¹ One Sino-Thai owner-manager of a large textile factory employing over 850 workers observed to me in June 1983 that over eighty per cent of business in Thailand was Chinese owned and that a knowledge of Chinese language was necessary in order to communicate with other Sino-Thai businessmen. He himself was fluent in Taechew as well as in Thai and English.

² Hantrakul, Sukanya, “Women in Thailand”, Far Eastern Economic Review 31 (5 Jan. 1984): 39Google Scholar. For other views, not always in agreement, see also Setboonsarng, Sunantar, “Women's Rights and Petticoat Power: Traditions Die So Hard”, Business in Thailand, 12 Aug. 1981, pp. 78–82Google Scholar; and “Executive World: Sex Makes No Difference”, Business in Thailand, 14 February 1983, pp. 84–88. Although females in Thailand have more status relative to males than in other Asian countries, centers of power are largely dominated by Thai males. Status determinants by sex and ethnic background are examined by Deyo, F. C., “Ethnicity and Work Culture in Thailand: A Comparison of Thai and Thai-Chinese White Collar Workers”, Journal of Asian Studies 34 (August 1975): 1011–1018.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Prasartset, Suthy, The Nature of Thai Business and the Implications for U.S. Business (Mimeo.: Unpublished Report for Agency for International Development, Bangkok, 11 June 1981), pp. 4–33.Google Scholar

⁴ Mabry, Bevars, The Development of Labor Institutions in Thailand (Ithaca: Data Paper Number 112, Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, 1979)Google Scholar; see Chapter Two, “Thai Labour History”. Strikes in 1972 numbered only 32 in the Kingdom. This number increased enormously to 501 in 1973. Even though the number of strikes declined until 1976 (358 in 1974; 241 in 1975 and 133 in 1976), their severity increased as the average man-days lost from strikes lengthened (585 man-days lost in 1972; 593 in 1973; 1418 in 1974; 3000 in 1975; 3726 in 1976).

⁵ Mabry, Bevars and Srisermbhok, Kundhol, “Labour Relations Under Martial Law: The Thailand Experience”, Asian Survey 25 (June 1985): 613–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Grievance strikes of a spontaneous nature still occurred, but registered labour unions rarely sponsored strikes in the 1977–81 period. The frequency of strikes and their duration returned to pre-1973 levels during this period (p. 623).

⁶ Ibid., p. 623. Because the Labour Dispute Settlement statute has been revised in 1981 to make it more efficient in mediating or arbitrating collective bargaining disputes and because in 1981 a Labour Court was established to supplement the Labour Relations Council in hearing grievance disputes, strikes are less numerous even as the labour movement has continued to expand. A recession in the 1981–83 period and a fear of a return to martial law also have mitigated the frequency of disputes (pp. 628–32).

⁷ Ibid., p. 626.

⁸ Ibid., p. 624. Most unions in the private sector are minority unions in the establishments of their members. Union members in the private sector numbered only about 100,000 in 1984. However, leaders of public sector unions, which numbered 93 unions with about 150,000 members in February 1985, have relatively much greater power through government tolerance of union membership of public employees and through their ability to control the provision of vital public utility services.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 633–34.

¹⁰ Frank Lombard, “The Thai Worker on the Move”, Bangkok Post, Supplement, Friday, 31 August 1973, p. 7.

¹¹ In an interview Mr Surasak Nananukul, Executive Vice-President in charge of Planning of Bangkok Bank, on 15 June 1983, noted that at one time foreign university degrees carried a salary and positional premium over Thai degrees. Except for a few world class universities such as Harvard, Yale, Cambridge or Oxford, this is no longer true in the Bangkok Bank and in many other progressive Thai establishments. See also, “The Making of Thai Managers and Technocrats”, Business Review, October 1980, pp. 793–95.

¹² According to Mr Nananukul, this is a vestige of Chinese-style management among the modern professional style of Thai management, which he characterizes as a blend of Western, Japanese, and Chinese influences. For a discussion of this blend, see Meeker-Buppha, Leslie, “The Human Factor”, ASEAN Investor (May 1982):11–15.Google Scholar

¹³ A study of 35 Japanese and 17 Western manufacturing companies operating in Thailand revealed much more extensive expatriate managerial staffing in Japanese firms than among American or European firms, which implies that opportunities for upward mobility of Thai managers is relatively less among Japanese affiliated firms. Yoshihara, Hideki, “The Japanese Multi-national”, Long Range Planning, April 1977, pp. 41–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The lack of opportunity of native Thais to move into management positions in Japanese-owned firms has been cited as one of the primary reasons for the enactment of the Alien Business and Occupations Act of 1973. See “Focus on Thailand, 1973”, Far Eastern Economic Review, Supplement 19 (14 May 1973): 29–31.Google Scholar

¹⁴ For a discussion of the role of status in different contexts of Thai society see (i) for village society, Phillips, Herbert P., Thai Peasant Personality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965)Google Scholar, Ch. 2, and Potter, J. M., Thai Peasant Social Structure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)Google Scholar; (ii) in terms of occupational roles and in religion, Bunnag, Jane, “Loose Structure: Fact or Fancy? Thai Society Reexamined”, in Journal of the Siam Society 59 (January 1971): 1–21Google Scholar; (iii) in politics, see Wilson, D.A., Politics in Thailand (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962)Google Scholar; (iv) in the factory, see Koji Taira, “Work Force Management and Labour Markets in Thai Industry”, paper presented at the Midwest Japan Seminar, University of Kansas, Lawrence, 27 November 1975, pp. 8–11. For a historical perspective on the development of the formal sakdina status rankings, see Rabibhadana, Akin, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782–1873 (Ithaca: Data Paper No. 74, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1969).Google Scholar

¹⁵ This nested pattern of overlapping patron-client relationships has been described as a network of hierarchical linkages by Van Roy, Edward, “An Interpretation of Northern Thai Peasant Economy”, Journal of Asian Studies 25, No. 31 (1967): 421–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also, see Taira, ibid., pp. 8–11.

¹⁶ Dr Sathit Uthaisri, Secretary of the Merchant Banking Group of Bangkok Bank, explained that Thai line executives are also very status conscious. Equals, whether line or staff, are competitive and don't cooperate or share information. Communication is vertical; if an executive wishes information, he must request it from the equal's superior. If one equal is promoted from within the job ladder, this creates jealousy and morale problems. Hence, promotions tend to occur outside the job ladder, and if the promoted executive is later reassigned to a higher position in the original hierarchy, this is accepted by the former peers. If equals are not in the same job ladder, two-way communication does occur and information is shared. Hence, staff executives will communicate with equal line executives whereas they would not with equal staff competitors. Interview, 15 June 1983.

¹⁷ Numerous informed observers of Thai labour relations' practices reported to the author in 1983 that the emphasis on hiring attorneys as Personnel Managers occurred among firms ideologically opposed to unions who wished to use instruments of law to combat the organizational efforts and influence of unions in their establishments. The director of Asian-American Free Labour Institute, John K. Sloan, reported in Bangkok on 13 June 1983 that he believed not more than one-third of large companies can ideologically deal bilaterally with organized representatives of employees. However, another view recognizes that the growing complexities of Thai labour law also require the attention of a staff manager with expertise in legal matters. The importance of labour law violations is reinforced by the criminal nature of such violations in the face of a valid labour agency directive.

¹⁸ Given the history of the reluctance of Thai administrators to participate in surveys, a response from the officers of forty companies to a questionnaire of this size must be considered quite unusual. Undoubtedly, the cooperation of the Thai Management Association in soliciting the responses was a critical factor.

¹⁹ The output resulted in a computer print-out of almost 500 pages. Obviously, from this rich source of data there are many avenues of statistical analysis yet to be explored and hence this report represents an initial analysis. Yet, the data even at this stage reveal a great deal about the practice of human resource management in Thailand.

²⁰ Employer-employee relationships in Japanese affiliated firms have been much less successful in Thailand than in Japan. In April 1983, a worker led demonstration before the Japanese Embassy sought Japanese government intervention to make Japanese employers more humane. Japanese firms have been found to have higher separation rates than Western firms, but still lower than those in Thai firms. (Chirayu Isarangkun and Koji Taira, “Labor Markets and Work Force Management in Thailand”, Industrial Relations Research Association Proceedings, Twenty-eight Annual Meeting, 1975, p. 21.) Because of cultural differences, another study has found that the Japanese management style has had to undergo major revisions in its application to affiliated firms in Southeast Asia. (See Shinʼichi Ichimura, “Japanese Firms in Asia”, Japanese Economic Studies, Fall 1981, pp. 31–52.) A discussion of the applicability of the Japanese management style to the Thailand setting is given in “The Art of Japanese Management”, in Thai Management Association 20th Anniversary Commemorative Edition, 1984 (Bangkok, 1985), pp. 49–64.Google Scholar

²¹ Of the 24 forms reporting the size of their personnel departments, the distribution by size of the firms is as follows:

²² This contrasts with the results of a November 1974 Thai-American Chamber of Commerce survey which revealed that forty per cent of the surveyed larger companies in Thailand did not employ a personnel officer. Both the 1974 and this questionnaire (1983) were completed by company officers.

²³ Mr Surasak Nanamukul of the Bangkok Bank, the nation's private largest employer, explained the reasons for his organization's departure from this referral practice. At one time, even to obtain an employment application, a job seeker at the bank had to have a family connection. The premise underlying this type of recruitment was based on the belief that family and friends also employed by the Bank would aid in the control of the employee's performance. This did not prove to be the case. Interview, 15 June 1983.

²⁴ At the Bangkok Bank, Thai executives are promoted from within on the basis of merit. All are university graduates. In recent years with the tremendous growth and expansion of the Bank, which in 1983 employed 18,000, some executives were brought in from other organizations where they had “proven” themselves. At lower level positions, seniority continues to be a prime consideration in promotion. Interview, 15 June 1983.

²⁵ In the early 1970's Thailand had become disillusioned with its vocational schools because of their high cost, insufficient number of graduates, and misdirection of training to meet the needs of industry. [See “Technicians for Thai Industry”, Investor 3 (March 1971): 201.] In December 1974, a national committee for education reform recommended that vocational schools be abolished and their curriculum be integrated into the general secondary curriculum. These programs have since been strengthened and liaison with industry is closer.

²⁶ There are pros and cons to supervisory training. One study reported that companies with extensive training programs may experience high turnover of staff as other companies pirate trained supervisors. See Ma, Teresa, “Make Up Your Mind, Decision Maker”, Business in Thailand 12 (March 1981): 17–20.Google Scholar

²⁷ There are many opportunities to attend management development seminars in Thailand. The Thailand Management Association conducts numerous seminars each month (146 in 1983), many of which are taught by leading management scholars and practitioners brought in from internationally known Graduate Schools of Business. Universities in Thailand frequently sponsor special seminars on management topics, and outstanding Thai professors in Industrial Psychology, Industrial Relations, and in other disciplines in business serve as consultants to offer and develop in-house seminars. The International Labour Organization in conjunction with the Department of Labour also offers numerous supervisory training programs. All these offerings are well attended and are typically oversubscribed.

²⁸ Koji Taira, “Work Force Management and Labour Markets in Thai Industry”, Paper presented at the Midwest Japan Seminar, University of Kansas, November 1975 (Urbana: University of Illinois, Center for Asian Studies, 1975), pp. 9–11. “Educated people do good work and good work is what educated people do.” This attitude was reflected by the Sino-Thai manager of a textile factory employing over 800 workers, mostly female. “Thai workers are not good employees unless they have seven or eight years of schooling; they are not disciplined for factory work with less education than this.” This factory stationed guards at exits to prevent employees from slipping out to evade work. Interview, 20 June 1983.

²⁹ A 1975 study of 77 Greater Bangkok employers conducted by the Bank of Thailand, revealed that 36.3 per cent of their 37,483 employees were receiving less than the existing twenty-five baht per day minimum wage. “Effects of New Minimum Wage”, Investor 7 (September 1975): 41. This percentage applied to both small and large firms with about equal weight.

³⁰ The private sector pays higher compensation than does government service. At lower occupational levels, the ratio of private to public sector compensation is about two to one, and at higher professional or administrative levels, the ratio is four or five to one. In the public sector in 1975, the ratio of highest salary levels to lowest was 15.9 to 1; in the private sector, the ratio was 70 to 1. McCusker found that those who transferred from government service into the private sector between 1962–69 increased their salaries by an average of 2.8 times. McCusker, H.F., The Role of Incentives in Human Resource Development: A Case Study of the Civil Service in Thailand (Palo Alto: Stanford University, School of Education, Ph.D. Thesis, 1973), p. 37.Google Scholar

³¹ The Bangkok Bank pays a standard wage by job class to employees located both in Bangkok and in the provinces, although employees in branches away from their homes also get “hardship” pay. By Thai standards, the base wage of the Bank is not itself unusually high for the banking industry, but the Bank gives twice yearly bonuses, which amount to at least four months pay each period. Hence, annual earnings are higher as a result. Also, the salary is net of taxes since the Bank pays income taxes for its employees. Interview, 15 June 1983.

³² Leave time in the Civil Service is more generous than in the private sector including an annual two-week paid vacation, a one-time 120 day leave to men to serve as a novitiate in the Buddhist priesthood, maternity leave for females, and up to 120 days per year for study abroad which may be borrowed against for extended educational programs, plus 13 paid official holidays. McCusker also notes that Thais appear to take a great deal of informal leave time to attend to their personal affairs, but much of this is accommodated by a 45-day personal leave allowance. See op. cit., pp. 67–68. This practice of informal leave taking also occurs among state enterprise employees “who may leave work early or arrive late, miss days of work with notice, as long as they do complete their assigned duties”. Interview, Dr Savaraj Sachchamarga, Managing Director, Public Warehouse Organization, 9 June 1983.

³³ Mark Blaug found in a 1971 survey that fringe benefits constituted thirty-five per cent of the average salary of college graduates. The Rate of Return to Investment in Education in Thailand (Bangkok: National Education Council, 1971), pp. 11–24Google Scholar. A survey in 1975 found that for all employees, fringes accounted for nineteen per cent of salaries. Business International Survey of Local Compensation Policies and Practices: Thailand 1975 (Hong Kong, 1975), pp. 144–45Google Scholar. Although our 1983 survey did not seek to determine the magnitude of such benefits, there appears to have been continued growth in the size, scope, and variety of fringes.

³⁴ The concern of Thai managers with the need to control costs through greater productivity is discussed in “Managing Human Resources”, Investor 11 (June 1979): 29–31.

³⁵ Op.cit., pp. 3–7.

³⁶ An interesting example of the Thai aversion to confrontations was revealed in the Bangkok Bank merit evaluation policy. This is particularly interesting because the Bank is acknowledged by the Thai Management Association to be one of the most professionally managed firms in the nation. (Interview, Dr Somboon Srisupandit, 21 June 1983.) Bank employees are evaluated each year on their work performance to determine the amount of the annual progression pay increase which they merit. However, the rating supervisor, because of the Thai aversion to potentially unpleasant interpersonal interactions, does not review his evaluation with the concerned employee. Although the employee becomes aware of the tone of the evaluation from the size of the increase, he or she of course does not receive feedback on the substance of the evaluation, which in turn does little to identify areas for performance improvement. Interview, 15 June 1983.

³⁷ Management — Thai Style”, Business Review, August 1979, pp. 666–68.

³⁸ Interview, 15 June 1983. Thais regard too many rules to be an intrusion and to be inhumane. Although rules do exist in factories as well as in financial institutions, they tend not to be well defined, but rather casual and informal. Employees in Thai establishments adhere to an accepted, informal code of conduct established by the model of behaviour exhibited by management (leadership by example): not because of fear of punishment but because it is the “right” (moral) behaviour expected of them.

³⁹ This finding is in keeping with McCusker's observation of the Thai civil servant's propensity to attend to personal affairs by the frequent use of informal leave. (See note 21 above.) Even though private businesses cannot operate with the same degree of flexibility in employee work hours as does the Civil Service or State enterprise, nevertheless Thai establishments do appear to accommodate this trait in the Thai worker personality.

⁴⁰ For a discussion of recent events, see B. Mabry and K. Srisermbhok, op. cit., pp. 613–37.

⁴¹ In a survey such as this, one danger is that respondents will reflect what they hope will come to pass rather than what the evidence, objectively considered, rationally concludes. Although many Thai managers acknowledge that unions have forced management to focus on human relations administration and have accelerated the professionalization of management, the dominant sentiment among Thai managers is one of strong opposition to the growth and spread of trade unionism, i.e. a conflict-containment pattern in labourmanagement relationships.

⁴² Dr Somboon Srisupandit of the Thai Management Association has interpreted the weakness of the union movement as a consequence of a “divide and conquer” strategy of the government which has split the leadership of the movement into rival factions. Of the four major Thai labour federations, the leadership of the largest — the Labour Council of Thailand — is reported to be under the influence of the Internal Securities Operations Command, and a second — the National Free Labour Union Congress — is reported to be sponsored by ISOC. See Mabry and Krisermbhok, op. cit., pp. 620–28. In recent years some factions have attempted to politicize the labour movement while others wish to retain the “bread and butter orientation that is characteristic of American unions. Dr Srisupandit believes the viability of the movement, given the Thai political environment, requires that it stick to “bread and butter” economic issues. Interview, 21 June 1983. Thai government leadership, having economic development as a primary national goal, has been decidedly probusiness while tolerating a weak union movement to voice the legitimate concerns of the urban labour force. However, incumbent political leaders historically have not tolerated a politically active labour movement. See Mabry, op. cit., 1979, Chapter 2. Another view is that the government seeks a viable labour movement as a countervailing power instrument to the centralized control of commerce, finance and industry by a few, interlocked Sino-Thai families. See Peter Fish, “Children, the Key to Thai Integration”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 June 1978, p. 23. In 1982, Dean Kirkhiat Phipatseritham, of the Faculty of Economics of Thammasat University, has detailed the inter-locking relationships of a few Chinese families that have concentrated an enormous degree of control of Thai finance and industry. The 1979 Commercial Banking Act sought to break up this control of the financial sector by requiring that over fifty per cent of bank ownership must be distributed over at least 250 shareholders. Family owners of two of the largest banks were reported to be in non-compliance in December 1984. See Paisal Srichatatchanya, “Thai Bhat on a Managed Float”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 December 1984, p. 62.