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Fixing the misalignment of the concession of corporate legal personality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2023

Jonathan Hardman*
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh
*

Abstract

The nature of separate legal personality is a perennial debate in corporate law. This paper uses insights from a previous iteration of the debate to argue that separate legal personality is best seen as a two-step process: it is a concession from the state to something real. That real thing is the economic concept of the firm, which has been recently debated within institutional economics. Viewing separate legal personality as a two-step process lets us explore whether the concession of separate legal personality is operating as it should. Law imposes no prerequisite requirement that a firm exists before establishing a company, nor limits firms to only one company. Law thus facilitates misalignments between the firm and the company. Such misalignments will only occur if two constituencies within the company structure – the ultimate shareholders and directors – consider it in their interests to create such misalignment. As a result, these misalignments harm third parties by allowing risk to be exported to them through opportunistic misalignment. This paper then explores the methods of misalignment and reviews current legal tools which are available to be deployed to re-align the company to the firm, and argues that they should be deployed.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Society of Legal Scholars

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Footnotes

The author is grateful to all those who provided input into the ideas advanced in this paper, including Professors David Cabrelli and Laura Macgregor, the two anonymous reviewers and all participants at the LSE’ Systemic Risk Centre conference on the Institutional Theory of the Firm held on 16 and 17 June 2022. All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author.

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144 Above n 133.

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150 Companies Act 2006, Part 2.

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153 Historically, at least seven persons were required to incorporate a company: see Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s III, Companies Act 1948, s 1(1). This became two persons in the Companies Act 1985, s 1(1), and is now merely one person: Companies Act 2006, s 7(1).

154 Partnerships occur automatically: Partnership Act 1890, s 1 and s 2. Scottish partnerships have legal personality: s 4.

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156 Hardman, above n 7.

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165 See ‘Should shareholders be personally liabile for the torts of their corporations?’ (1967) 76 YLJ 1190; P Halpern et al ‘An economic analysis of limited liability in corporation law’ (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal 117.

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169 Often to achieve ‘structural subordination’, which prevents distributable profits repaying equity investments upstream until downstream debt has been reduced: see C Wells and N Devaney ‘Is the future secure for second lien lenders in Europe?’ (2007) 22 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 443.

170 Since Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, s 3: see discussion in Witting, Liability of Corporate Groups, above n 163, ch 3.

171 For example, Companies Act 1985, s 24 stipulated that if a company had a sole shareholder for six months, and the shareholder knew it, they were joint and severally liable for the debts of the company. See A Muscat The Liability of the Holding Company for the Debts of its Insolvent Subsidiaries (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996).

172 Arguably, limited liability conceptually follows personality: PL Davies et al Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 11th edn, 2021) para 2-008.

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