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Coercion and Compliance: A New Look at an Old Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Malcolm Feeley
Malcolm Feeley*
Affiliation:
New York University
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Extract

Despite the general recognition of its importance, it has been noted that there is a paucity of theoretical treatment of the problems of compliance to law (Krislov, 1966). While there is a vast literature dealing with rule-specified behavior, a direct focus on the peculiarities of legal rules and compliance to them seems to have been skirted in favor of more general treatments of social norms, less-structured rule and compliance systems, and basic or constitutional rules. And when law and the problems of compliance have received specific attention, it has usually been in terms of a broad, societal level, relating legal norms to cultural norms or focusing on “trouble cases” and instances of noncompliance. Detailed empirical studies in sociology have tended to focus on deviant behavior and its correlates, while in political science the approach has tended towards even less-general descriptions and case studies of the impact and consequences of legislative and judicial policy-making.

Type
Research Article
Information
Law & Society Review , Volume 4 , Issue 4 , May 1970 , pp. 505 - 519
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by the Law and Society Association

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