also Christine Davies, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Future Interests and Future Property’ [1996] Conv 193. Promissory estoppel is distinguished from common law estoppel by requiring only statements as to future intent: Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130. As with the express trust, however, A's intention is objectively inferred: Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179. On this basis, the conversations relied on in Unguriun v Lesnoff, n 12, would have sufficed to found an estoppel.

119. Requirements for reliance are set out by Mustill LJ in Grant v Edwards, n 6, at 652 A-C. Unlike his brethren, he appears to decide the case on estoppel principles; at any rate he rules out an immediate declaration of trust, at 653D.

120. Crabb v Arun District Council, n 118, per Scarman v at 198G-H.

121. See, eg, Baker v Baker, n 13.

122. See, eg, Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115, per Russell LJ at 1115 (col 2).

123. Dodsworth v Dodsworth should be compared with Ungurian v Lesnoff, n 12, a trusts case where the interest created, a life tenancy, gave Mrs Lesnoff, as a life tenant under the Settled Land Act 1925, powers far greater than contemplated by either of the parties. This will cease to be a problem when the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996

124. Eg, Hayton, op cit n 11, at 380ff; Ferguson, op cit n 10; Battersby, [1991] Conv 36.

125. Ibid, at 38–39.

126. But see Battersby's own contrary view, Ibid, at 45, repeated in (1995) 58 MLR 637, at 642. This is however a discussion of Crabb v Arun District Council, n 118, where the estoppel could hardly have been crystallised as anything apart from a proprietary easement. It is difficult to see how the argument can work where it is not known, in advance of a court case, whether a proprietary interest (or indeed, any right at all) will be granted.

127. Op cit n 11, at 384. Also cases such as Stokes v Anderson, n 13, where again B's interest can vary over time.

128. Todd, [1981] Conv 347; Battersby, op cit n 124, at 39–44; Glover and Todd, op cit n 55. The difficult cases are ER Ives Investments v High [1967] 2 QB 379, which may be explicable on other grounds, and Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29, which is difficult to reconcile with National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, and is probably wrong. The thud party who was bound in Jones v Jones, n 94, was an administratrix of the representor, and the case provides no authority for the position of purchasers.

129. As in, eg, Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431. Todd's argument, op cit n 128, at 357–8, that this may not in reality have been an estoppel case at all, must be revised in the light of later authorities, eg, Baker v Baker, n 13, which clearly treat the earlier case as one of proprietary estoppel. See also Re Basham, n 118, where a constructive trust was imposed to satisfy a proprietary estoppel.

130. [1979] Ch 291.

131. Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1989] Ch 1, overruled by the House of Lords, but on other grounds, in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body [1992] 2 AC 386. Where the contract creates an interest in land, a third party will be bound: Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 20 Ch D 9.

132. Pullan v Koe [1913] 1 Ch 9.

133. Hence, declarations of trust in personalty do not require writing under s 53(l)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925 or its precursor: Milroy v Lord, per Turner LJ at 803 (col 1); Re Vandervell's Trusts (No 2) [1974] 1 Ch 269, per Lord Denning MR at 320E.

134. [1948] 2 All ER 133.

135. Above n 1, eg, at 132G. See also Midland Bank plc v Cook, n 18, where constructive trust reasoning is used in quantification, which we have argued is wrong: see above n 111–112, and text thereto.

136. Lord Denning MR quoted Gissing v Gissing, above n 17, only at 905 B-C, without tying this paragraph in with the one before it, where Lord Diplock clearly talks in terms of an express declaration. Lord Diplock's reasoning at 906 B-D does not envisage an express declaration, but there he appears to be talking about what later became the second category in Rosset, where there is obviously no need for an express declaration.

137. Eg, Burns v Burns, n 7, at 343C.

138. See above n 64. See also Re Busham, n 118, where a similar approach is taken.

139. See above n 131, per Fox LJ at 25 B-D.

140. See also Hayton, op cit n 14, at 486, n 10.

141. This depends on whether they give rise to full proprietary interests. See the authorities referred to above n 64–65, and Browne-Wilkinson J in Re Sharpe, but in the latter case a note of caution is sounded about purchasers: see above n 64.

142. Eg, Lord Denning MR in Binions v Evans, n 65.

143. Op cit n 10, at 117.

144. [1980] 1 WLR 1306, at 1311 B–F, per Lord Denning MR.

145. Op cit n 10, at 119.

146. Note that this is not the same link as that alluded to by Browne LJ and Brightman J in Eves v Eves, above n 15, which was a link between the reliance and the statement. Clearly, such a link would always need to be shown, merely to establish a causal relationship.

147. See above n 37.

148. Bedson v Bedson [1965] 2 QB 666.

149. This was the position in Springette v Defoe, n 36, although in that case the sexes of the parties were reversed.

150. Unless the disposition arguments considered above n 110, and text thereto, are regarded as attractive, but in that case writing is clearly required under s 53(1)(c).

151. [1979] 1 Ch 312. For discussion of this issue, see in particular Lord Denning MR at 329 F-G, 331A, Ormrod LI at 333H, 3366; Browne LJ at 340F, 341C. See also Stuart Anderson (1984) 100 LQR 86. When the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 comes into force, then it will be impossible to argue that A's interest is in personalty only, since section 3 abolishes the doctrine of conversion in this situation.

152. [1981] AC 487.

153. Wording which, as Browne LI observed, was wider than ‘interest in land’. See also Elias v Mitchell [1972] Ch 652, which suggests that A would be a ‘person interested’ within the Land Registration Act 1925, s 54(1).

154. National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175.

155. [1986] 1 WLR 783.

156. Green, (1984) 47 MLR 385 at 398.

157. Gissing v Gissing, above n 17, at 905B. But see also Drake v Whipp, above n 31, for an express disapproval of a similar confusion of terminology.

158. This statement is in any event contradicted by other authorities: see above n 86.