Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-xm8r8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-23T03:20:34.208Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

How Courts Govern America, by Richard Neely. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, xvii + 226 + (index) 6 pp; (hardback £10.50)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Hjalte Rasmussen
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Book Review
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , March 1983 , pp. 94 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. Nagel, Stuart S. ‘Court-Curbing Periods in American History’ (1964–65) 18 Vanderbilt Law Review 925–944 Google Scholar.

2. Cf. below, 3. On Law and Policy in the Court of Justice of the European Community. And 30 Ans de Droit Communautaire (EC Commission ed., Brussels, 1982 (an English version forthcoming in 1983)), especially Hjalte Rasmussen La Cour de Justice-Compétences.

3. f5. Harvard University Press (1977).

4. Neely op. cit. p. 12.

5. Inter alia on pp. 12 et seg., op. cit.

6. Neely, op. cit. p. 22 Google Scholar.

7. Neely, op. cit. p. XII Google Scholar. Chapters 2–5 deal comprehensively with the circumstances which Neely cites in support of his ‘structural-infirmity’ contention.

8. In The Constitution of the United States (1922), Beck, James M. compared the work of the Supreme Court to that of a continuous constitutional convention. Quoted in Berger op. cit. p. 2, n. 2Google Scholar.

9. Cf., e.g. Neely, op. cit. p. 18 Google Scholar. Cf. also numerous references in Berger op. cit.

10. Neely, op. cit. p. 13 Google Scholar.

11. 297 US 1 (1936).

12. Neely, op. cit. p. 10 Google Scholar.

13. A. Donner ‘The Constitutional Powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (1974) 11 CML Rev 139–140. Compare also Feld and Slotnik ‘Judicial Integration (1976) 25 Emory Law Journal 317, 352–353.

14. Neely, Cf. op. cit. p. 3 Google Scholar.

15. Cf. Choper, Jesse H., Judicial Review and The Notional Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

16. Neely, op. cit. p. 3 Google Scholar.

17. Neely, op. cit. p. 21 Google Scholar.

18. Berger, op. cit. p. 3 Google Scholar with references in n. 3.

19. Diplock, Lord, ‘The Courts as Legislators’ in Harvey, B. W. (ed.), The Lawyer and Justice (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1978) p. 266 Google Scholar. See for a comprehensive analysis of modern views on judicial review, M. Cappelletti ‘The Law-Making Power of the Judge and Its Limits. A Comparative analysis, (1981) 8 Monash Law Review p. 21 et seq.

20. Neely, op. cit. p. XIII Google Scholar.

21. Neely, op. cit. p. XII Google Scholar.

22. The Imperial Presidency (Public Library ed., 1973) p. 3. Cf. also Huntington, Samuel P. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Harvard University, 1981)Google Scholar; Book Review by Rogers M. Smith in (1981) 95 Harv L Rev pp. 1691 et seq.

23. Cf. e.g. Miller, Arthur S. Social Change and Fundamental Law (Greenwood Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

24. Courts are also designed to serve a conflict-resolution function among private litigants; but Neely submits, ‘when it comes to private law suits and criminal prosecution, courts do not work’, op. cit. p. XII.

25. In the Public Interest (1975) pp. 104 et seq.

26. Neely, op. cit. p. 16 Google Scholar.

27. Neely, op. cit. p. 22 Google Scholar.

28. Cf. e.g. pp. 206 et seq.

49. Ibid.

30. Cf. Ch. 6.

31. Cf. Ch. 7.

32. Neely, op. cit. p. 16 Google Scholar.

33. Pp. 216–217.

34. Its title is: On Law and Policy in the Court of Justice of the European Communities. All documentation, including comprehensive case-analysis, will be given in this book. Regard to space here prohibits anything but a broad canvassing of the issues and objectives of that new research.

35. Pierre Pescatore, Judge and Professor, for one shares in this view. Cf. ‘Role et Chance des Juges dans la Construction de l'Europe’ in Papers from 1973 - FIDE Conference p. 11.

36. Collected Legal Papers (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co) p. 296 Google Scholar.

37. Cf. book with that title: Federalism and Supreme Courts and Integration of legal systems (Pescatore and McWhinney, eds., Editions UGA, 1973)Google Scholar.

38. Cf. remarks about the Court's inefficient judicial review power vis-à-vis state acts by Feld and Slotnik, ‘“Marshalling” the European Community Court: A comparative study in Judicial Integration’ (1976) 25 Emory Law Journal 325.

39. This expression is borrowed from Gerhard Casper. Cf. Proceedings of the 72nd annual meeting of the American Society for International Law, April 1978.

40. See in detail Rasmussen Ch. 12.

41. See Case 139/79, Production Quotas for Isoglucose [1979] ECR 3393.

42. See inter alia Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263 and Opinion 1/78, Natural Rubber [1979] ECR 2871.

43. Opinion 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151.

44. Case 93/78 Mattheus v Doego [1978] ECR 2203.

45. Cases 36 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Assn v Ireland [1981] ECR 735.

46. See e.g. case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked [1981] ECR 181.

47. See e.g. case 47/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 453.

48. The expression is borrowed from Arthur S. Miller Judicial Activism And American Constitutionalism pp. 333, 336.

49. Limitations of space means they must be omitted here.

50. Alf Ross On Law And Justice (London, 1958) p. 151.

51. Maurice Lagrange ‘The Non-Contractual Liability of the Community in the ECSC and in the EEC’ (1965) CML Rev 10 (at p. 20).

52. See e.g. Hjalte Rasmussen Domstolen i EF (København, 1975) pp. 32–33 with references.

53. See Tribe, , Constitutional Law p. 49nGoogle Scholar; a comprehensive account of the impeachment process is found in Warren, Charles The Supreme Court, Vol 1, pp. 279–292 Google Scholar.

54. The word ‘influence’ is not here used in any concrete sense. The individual judge's voting record is secret.

55. For example, several US Justices postponed their retirements under President Roosevelt's first term of office in order to await the 1936 Presidential elections which might have brought a less progressive president into the White House. When Roosevelt was re-elected, resignations were reluctantly offered.

56. Hence, if country X continues to propose Judge Y, known for his strong pro-community convictions, he will in practice stay on the Court. Interestingly, on average, a new Member of the European Bench has been appointed every 12 months, enlargement included, while a new US Supreme Court Justice has been nominated every 22 months. Not a very noticeable discrepancy given that the latter are appointed for life and the former are given only six-year, renewable terms of office; see Mauro Cappelletti’ The Law Making Power of the Judge and Its Limits: A Comparative Analysis; (1981) 8 Monash University Law Review 15, 53.

57. It is recalled that President Giscard d'Estaing urged his colleagues in the European Council together to ‘come to grips with this Court and its illegal ruling’.

58. Compare, ‘Change in Constitutional Doctrine Through Legislation’ (1950) 63 Harvard Law Review 861.

59. Ross, Alf On Law And Justice (London, 158) p. 281 Google Scholar.

60. Articles 21–22 in the Statutes of the Court (EEC) gives the Court everything needed.

61. Introduced by Judge Brandeis (when still practising law) in Muller v Oregon (1908) 208 US 412.

62. Or, if restraint is actually shown, it might very well be for reasons of policy which are incommensurate with the Court's own possible admission philosophies.