Stastny and Lehner (2018) reported a study comparing the forecast accuracy of a US intelligence community prediction market (ICPM) to traditionally produced intelligence reports. Five analysts unaffiliated with the intelligence reports imputed forecasts from the reports after stating their personal forecasts on the same forecasting questions. The authors claimed that the accuracy of the ICPM was significantly greater than that of the intelligence reports and suggest this may have been due to methods that harness crowd wisdom. However, additional analyses conducted here show that the imputer’s personal forecasts, which were made individually, were as accurate as ICPM forecasts. In fact, their updated personal forecasts (made after reading the intelligence reports) were marginally more accurate than ICPM forecasts. Imputed forecasts are also strongly correlated with the imputers’ personal forecasts, casting doubt on the degree to which the imputation was in fact a reliably inter-subjective assessment of what intelligence reports implied about the forecasting questions. Alternative methods for comparing intelligence community forecasting methods are discussed.

Psychologists typically measure beliefs and preferences using self-reports, whereas economists are much more likely to infer them from behavior. Prediction markets appear to be a victory for the economic approach, having yielded more accurate probability estimates than opinion polls or experts for a wide variety of events, all without ever asking for self-reported beliefs. We conduct the most direct comparison to date of prediction markets to simple self-reports using a within-subject design. Our participants traded on the likelihood of geopolitical events. Each time they placed a trade, they first had to report their belief that the event would occur on a 0–100 scale. When previously validated aggregation algorithms were applied to self-reported beliefs, they were at least as accurate as prediction-market prices in predicting a wide range of geopolitical events. Furthermore, the combination of approaches was significantly more accurate than prediction-market prices alone, indicating that self-reports contained information that the market did not efficiently aggregate. Combining measurement techniques across behavioral and social sciences may have greater benefits than previously thought.

For connoisseurs of antiques and antiquities, cleaning old objects can reduce their value. In five experiments (total N = 1,019), we show that lay people also often judge that old objects are worth less when cleaned, and we test two explanations for why cleaning can reduce object value. In Experiment 1, participants judged that cleaning an old object would reduce its value, but judged that cleaning would not reduce the value of an object made from a rare material. In Experiments 2 and 3 we described the nature, age and origin of the traces that cleaning would remove. Now participants judged that cleaning old historical traces would reduce the object’s value, but cleaning recently acquired traces would not. In Experiment 4, participants judged that the current value of an old object is reduced even when it was cleaned in ancient times. However, participants in Experiment 5 valued objects cleaned in ancient times as much as uncleaned ones, while judging that objects cleaned recently are worth less. Together, our findings suggest that cleaning objects may reduce value by removing valued historical traces, and by changing objects from their historic state. We also outline potential implications for previous studies showing that cleaning reduces the value of objects used by admired celebrities.

Attitudes of public groups towards behavioral policy interventions (or nudges) can be important for both the policy makers who design and deploy nudges, and to researchers who try to understand when and why some nudges are supported while others are not. Until now, research on public attitudes towards nudges has focused on either state- or country-level comparisons, or on correlations with individual-level traits, and has neglected to study how different social groups (such as minorities) might view nudges. Using a large and representative sample, we tested the attitudes of two distinct minority groups in Israel (Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews), and discovered that nudges that operated against a minority group’s held social norms, promoting a more general societal goal not aligned with the group’s norms, were often less supported by minorities. Contrary to expectations, these differences could not be explained by differences in trust in the government applying these nudges. We discuss implications for public policy and for the research and applications of behavioral interventions.

Prior research using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) has established that political ideology is associated with self-reported reliance on specific moral foundations in moral judgments of acts. MFQ items do not specify the agents involved in the acts, however. By specifying agents in MFQ items we revealed blatant political double standards. Conservatives thought that the same moral foundation was more relevant if victims were agents that they like (i.e., corporations and other conservatives) but less relevant when the same agents were perpetrators. Liberals showed the same pattern for agents that they like (i.e., news media and other liberals). A UK sample showed much weaker political double standards with respect to corporations and news media, consistent with feelings about corporations and news media being much less politicized in the UK than in the US. We discuss the implications for moral foundations theory.

Previous research has revealed that intuitive confidence is an important predictor of how people choose between an intuitive and non-intuitive alternative when faced with information that opposes the intuitive response. In the current study, we investigated the speed of intuition generation as a predictor of intuitive confidence and participant choice in choice conflict situations. Participants predicted the outcomes of several National Basketball Association games, both with and without reference to a point spread. As hypothesized, the faster participants were to predict the outright winner of a game (i.e., generate an intuition) the more likely they were to predict the favourite against the point spread for that game (i.e., endorse the intuitive response). Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that the speed of intuition generation acts as a determinant of intuitive confidence and a predictor of choice in situations featuring equally valid intuitive and non-intuitive alternatives.

When people learn of the outcome of an option they did not choose (the alternative outcome) before they know their own outcome, they see an illusory negative correlation between the two outcomes, the Alternative Omen Effect (ALOE). Why does this happen? Here, we tested several alternative explanations and conclude that the ALOE may derive from a pervasive belief that good luck is a limited resource. In Experiment 1, we show that the ALOE is due to people seeing a good alternative outcome as a bad sign regarding their outcome, relative to seeing a neutral alternative, but find no evidence for seeing a bad alternative outcome as a good sign. Experiment 2 confirms that the ALOE replicates across tasks, and that the ALOE cannot be explained by preconceptions regarding outcome distribution, including: 1) the Limited Good Hypothesis (zero-sum bias), according to which people see the world as a zero-sum game, and assume that resources there means fewer resources here, and/or 2) a more specific assumption that laboratory tasks are programmed as zero-sum games. To neutralize these potential beliefs, participants had to draw actual colored beads from two real, distinct bags. The results of Experiment 3 were consistent with a prediction of the Limited Luck Hypothesis: by eliminating the value of the outcomes we eliminated the ALOE. Taken together, our results show that either the limited good belief is so robust that it defies strong situational evidence, or that individuals perceive good luck itself as a limited resource. Such a limited-luck belief might have important consequences in decision making and negotiations.

The representativeness heuristic (RH) has been proposed to be at the root of several types of biases in judgment. In this project, we ask whether the RH is relevant in two kinds of choices in the context of gambling. Specifically, in a field experiment with naturalistic stimuli and a potentially extremely high monetary pay-out, we give each of our subjects a choice between a lottery ticket with a random-looking number sequence and a ticket with a patterned sequence; we subsequently offer them a small cash bonus if they switch to the other ticket. In the second task, we investigate the gambler’s fallacy, asking subjects what they believe the outcome of a fourth coin toss after a sequence of three identical outcomes will be. We find that most subjects prefer “random” sequences, and that approximately half believe in dependence between subsequent coin tosses. There is no correlation, though, between the initial choice of the lottery ticket and the prediction of the coin toss. Nonetheless, subjects who have a strong preference for certain number combinations (i.e., subjects who are willing to forgo the cash bonus and remain with their initial choice) also tend to predict a specific outcome (in particular a reversal, corresponding to the gambler’s fallacy) in the coin task.

Science often advances through disagreement among scientists and the studies they produce. For members of the public, however, conflicting results from scientific studies may trigger a sense of uncertainty that in turn leads to a feeling that nothing new has been learned from those studies. In several scenario studies, participants read about pairs of highly similar scientific studies with results that either agreed or disagreed, and were asked, “When we take the results of these two studies together, do we now know more, less, or the same as we did before about (the study topic)?” We find that over half of participants do not feel that “we know more” as the result of the two new studies when the second study fails to replicate the first. When the two study results strongly conflict (e.g., one finds a positive and the other a negative association between two variables), a non-trivial proportion of participants actually say that “we know less” than we did before. Such a sentiment arguably violates normative principles of statistical and scientific inference positing that new study findings can never reduce our level of knowledge (and that only completely uninformative studies can leave our level of knowledge unchanged). Drawing attention to possible moderating variables, or to sample size considerations, did not influence people’s perceptions of knowledge advancement. Scientist members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, when presented with the same scenarios, were less inclined to say that nothing new is learned from conflicting study results.

The endowment effect is a well-documented decision phenomenon, referring to a tendency that people price a commodity higher when selling it than when buying it. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a sort of inertia, an unwillingness to make a change, or in other words an attachment to the status-quo. People with autism dislike social interaction, and are thus probably less willing to buy and sell items and more attached to the status quo. Previous research revealed that T-carriers of a single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) of the dopamine beta-hydroxylase (DBH) gene, rs1611115 (C-1021T), are associated with autism and difficulty in social interaction. Therefore, rs1611115 may modulate the endowment effect. In the current study, the subjects sold and bought lotteries with various probabilities of winning money and provided saliva for genotyping. We found that T-carriers (people of CT genotype in this study) exhibited greater endowment effects compared to people of CC genotype. We discuss another two possible explanations of our results: empathy and loss aversion. This is the first attempt to research the endowment effect from the perspective of genes. The result indicates that an SNP of genes (an innate factor) can exert an observable effect on human market activities.

Increasingly, we can invest in projects that are distributed around the world through online investment platforms. Will the spatial distance between these projects and ourselves affect our investment preferences? The present research aims to experimentally examine the impact of spatial distance on intertemporal preferences for investment returns and to explore the underlying mediating effect of the sense of control. Three studies were devised to address this topic. Studies 1 and 2 used two methods to manipulate the spatial distance between the location of investment projects and the location of investors. Participants were more impatient with investment returns when the investment project was located farther away. In other words, they preferred lower but earlier returns in intertemporal choice. Moreover, participants’ sense of control over the investment project mediated the relationship between spatial distance and intertemporal preferences. Using a priming method, Study 3 showed that participants’ impatience for investment returns in investments with different spatial distances could be remedied by giving them generalized control. Theoretical implications for studies regarding psychological distance and intertemporal decision making and practical implications for investments are discussed.

Executing an important decision can be as easy as moving a mouse cursor or reaching towards the preferred option with a hand. But would we decide differently if choosing required walking a few steps towards an option? More generally, is our preference invariant to the means and motor costs of reporting it? Previous research demonstrated that asymmetric motor costs can nudge the decision-maker towards a less costly option. However, virtually all traditional decision-making theories predict that increasing motor costs symmetrically for all options should not affect choice in any way. This prediction is disputed by the theory of embodied cognition, which suggests that motor behavior is an integral part of cognitive processes, and that motor costs can affect our choices. In this registered report, we investigated whether varying motor costs can affect response dynamics and the final choices in an intertemporal choice task: choosing between a readily available small reward and a larger but delayed reward. Our study compared choices reported by moving a computer mouse cursor towards the preferred option with the choices executed via a more motor costly walking procedure. First, we investigated whether relative values of the intertemporal choice options affect walking trajectories in the same way as they affect mouse cursor dynamics. Second, we tested a hypothesis that, in the walking condition, increased motor costs of a preference reversal would decrease the number of changes-of-mind and therefore increase the proportion of impulsive, smaller-but-sooner choices. We confirmed the hypothesis that walking trajectories reflect covert dynamics of decision making, and rejected the hypothesis that increased motor costs of responding affect decisions in an intertemporal choice task. Overall, this study contributes to the empirical basis enabling the decision-making theories to address the complex interplay between cognitive and motor processes.

Recent research suggests that communicating probabilities numerically rather than verbally benefits forecasters’ credibility. In two experiments, we tested the reproducibility of this communication-format effect. The effect was replicated under comparable conditions (low-probability, inaccurate forecasts), but it was reversed for low-probability accurate forecasts and eliminated for high-probability forecasts. Experiment 2 further showed that verbal probabilities convey implicit recommendations more clearly than probability information, whereas numeric probabilities do the opposite. Descriptively, the findings indicate that the effect of probability words versus numbers on credibility depends on how these formats convey directionality differently, how directionality implies recommendations even when none are explicitly given, and how such recommendations correspond with outcomes. Prescriptively, we propose that experts distinguish forecasts from advice, using numeric probabilities for the former and well-reasoned arguments for the latter.

While previous studies reveal mixed findings on the relationship between analytic cognitive style (ACS) and right-wing (conservative) political orientation, the correlation is generally negative. However, most of these studies are based on Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and it is not clear whether this relationship is a cross-culturally stable phenomenon. In order to test cross-cultural generalizability of this finding, we re-analyzed the data collected by the Many Labs 2 Project from 30 politically diverse societies (N = 7,263). Social conservatism is measured with the binding foundations scale, comprising of loyalty (patriotism), authority (respect for traditions), and sanctity (respect for the sacred), as proposed by the moral foundations theory, while ACS is measured by the three-item modified cognitive reflection task. The level of WEIRDness of each country was calculated by scoring how much a culture is Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic. Although social conservatism is negatively associated with ACS in the aggregate, analysis indicates that the relationship is significantly stronger among WEIRD and remains negligible among non-WEIRD cultures. These findings show the cross-cultural variability of this relationship and emphasize the limitations of studying only WEIRD cultures.

Assessing how managers discount and evaluate risks is crucial in designing effective managerial policies. In this work, we examine whether risk preferences (RP; both in the domains of gain and loss) and time preferences (TP) are related to managers’ cognitive reflection (CR). To achieve this, the current study focuses on the responses of 601 corporate decision-makers, such as CEO and CFO, of 200 non-financial firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange. Using the three-item of Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) as a measure of CR, we observe that males perform better on this test than females. Correlation analysis reveals that individuals’ RP in the gain domain are positively associated with their TP, implying that risk-taking individuals are more patient. Our evidence further shows that higher CR is associated with a higher likelihood of increased patience and a lower likelihood of willingness to take risks in the domain of loss. Greater CR is also linked to a higher likelihood of risk-taking in the domain of gain. These findings have important implications regarding the ability of managers to make financial decisions that involve uncertainty and delayed rewards but maximize firm value.

When deciding for others based on explicitly described odds and outcomes, people often have different risk preferences for others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we examine risk preference for others where people learn about the odds and outcomes by experiencing them through sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse for others than for themselves, but only when the risky option had a higher expected value. Furthermore, based on a separate set of choices, we classified people as pro- or anti-social. Only those people classified as anti-social were more risk averse for others, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. When the uncertainty was removed, however, all participants exhibited less anti-social behavior. Together, these results suggest that anti-social motives contribute to the observed limited risk taking for others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of these motives.

Anchoring has been shown to influence numeric judgments in various domains, including preferential judgment tasks. Whereas many studies and a recent Many Labs project have shown robust effects in classic anchoring tasks, studies of anchoring effects on preferential judgments have had inconsistent results. In this paper, we investigate the replicability and robustness of anchoring on willingness-to-pay, which is a widely used measure for consumer preference. We employ a combination of approaches, aggregating data from previous studies and also contributing additional replication studies designed to reconcile inconsistent previous results. We examine the effect of differing experimental procedures used in prior studies, and test whether publication bias could contribute to the inconsistent findings. We find that different experimental procedures used in previous studies do not explain the divergent results, and that anchoring effects are generally robust to differences in procedures, participant populations, and experimental settings.

Frederick, Levis, Malliaris & Meyer (2018) report a package of laboratory studies where participants underestimate the value of “hedges”: Risky bets which cancel out the risk of another presently-held bet. However, it might be questioned to what extent laboratory findings predict field behavior. People might better understand hedges when more money is at stake, or when they have more time to reflect. We discuss three gamblers who, instead of hedging, used a costly “cash-out” option to eliminate the risk of their bets on Leicester FC’s improbable victory in the 2015/2016 English Premier League soccer season. The decision to cash-out rather than to hedge led to individual losses of up to £8,000, and did not seem plausibly explained by rational economic factors. High-stakes hedges are misunderstood too.

The notorious bat-and-ball problem has long been used to demonstrate that people are easily biased by their intuitions. In this paper we test the robustness of biased responding by examining how it is affected by repeated problem presentation. Participants solved 50 standard and control versions of the bat-and-ball problem. To examine the nature of a potential learning effect we adopted a two-response paradigm in which participants have to give a first hunch and can afterwards take the time to deliberate and change their answer. Results showed that both people’s first hunches and the responses they gave after deliberation predominantly remained biased from start to finish. But in the rare cases in which participants did learn to correct themselves, they immediately managed to apply the solution strategy and gave a correct hunch on the subsequent problems. We discuss critical methodological and theoretical implications.

Students may need to decide whether to invest limited resources evenly across all courses and thus end with moderate grades in all, or focus on some of the courses and thus end with variable grades. This study examined which pattern of grades is perceived more favorably. When judging competency, people give more weight to positive than negative information, in which case heterogeneous grades would be perceived more favorably as they have more positive grades than homogeneous moderate grades. Furthermore, high school students are told to demonstrate their passion in college applications. Nonetheless, people generally overweigh negative information, which can result in a preference for a student with homogeneous grades lacking extremely negative grades. The college admissions decisions in particular may also involve emphasis on long-term stable, consistent, and responsible character, which the homogeneous grades may imply. Study 1 found that laypeople, undergraduate students, and admissions officers preferred to admit a student with homogeneous grades to a college than a student with heterogeneous grades even when their GPAs were the same. Study 2 used a heterogeneous transcript signaling a stereotypic STEM or humanities student, and found that while undergraduate students were more split in their choices, laypeople and admissions officers still preferred a student with homogeneous grades. Study 3 further replicated the preference for a student with homogeneous grades by using higher or lower average GPAs and wider or narrower range of grades for the heterogeneous grades. Possible reasons and limitations of the studies are discussed.