1. A very useful essay for reviewing the literature of foreign visitors or analysts and Costa Rican commentators on the “specialness” of Costa Rica is Chester Zelaya's “Democracia con justicia social y libertad.” He lists eight key factors used to explain the emergence of democracy in Costa Rica and observes that probably some combination of the following factors will explain it: colonial poverty, the absence of precious metals, the isolation of the colony, the small size of the Indian population, and the system of landownership and labor. See Chester Zelaya, Daniel Camacho, Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, Adolfo Cerdas, and Jacobo Schifter, ¿Democracia en Costa Rica? Cinco opiniones polémicas, 2d ed. (San José: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 1983), p. 26.

2. For an effort at generalizing about Latin America, see Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, Latin American Politics and Development, 2d ed. (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), chap. 2. Speaking of Costa Rica and a few other countries, the authors comment, “Where Indians and precious metals were scarce and hence Spanish institutions weak, … the possibilities for development and democratization have been better” (p. 23). The chapter on Costa Rica cites two additional factors to account for its democratic political system: its educated citizenry and the lack of a standing military force.

3. Rather than attempting to explain why Costa Rica has achieved its level of modernization, Edward Williams and Freeman Wright concentrate on factors that explain why the other countries have not. See Edward J. Williams and Freeman J. Wright, Latin American Politics: A Developmental Approach (Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield Publishing, 1975), p. 462. Approaches that employ the concept of “political participation” find much political activity in Latin America to be rational if not democratic. In this context, Costa Rican politics is not unique and exceptional in the area. See Political Participation in Latin America; Volume 1: Citizen and State, edited by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1978), chap. 1.

4. One statement of the many theoretical challenges to the problem of explaining the emergence of any democracy is found in Fabrice E. Lehoucq, “Explaining the Origins of Democratic Regimes: Costa Rica in Comparative Perspective,” paper presented at the meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, 17–19 Mar. 1988, New Orleans.

5. In deciding which books to include in this review essay, I was greatly aided by discussions with faculty at the University of Costa Rica, especially Professors Daniel Masis (Political Science) and Juan Muñoz López (Sociology).

6. In August 1984, the banking law was modified, after initial opposition by a group of nineteen PLN deputies (see Rovira, p. 86). The issue arose again during the Arias administration that followed.

7. Rovira is highly critical of Costa Rican treatment of labor unions. He quotes Manuel Rojas and Elisa Donato as saying, “If the tendency toward the deterioration and weakening of labor organizations does not turn around, it is possible that unionism in Costa Rica in the next few years may have a purely nominal existence, one without any real power.” Rovira adds that this judgment is only slightly exaggerated (p. 113).

8. Rovira mentions Monge's pronouncements in favor of U.S. aid to the Contras and in support of the attack on Libya (p. 95). Monge's successor, Oscar Arias, has also criticized him for collaborating with the United States, contrary to the proclaimed policy of “unarmed, active, and perpetual neutrality.” See “Arias critica al Gobierno de Monge,” La Nación, 6 Aug. 1988, p. 4-A. Even so, Monge asserted his foreign policy differences with the United States by supporting the Contadora process. Those differences have continued and sharpened with the advent of Arias and his formulation of a Central American initiative to replace the faltering Contadora process.

9. Earlier in his career, Arias published Grupos de presión en Costa Rica (San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1971), for which he received the Aquileo Echeverría Prize.

10. Things may have changed since Arias wrote Nuevos rumbos. Recent polls show that a majority of those sampled believed that the government was not interested in their problems (54.5 percent); that it serves the interests of the few (62.3 percent); that it misspends tax money (78.8 percent); and that many public employees are dishonest (59.3 percent). This poll was conducted by Investigaciones Psicosociales and reported in “Ticos tienen imagen negativa del Estado,” La Nación, 14 Oct. 1988, p. 4–A.

11. The collection contains statements by four former presidents—José Figueres, Mario Echandi, Daniel Oduber, and Luis Monge. Also participating in the symposium were Oscar Arias and Rafael Calderón Fournier, both of whom were then candidates for the presidency. ANFE has also produced an influential companion volume entitled El modelo económico costarricense (San José: ANFE, 1980).

12. Fernández has played an important role in the current Arias administration. He served as ambassador to the United States until recalled in February 1988, allegedly due to pressure from Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams. Fernández was then appointed Minister of Information, a position he holds at the time of this writing (late 1989). See “February,” The Tico Times: 1988 Year in Review, special issue, Dec. 1988, p. 10.

13. The most serious charges, involving questionable relationships between high officials and known drug dealers, have led to a major investigation by a special commission of the Legislative Assembly. The commission made the unprecedented demand that three supreme court justices and one deputy in the Legislative Assembly resign. See “Comisión pide renuncia de 3 magistrados y diputado,” La Nación, 24 Nov. 1988, p. 4-A.

14. Apparently, Arias as president continues to command public support for his peace initiative. In a public opinion poll conducted by Investigaciones Psicosociales, 44.9 percent of the respondents rated the peace plan as the greatest achievement of his government. See “El Gobierno en la mira ciudadana,” La Nación, 29 Jan. 1989, p. 8-A.

15. One minister resigned, three were shifted, and one was promoted from the rank of vice-minister. See “Arias Wins Key Victory in Shuffle,” The Tico Times, 9 Sept. 1988, p. 1. The background to the internal conflict is described by Eduardo Amador in “Los pleitos de Oscar Arias,” Rumbo, 27 Sept. 1988, pp. 8–11. The minister who resigned, Ottón Solís, did so primarily over opposition to the bank modernization law. He subsequently formed an association called Mi Voto por un Programa to elect a nominee for the PLN who would pledge himself specifically to change the newly enacted bank law. Solís's group endorsed Carlos Manuel Castillo, who went on to win the nomination of the PLN in February 1989.